我国保险代理人制度现状分析

利益矛盾和信息不对称导致了保险代理人制度种种的问题。保险人与保险代理人之间是一种松散的经济利益关系,委托人无法实现对代理人合理有效的激励和约束。发展保险经纪人,公估人参与保险中介市场,弥补保险中介资源配置结构上的失衡,提升代理人职业的社会价值。这样才能减少纠纷,规范保险代理制度。     

大型能源项目保险关键要选好用好保险中介

成熟的保险市场应具有保险人、保险中介人、被保险人三个要素。在一个完善的保险市场中，应该同时存在一个健全的保险中介市场。保险中介市场对于处于信息不对称弱势的被保险人来讲尤其关键。大型能源项目的建安险、营运保险等保险标的动辄数十亿美元，风险相对集中且巨大，投保时保险费率的微小变动便会导致数十万甚至上百万美元保费的绝对差异；     

从博弈论看保险市场信息不对称的本质及规范举措

博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业，保险人与被保险人之间存在着严重的信息不对称，特别是被保险人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险人的违规操作等现象普遍存在，长期困扰着保险界。     

信息不对称与保险监管制度建设

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,信息不对称对保险市场健康发展带来许多消极影响.本文从保险人与投保人两个层面分析了保险市场信息不对称的表现形式、成因及其危害,信息不对称与保险监管的内在联系,并从保险监管制度建设角度提出治理信息不对称的政策建议.     

博弈论视角下公估人的理性选择及外部约束

保险公估人是保险业发展不可缺少的重要组成部分,但“公估不公”始终是公估行业发展中的一个难题。作为一种典型的承揽关系,保险人与公估人之间存在着信息不对称,以及由此带来的道德风险。本文从博弈论的角度,构建公估人和保险人之间的策略型博弈,通过求解纳什均衡发现,公估人的理性选择并不总是诚实公正。因此,只有加强外部约束,才能实现...     

保险中介机构违规经营现象及对策分析

保险市场中介既包括活动于保险人与投保人之间,充当保险供需双方的媒介,把保险人和投保人联系起来并建立保险合同关系的保险代理和保险经纪人也包括独立于保险人与投保人之外,     

中国车损险市场不对称信息存在性的实证分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

道德风险和逆选择问题与保险发展总是相伴而生的,这个问题在我国似乎更加严重,但是,真实情况究竟如何呢?本文使用两种参数估计的方法,去检验保险保障选择的全面性与损失频率之间的正相关关系,以此寻找中国机动车车损险市场是否存在保险人与被保险人之间信息不对称的证据。我们对损失频率的概念作了不同的定义,通过对不同模型实证结果的对比发现:车险市场的确存在信息不对称情况,但是,我们的数据并不支持在高额赔付部分有不对称信息的问题。     

论构建中国保险信用评级制度的微观基础

当前，我国保险市场出现了较严重的市场失灵；一方面某些保险人及其行为代理人违背诚信原则，引起了公众的信任危机，抑制了保险市场的进一步拓展；另一方面保险人之间的无序竞争，恶性竞争态势牺牲了保险市场的经营效率。这在很大程度上是由于我国保险市场交易主体之间的严重的信息不对称分布格局所致。本文从信息不对称角度出发，提供了一个矫正我国保险市场信息不对称状态的制度安排-保险信用评级制度的微观理论框架。     

保险说明义务程序化蜕变后的保险消费者保护

保险说明义务面临被法院滥用的困局,凸显出此制度程序化蜕变的既定事实与保险消费者保护目标之间的冲突。其根源在于,单个先合同阶段义务的制度供给与全方位消除保险消费者信息劣势的现实需求之间的矛盾。应借鉴德国关于先合同阶段义务群的立法经验,构筑以保险人和保险中介的建议义务、信息提供义务为主的先合同阶段义务群机制,以缓冲说明义务制度的适用压力,实现保护保险消费者的公平目标。     

从被保险人的弱势性看保险经纪人的发展

一、目前中国保险市场被保险人的弱势性表现及其危害 保险过程中被保险人的弱势性表现在两个方面:一是在保险商品买卖的过程中,保险商品价格的内含信息,保险保障程度、功能等信息,保险人的服务质量与信誉,保险人比投保人更清楚。这是保险市场信息不对称的表现之一;二是在投保后,在纠纷的处理过程中,由于保险人拥有保单条款的解释权,有保险专业知识的优势,拥有与司法机关沟通的便利性,而被保险人受其自身素质专业知识的限制,无法获得与保险人对等的谈判地位,其权益往往得     

The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries

This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.     

保险公司偿付能力风险信息对称性与市场供求

保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称.本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司...     

What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?

The aim of this article is to summarize the knowledge on market discipline in insurance and other financial service sectors. Market discipline can be defined as the ability of customers, investors, intermediaries (agents, brokers), and evaluators (analysts, auditors, rating agencies) to monitor and influence a company's management. Looking at banking is especially interesting, since market discipline in this field has been studied extensively. Based on existing knowledge, we develop a framework for researching market discipline in insurance that includes its most important drivers and impediments. The results highlight a significant need for continuing research. The findings are of relevance not only for European insurers and regulators, but for institutions outside Europe.     

Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced adverse selection and improve insurance market efficiency. It may also have undesirable equity consequences and undermine the implicit insurance against reclassification risk, which legislated restrictions on risk classification could provide. We use a canonical insurance market screening model to survey and to extend the risk classification literature. We provide a unified framework for analysing the economic consequences of legalised vs banned risk classification, both in static-information environments and in environments in which additional information can be learned, by either side of the market, through potentially costly tests.     

CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas

What market features of financial risk transfer exacerbate counterparty risk? To analyze this, we formulate a model which elucidates important differences between financial risk transfer and traditional insurance, using the example of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We allow for (heterogeneous) insurer insolvency, which captures the possibility that relatively risky counterparties may exist in the market. Further, we find that stable insurers become less stable as the price of the contract decreases. The analysis includes insured parties that have heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for trading purposes. We show that traders will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory policy that removes traders can, perversely, cause stable counterparties to become less stable. We conclude with two extensions of the model that consider a Central Counterparty (CCP) arrangement and the consequences of asymmetric information over insurer type.     

How Insurance Brokers Create Value—A Functional Approach

Fundamental changes in the market make it necessary for insurance intermediaries to continuously redefine their roles. This study concentrates on a customer perspective of the future role of insurance brokers, using the theoretical foundations of the customer value approach. Findings from 20 in-depth interviews with leading managers of various types of multinational companies are supplemented with the results from interviews conducted with representatives of intermediaries and insurers. From this study it can be concluded that, depending on the customer's individual situation, brokers will assume one of four functions, the choice of which will be highly dependent on the degree of innovation and individualization desired. The investigation shows that although traditional transaction-oriented services will continue to be important, there will be a shift toward tailor-made solutions with an emphasis on consulting services, a situation that will require brokers to acquire new skills so as to be able to meet customer needs.     

Informations- und Beratungspflichten des Versicherers nach der VVG-Reform

The insurer’s duty to enable the customer to come to an appropriate decision, providing advice and information, is a central topic of the reform of the German insurance contract law. The obligations of intermediaries given by the Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation are transferred to insurers and thereby enlarged in some aspects. The duty to give advice in §6 I 1 VVG depends on the objective circumstances of each individual case depending upon either the complexity of the insurance contract and problems in understanding its terms, or the characteristics and situation of the customer. Therewith, the regulation both refers to former jurisdiction and exceeds it by implementing a duty for the insurer to ask for the demands and the needs of the customer. Without reason in the special case the customer has to disclose his need for advice to obtain it. During the term of the contract the insurer is only obliged to give advice if he knows or — acting diligently — could know the needs of the policy-holder. On a European level further duties to inform and advise could help to achieve an effective internal insurance market.     

Insurance Markets With Differential Information

This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information.     

Aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für die Tätigkeit von EU-Versicherern in der Türkei

In recent years the Turkish insurance market has exerted a strong appeal, especially for insurers seated in the EU, in view of its exponential growth rates and its dormant growth potential. EU insurers are, however, subject to more stringent insurance supervisory requirements when entering this insurance market, external to the EU, than when expending into other European insurance markets.