中间汇率制度下货币、财政政策效应比较及政策建议

蒙代尔-弗莱明模型(M-F模型)研究了固定汇率制和浮动汇率制下财政、货币政策的有效性。将其拓展到中间汇率制度下发现,无论资本的流动性如何,扩张性的财政政策和货币政策基本有效,其效应介于固定汇率制和浮动汇率制的情况之间。实行中间汇率制度的国家在进行宏观调控时,最应该运用财政、货币政策搭配方法,此时政策效果最好。     

Verifying India’S Exchange Rate Regime in the Pre-Reforms Period (1975–91)

Verifiability of an announced exchange rate regime becomes important in the context of credibility and transparency of a regime. These latter ideas become especially significant in the context of the currently reigning hypothesis of the missing middle, which postulates that exchange rate regimes intermediate to the corner regimes of ‘free floating’ and ‘firm fixing’ are increasingly becoming nonviable in a world of greater international capital mobility as these intermediate regimes are more difficult to verify. This paper attempts to verify India’s exchange rate regime in the so-called basket arrangement period. Using auxiliary information about the regime, it estimates the confidential Indian basket and shows that the behaviour of India’s exchange rate was not exactly as per the announced regime.

     

The choice of exchange rate regime: An empirical analysis for transition economies*

We analyze the choice of exchange rate regimes of the 25 transition economies in Europe and the CIS after 1990. The empirical results show that the traditional Optimum Currency Area considerations provide relevant guidance for the regime choices in these countries. Moreover, regime choices are influenced by inflation rates, cumulative inflation differentials, and international reserves sufficiency. That is, macroeconomic stabilization and the ability to commit to exchange rate pegs also play important roles. Large government deficits have ambiguous effects; they increase the likelihood of moving from flexible to intermediate regimes as well as that of moving from fixed to intermediate ones.     

Dynamic Analysis of the Exchange Rate Regime: Policy Implications for Emerging Countries in East Asia

This paper discusses exchange rate policies in East Asia. In particular, we explore whether actual policies that have been implemented by East Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis follow or deviate from theoretically “desirable” policies over the medium and long terms. On theoretical analysis, we show the relative superiority of a basket‐peg regime with the basket weight rule when compared with a floating regime implementing the interest rate rule or money supply rule. For countries that currently adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, they would be better off shifting toward either a basket‐peg or a floating regime over the medium term. A shift to a basket peg is more preferred when compared with a shift to a floating regime when the exchange rate fluctuations are large.     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY POLICY INDEPENDENCE IN EAST ASIA

Abstract.  This paper investigates whether the choice of exchange rate regimes influences the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest rates. We empirically analyse this issue in the context of East Asian economies by employing a regime switching model. We find that the sensitivity of local interest rates to international interest rates declined in Korea and Thailand after they adopted floating exchange rate regimes. We also find that Japan, with a floating exchange regime, has greater independence in monetary policy than a pegged economy such as Hong Kong. These empirical findings suggest that exchange rate flexibility provides greater monetary independence.     

Alternative Strategies for Monetary Policy

The aim of the paper is to emphasize the importance of the central bank's alternative strategies for macroeconomic equilibrium. Using a constrained maximization process founded on a behavioural equation, we underscore the relevance, for monetary policy, of the assumptions adopted by policymakers regarding how the economic system works. In particular, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the relevant hypotheses are those concerning the supply curve. Under a fixed exchange rate regime the relevant assumptions are those related to the maintenance of the currency agreements and to the internal sustainability of an interest rate setting policy. We demonstrate that these hypotheses define the objective pursued and the strategy followed. Furthermore, if they do not coincide with the actual characteristics of the market, the adjustment dynamics of aggregate income and inflation do not allow convergence toward equilibrium. We use the tools of New Consensus Macroeconomics to discuss the implications of the model and to offer an enhanced analytical framework for teaching intermediate macroeconomics without necessarily adopting the mainstream hypotheses.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Exchange rate regime classifications and exchange rate variability

It is well known that the exchange rate regime (ERR) declared to the IMF is often different from the actual regime. Several alternative schemes for de facto regime classification have been developed. In this article, we compare the ability of four popular schemes to track exchange rate variability (ERV). We find that the existing ERR classifications do not match well with the degree of ERV, especially for intermediate regimes. For instance, in the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) coding, the intermediate regimes exhibit greater ERV than the floaters. On the other hand, for the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) coding, the fixers show greater variability than some intermediates.     

International Capital Movement and Monetary Independence in Asia

In this paper, we investigate the extent of monetary independence in a group of ten Asian countries: China, Malaysia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. While the traditional investigation has considered only the bivariate relationship between the home interest rate and the base rate, we employ both single-equation and vector autoregressive representations of the bivariate and the trivariate relationship including the desired (or optimal) interest rate. We find in most countries, that the ranking of monetary independence is relatively consistent across the models and methodologies although model specifications produce important differences for some countries such as Japan, Indonesia, and India. Trilemma suggests that a country cannot accomplish all three policy objectives: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and free capital mobility. To increase monetary independence a country must choose between greater exchange rate flexibility or a lower degree of capital mobility. The fact that China and Malaysia, the two countries that are known to have imposed the strictest capital controls, consistently rank high in various scenarios while Hong Kong, which has maintained nearly the freest regime in capital markets, is lowest in monetary independence, indicates that perhaps capital controls may play a more important role than does exchange rate flexibility in securing independence in monetary policy making. On the other hand, countries that maintain greater exchange rate stability do not necessarily rank low, unless it is combined with greater capital mobility as in the case of Hong Kong.     

人民币汇率制度渐进性转换路径的Logistic回归分析

目前浮动汇率制度转换的相关理论和实证分析相对匮乏.通过构建二元Logistic回归模型对样本国家的汇率制度转换进行实证研究,分析人民币汇率制度从固定盯住汇率制度退出的渐进性转换路径问题,可得出人民币汇率制度退出固定盯住汇率制度应先转向中间汇率制度的研究结论,从而为我国人民币汇率制度转换政策提供重要的理论和实证支持.     

Why peg? The role of capital mobility and financial intermediation

Many economists argue that the growth of international capital mobility has made the maintenance of pegged exchange rates more costly, forcing developing states to choose alternative arrangements. But some states do not simply abandon pegged exchange rates as their exposure to capital mobility rises. Some states abandon pegs long before a crisis can erupt, while others maintain pegs until the speculative pressures became unbearable. Why, in an environment of growing capital mobility, do some states maintain pegs longer than others do? One reason is that the more that bank lending dominates investment in a country, the more likely that state is to hold on to a pegged exchange rate. When banks have accumulated significant amounts of foreign debt they lobby for exchange rate stability. In a bank‐dominated financial system, a concentrated banking sector can organize easily and use its crucial role in the economy to exert influence over economic policy. This article presents new evidence from statistical tests on 61 developing countries that confirm that states with deeper banking systems are more likely to peg their exchange rates, in spite of growing capital mobility.     

通胀目标制与汇率目标制不能共存吗

基于汇率传递的风险溢价渠道，本文将我国利率调控通胀、外汇储备对冲干预汇率纳入新凯恩斯政策模型，构建双目标双工具政策分析框架，比较泰勒规则与双目标双工具规则下通胀目标与汇率目标共存的经济机制与效应。本文模拟显示：（1）双目标双工具政策框架下通胀目标与汇率目标能够共存，此时通过影响汇率风险溢价来盯住汇率不影响通胀；而单工具政策下两目标无法共存，此时降低国内资产的收益率盯住汇率会刺激居民的消费行为引起通胀。（2）国际资本冲击下，双目标双工具政策在固定汇率的同时能保证经济稳定；而当贸易条件恶化时，选择完全浮动汇率制度最优。央行政策损失分析进一步验证了以上结论。（3）随着金融市场化改革深入，外汇储备稳定汇率的有效性将下降，冲销成本会大幅提升。资本账户开放下，双目标双工具政策仍是央行抵御外部资本冲击的首选政策；但是汇率市场化后，通胀目标制与双目标双工具政策效果基本无差异。本文结论的启示是：面对国际资本，需必要的汇率管制；但是面对贸易冲击，可适度提升汇率弹性来减少冲击对产出和通胀的影响。     

Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. words

Most of the empirical literature on exchange rate regimes uses the IMF de jure classification based on the regime announced by the governments, despite the recognized inconsistencies between reported and actual policies in many cases. To address this problem, we construct a de facto classification based on data on exchange rates and international reserves from all IMF-reporting countries over the period 1974-2000, which we believe provides a meaningful alternative for future empirical work on the topic. The classification sheds new light on several stylized facts previously reported in the literature. In particular, we find that the de facto pegs have remained stable throughout the last decade, although an increasing number of them shy away from an explicit commitment to a fixed regime (“hidden pegs”). We confirm the hollowing out hypothesis but show that it does not apply to countries with limited access to capital markets. We also find that pure floats are associated with only relatively minor nominal exchange rate volatility and that the recent increase in the number of de jure floats goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of de facto dirty floats (“fear of floating”).     

On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies

I study the relevance of the composition of the public debt between domestic and foreign liabilities in a standard stochastic small open-economy framework. The government issues nominal bonds of several maturities with noncontingent face value at redemption. Intervening in the exchange market to implement an adequate state-contingent path for the nominal exchange rate is an effective way for the government to prevent the economy from reaching any competitive equilibrium it wishes to rule out. Most sterilized interventions are not neutral; however, few of them are. As a consequence, the composition in question is undetermined. Hence, a floating regime may decentralize every competitive outcome, even one induced by a pegging policy. Conversely, outcomes brought forth by a floating regime can also be induced by a policy that prescribes active government intervention in the foreign currency market. Moreover, an open-market operation can be replaced by an equivalent combination of an exchange intervention plus a restructuring of the domestic debt maturity. Introducing in the model strategic behavior by the government combined with asymmetric information or lack of commitment can remove that indeterminacy. Hence, these factors seem to be the major determinants of a possible relation between floating exchange rate policies and economic outcomes.     

Exchange Rate Flexibility and the Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth

This paper studies the question of whether exchange rate policy affects the impact of remittances on economic growth in recipient countries. The findings indicate that more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with a greater increase in economic growth following an increase in remittances, but also that the impact of remittances on growth is positive under a fixed regime. The results further show that the effect of remittances under a fixed exchange rate regime is positive in less financially developed countries as well, but do not provide conclusive evidence that this effect varies inversely with exchange rate flexibility in such economies as theorized; the results being sensitive to the choice of financial development indicator.     

A cautionary note in using patterns of shocks to determine optimal exchange rate policy. An exploration of Nepalese and Indian exchange rate relations: 1964–1994

Nepal and India are developing countries in Asia whose (hard) peg has existed for almost forty years as well as no restriction on capital mobility between both countries. However, empirical results suggest that Nepal and India do not face symmetric patterns of shocks and are thus not suitable for a fixed exchange rate under this criteria. One possible explanation may be that the monetary authority plays some role in the short run to reduce the cost of the exchange rate regime. This suggests that some caution should be used in basing optimal exchange rate policy on this single criteria.     

The model and empirical estimation of the optimal flexibility of RMB exchange-rate regime: A study based on the price-stabilization

Under the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (M-F-D) framework, the paper develops a stochastic model to study the optimal choice of RMB exchange rate regime based on two objectives, namely the exchange rate stabilization and price stabilization. The paper finds that different policy objectives will lead to different optimal choices of RMB exchange-rate regime. If the central bank aims to stabilize the price level, the optimal choice would be a certain type of intermediate regime, or the optimal choice would be a fixed one if it aims to stabilize the RMB exchange rate. Based on the model, the paper empirically estimates China’s open economy parameters and uses them to estimate the optimal flexibility of RMB exchange rate regime. The paper points out that China should allow more exchange rate changes to absorb its foreign exchange market pressure in order to stabilize the general price level, which indicates that China should move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime.     

Are Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes more Volatile? Panel GARCH Evidence for the G7 and Latin America

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between exchange rate (ER) regimes and volatility of real exchange rate depreciation (RERD), comparing the G7 and 17 Latin American (LA17) countries, during 1970–2010. We estimate a panel autoregressive model with generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) errors and regime‐specific effects on both the conditional mean and conditional variance. For the G7, we find that, relative to the fixed ER regime, only the freely floating regime shows higher RERD volatility; under the managed floating regime the RERD is equally volatile and under the crawling peg it is actually less volatile. Instead, in the case of the LA17, more flexible ER regimes are associated with more volatile RERD rates, with higher volatility under the managed floating regime than under the crawling peg and with extremely high volatility under the “freely falling” ER regime.     

On the Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor: The Rise and Fall of the Credibility Hypothesis

The credibility hypothesis, which was used to support the use of a pegged exchange rate arrangement as a nominal anchor mechanism, is based on restrictive analytical foundations that circumscribe its real world applicability. While all pegged exchange rate arrangements are subject to circumstances that can undermine the sustainability of the peg, exchange rate nominal anchor pegs are especially fragile because such arrangements introduce problems that are endogenous to that particular type of regime. The East Asian crisis is used to demonstrate the fragility of exchange rate nominal anchor pegs, while the case of Australia demonstrates how a floating currency escaped the contagion of the East Asian crisis.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Banking Crises: When Does the Former Prevent the Latter?

Because monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, banks should expect fewer money‐financed bailouts and therefore manage their risks more carefully when exchange rates are fixed than when they are flexible. It follows that we should observe fewer banking crises in countries with formal currency pegs. The 1990s however are littered with occurrences of banking crises in countries with fixed exchange rates. This paper asks whether banks in those countries could have adopted excess risk expecting money‐financed bailouts or whether their pegs discouraged such moral hazard‐type risks.