基于我国建筑市场政府寻租的分析

1．我国建筑市场制度性缺陷的表现一寻租活动 我国建筑市场的制度缺陷表现为寻租活动。按照寻租理论：①租金是政府干预的结果；②寻租活动造成社会资源的浪费，这种浪费主要包括两个部分：一部分是由于政府限制造成的直接福利损失，另一部分是额外的寻租过程中的资源损失；③利益集团对建立租金的需求，租金的好处使利益集团产生了对建立租金的     

风险的特征与租金的消散

寻租理论的进展为揭示寻租现象的本质提供了有意义的工具,但是,传统的寻租理论对寻租活动的成本与社会福利之间的关系问题的探讨还有待于进一步验证。从风险中性与风险厌恶条件下的租金消散程度的比较分析中,不仅更深入地考察了寻租活动对社会经济影响,而且,使得人们对寻租现象的看法更为客观,更加科学,对以寻租为特征的腐败预防具有一定积极的理论指导意义。     

政府寻租及寻租社会的改革

寻租理论一直是人们最关注的领域。它既与公共选择学派分不开，又与传统政治经济理论相区别。公共选择学派的观点和现实生活中政府的寻租行为使得人们对政府的作用及其越来越多的限制个人行为的偏好产生极不信任的态度。通过对政府寻租、寻租的社会变革以及寻租产生的根源的分析，可以发现，用制度创新来抑制寻租将会更加灵活和多样化，也更加有效。     

我国资本市场审计寻租涵义诠释

审计寻租作为我国资本市场中的非生产性的寻利活动,不仅会消耗社会资源,导致整个社会福利的损失,而且还会导致审计信息失真和审计失败。文章结合地租理论,深入探讨租金的涵义演变,揭示审计寻租的租金内涵。     

寻租问题的政治经济学研究综述

寻租理论是20世纪后半叶政治经济学最为关注的领域之一。寻租理论研究包括寻租的性质研究、寻租的成本研究、寻租原因和治理理论以及由此产生的公共选择学派和新制度学派的不同寻租理论体系研究。     

寻租社会成本的构成及其扩张——公共选择分析视角

寻租是利用资源通过政治过程获得特权从而构成对他人利益的损害大于租金获得者之收益的行为。寻租理论从一开始便沿着国际贸易纲领和公共选择纲领这两个独立的研究分支进行。寻租成本由三个部分构成:一是哈伯格三角形所代表的社会净损失,二是寻租消耗的实际资源所代表的额外社会成本,三是塔洛克四边形所代表的转移性社会成本。其中第二部分的额外社会成本又包括消耗的资源本身、该资源本可以生产的社会福利和该资源用于寻租所造成的社会损害三个方面;第三部分的转移性社会成本又包括竞争性租金耗散成本和低效率生产技术成本两个方面。寻租社会成本的扩张就是沿着第二和第三部分社会成本的几个方面进行的,其直接的诱因是租金耗散和采用低效率生产技术,而根本原因则涉及到寻租产生的根源。     

寻租危害及对策述评

本文从我国近年国家工作人员贪污腐败加剧,尤其是高官频频落马的现象,在社会政治经济生活中频繁的寻租活动已不容忽视。它已经使政府部门的相关运作、政府诚信和社会经济生活的正常秩序出现了部分的溃烂。它渗透于社会的政治经济生活中并寻找着各种制度政策的缝隙和漏洞,认真讨论、研究寻租问题是当务之急,具有很大的现实意义。接下来从寻租理论及其演进过程开始论述,界定何为寻租活动。并分析了寻租活动的成因及其危害。针对寻租活动产生的原因,提出应对之策,着重制度建设和道德感、政治责任感树立,二者相辅相成。对于寻租活动的治理是一个长期而复杂的系统工程,需要全社会齐心协力。一个良好的政治、经济环境才是国家繁荣发展的保证。     

对我国寻租问题的探讨

所谓“寻租”（ren-seeking）,是指人们凭借政府保护进行的寻求财富转移而造成的浪费资源的活动。人们在寻租过程中所做的使价值最大化的努力所产生的不是社会剩余而是资源浪费（布坎南）。换句话说,寻租是在分配领域中进行的非生产性活动。在现实社会中,寻租多以贪污、腐败、贿赂等形式出现。     

寻求垄断特权的寻租理论综述

一、寻租理论起源１．租、经济租与寻租“租”,也称“租金（Ｒｅｎｔ）”,其最初的经济含义是指为使用土地而付给土地所有者的报酬,即地租。土地作为一种生产活动的投入要素,由于其具有天然不可毁灭的肥力（Ｒｉｃｈａｒｄｏ,１８２１）,所以对土地使用需求往往大大...     

政府技术采购的权力寻租模型及规制措施

政府技术采购作为一项公共政策工具,能够极大地推动技术创新。基于经济人动机,政府技术采购领域不可避免地存在权力租金交易。借助委托-代理理论,构建了政府技术采购的权力寻租模型。权力寻租可能带来种种社会危害,如破坏社会的生产力水平、降低公众的福利水平、导致科研单位的X-低效率。为最大限度地降低政府技术采购领域中权力寻租的规模和概率,有必要明确政府管理部门的角色定位、建立租金的消散机制、实行高薪养廉与预防寻租相结合的机制、完善对权力寻租行为的监督机制和加大对租金交易的惩罚力度。     

Group competition for rents

This paper examines rent dissipation in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest without a predetermined distribution rule. the rent in this setting exhibits both public and private good characteristics depending on the stage of the contest. Focusing on the relationship between group size and aggregate rent seeking we find that social waste depends not only on total numbers but also on the distribution of population across groups. We show that group size asymmetry acts to reduce rent dissipation.     

RENT DISSIPATION AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE POLICY

This paper uses a general equilibrium-based exchange economy model to examine rent seeking for a price policy. Opposing interests spend resources to influence the government's choice of a price vector. Rents, the willingness to pay for the policy, are determined endogenously from the Nash equilibirum of a non-cooperative game. Numerical simulations explore the degree to which rents are dissipated by wasteful rent seeking. It is found that dissipation, measured as the ratio of rent-seeking costs to rents garnered, can grow without limit, and is greatest when opponents are evenly matched. Dissipation is smallest with widely disparate groups, a result that might help explain the underdissipation that seems to occur in many industries.     

国有企业外部人控制：—个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化。解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。     

寻租、权力腐败与社会福利——基于公共品供给的视角

激励与监督机制缺失是委托代理问题产生的根源所在,由此不但容易模糊政府之间的权力边界,造成上下级政府间垂直监督的缺位,而且也会对民主监督功能的发挥产生抑制,从而诱发政府官员的权力腐败以及社会福利的损失.基于这一逻辑关系,文章在引入寻租因素后,建立了一个完整的分析框架,从公共品供给视角讨论了委托代理、政府寻租与社会福利三者之间的关系,借此对我国政治体制改革中官员权力腐败的成因、过程及其对经济发展的影响做出了系统的解释.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

Development and inefficient regulation under the threat of revolution

This paper considers a model of strategic interaction between a rent-seeking elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, whose ability to revolt constrains the elite’s choice of economic institutions. The disenfranchised are imperfectly informed about the economy’s productive capacity, an asymmetry which the elite may exploit to implement distortionary economic regulations to create rent in excess of that which can be generated in a relatively more efficient manner. Our main result is that, the manner in which the elite will extract rent depends on the economy’s level of development. We demonstrate that below a threshold development level the elite choose relatively inefficient regulation and above the threshold development level the elite choose relatively efficient taxation.     

Political incentives for rent creation

Rent-seeking is often depicted as a contest in which rent-seekers compete for a prize—the rent. In the process of rent-seeking, much or perhaps all of the rent is dissipated through the costs the contestants incur to compete. Rent dissipation is inconsistent with the incentives of both the rent-seekers and those who create the rents. Policymakers have an incentive to create rents only if they gain from the process, and their gain comes from sharing any surplus that goes to those who obtain the rents. A surplus can be created through a barrier to entry into rent-seeking. When institutions that generate barriers to entry into rent-seeking break down, rent-seeking competitions can occur in which all rents are dissipated, but this should be a special case rather than the general rule in rent-seeking.     

A Rent-Seeking Experiment for the Classroom

Abstract: Recent research has demonstrated that active learning techniques improve student comprehension and retention of abstract economic ideas such as rent seeking. Instructors can reinforce the concept of rent seeking with a classroom game, particularly one involving real money. The authors improve upon a game first introduced by Goeree and Holt (1999) and later expanded upon by Bischoff and Hofmann (2002). The authors present a version of the game in which students participate in an all-pay auction, risking their own money, and discover first hand the potential inefficiencies of rent seeking. The authors suggest extensions of the rent-seeking game, including discussions of social welfare effects, equity, campaign finance reform, tax simplification, and congressional reforms designed to limit the influence of rent seeking in the economy.     

写字楼租金差异的特征价格分析——基于杭州的实证研究

写字楼作为商业地产的重要组成,已成为当前投资开发的热点,写字楼租金的研究也越来越具有实践意义。本文在文献回顾的基础上,采用特征价格方法,对我国浙江省杭州市写字楼市场进行实证研究。研究结果表明,距市中心距离/次级市场、建筑年龄、建筑形象等因素对写字楼租金具有显著影响,但影响机理异于国外的经验研究;建筑面积、楼层数等变量的影响不显著,这也异于已有的经验研究。后续研究可从研究对象、研究样本、变量选取与度量等方面深入改进。     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72