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1.
We study the impact of public information and shared information on traders' trading behavior in the context of Kyle's (1985) speculative market. We suppose that there are four types of traders in our model: one insider, M outsiders, liquidity traders, and market makers. We explicitly describe the unique linear Nash equilibrium and find that public information harms the insider but benefits the outsiders and noise traders. Also, the market is more efficient because of the existence of public information. 相似文献
2.
We provide several generalizations of Mailath?s (1987) [9] result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent?s strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977) [8], Glosten (1989) [4], and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) [3], that were not previously covered. 相似文献
3.
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments. 相似文献
4.
We use time-varying regression to model the relationship between returns in the Shanghai and New York stock markets, with possible inclusion of lagged returns. The parameters of the regressions reveal that the effect of current stock return of New York on Shanghai steadily increases after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and turns significantly and persistently positive after 2002 when China entered WTO. The effect of current return of Shanghai on New York also becomes significantly positive and increasing after 2002. The upward trend has been interrupted during the recent global financial crisis, but reaches the level of about 0.4–0.5 in 2010 for both markets. Our results show that China’s stock market has become more and more integrated to the world market in the past twenty years with interruptions occurring during the recent global economic downturn. 相似文献
5.
We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence. 相似文献
6.
Abstract. This paper deals with the determinants of agents' acquisition of information. Our econometric evidence shows that the general index of Italian share‐prices and the series of Italy's financial newspaper sales are cointegrated, and the former series Granger‐causes the latter, thereby giving support to the cognitive dissonance hypothesis: (non‐professional) agents tend to buy the newspaper when share prices are high and not to buy it when share prices are low. Instead, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the agents acquire information in order to trade in the stock market: we find no relationship between quantities exchanged in the market and newspaper sales, nor between stock market volatility and newspaper sales. 相似文献
7.
Pertti AHONEN 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2016,87(2):257-274
Applying an approach of neo‐institutional research, this article examines the history of company holdings of the national government and local governments in Finland in the longer term. The article examines the genealogy of the institutional forms of these holdings, the diffusion, adoption and adaptation of these forms, and the political legitimacy of new forms and the political de‐legitimation of earlier forms. For theory, the results indicate that the individual tailoring of institutional forms offers flexibility but increases complexity. For practice, the results suggest that the company form may too easily marginalize alternative institutional forms such as co‐operatives, associations, and foundations. 相似文献