Money Growth and Inflation in the Euro Area: A Time‐Frequency View

This article provides new insights on the relationship between money growth and inflation in the euro area over the last 40 years. This highly relevant link for the European Central Bank monetary policy strategy is assessed using wavelet analysis. The findings indicate a stronger link between inflation and money growth at low frequencies over the whole sample period. At the typical business cycle frequency range the link is only present until the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, there seems to be a recent deterioration of the leading properties of money growth with respect to inflation in the euro area.     

The Wage Inflation‐Unemployment Curve at the Macroeconomic Level

Based on the reduced form New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve, we estimate wage rigidity and indexation at the aggregate level in several advanced countries for the 1985–2014 period. We document that the wage setting process is heterogenous among our sample of countries: nominal wage rigidities are more important in the United States, while wage indexation is dominant in European Countries. We also present evidence that indexation to past inflation has decrease as inflation stabilizes at lower levels. In addition, our results suggest that wage rigidity is not linked to the institutional environment at the macroeconomic level. Finally, we show that there is significant time variation in the estimated coefficients on the implied equation that is usually not taken into account in the theoretical literature.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.     

Modelling the inflation process in transition economies: Empirical comparison of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic

This paper starts from the observation that inflation in transition economies appears to be persistently high and volatile and attempts to provide some empirical characterisation of the inflation process in three such transition economies: Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. We first consider the role of monetary growth as a major causal factor for inflation in these economies, and argue that the evidence provides rather weak support for the causal relationship. We then propose a transition economy cost-plus model and estimate this using the equilibrium-correction modelling (ECM) strategy augmented by introduction of a number of transitory factors and changes in the internal structure of the real economy which we believe may have had a significant impact on inflation in these economies. We show that this approach enables us to account for long-run inflation in these economies from the early 1980s to the present despite the turbulence of the latter part of the sample period. Our results support wage and exchange rate based inflation policies.     

Does money help predict inflation? An empirical assessment for Central Europe

This paper investigates the predictive ability of money for future inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. We construct monetary indicators similar to those the European Central Bank regularly uses for monetary analysis. We find in-sample evidence that money matters for future inflation at the policy horizons that central banks typically focus on, but our pseudo out-of-sample forecasting exercise shows that money does not in general improve the inflation forecasts vis-à-vis some benchmark models such as the autoregressive process. Since at least some models containing money improve the inflation forecasts in certain periods, we argue that money still serves as a useful cross-check for monetary policy analysis.     

What drives household inflation expectations in South Africa? Demographics and anchoring under inflation targeting

Demographic determinants (i.e., gender, income, education, race, age) of one year ahead inflation expectations in South Africa are explored. Surveys covering the period 2006–2016 are examined via a mix of time and cross-sectional methods. In doing so, we uncover clear behavioural biases in how respondents view the inflation outlook. Education and income tend to be inversely related to inflation expectations. This is consistent with the literature, although we observe significant changes over time that many other surveys are unable to uncover. Inflation expectations also respond to recently observed inflation, but this is likely facilitated by priming in the survey since respondents are given the previous year and five years mean inflation rates. Younger individuals have lower inflation expectations and react significantly to central bank communication, which is a novel variable not included in other studies of this kind. Another demographic characteristic interacting with communication by the South African Reserve Bank is race. Finally, the direction of change in inflation, that is, whether it is rising or falling, also matters. Hence, even if respondents are primed, they appear to be aware of changes in the direction of inflation. This represents an additional novel feature of the study.     

Whatever Happened to Goldilocks? The Role of Expectations in Estimates of the NAIRU in the US and the UK*

During the second half of the 1990s the US economy was characterized as the Goldilocks economy: not too hot, nor too cold, but just right. It was argued that this represented a new paradigm, enabling unemployment to remain low without igniting inflationary pressure. We examine the evidence for a change in the relationship between inflation and unemployment for the US and UK using Phillips curve models. The impact of including explicit inflation expectations is also considered. Inflation expectations are found to play an important role, particularly in the US. When expectations are included there is still evidence that the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) steadily declined during the late 1990s, although this decline in the US NAIRU is not found solely in the 1990s.     

“What does the word ‘inflation’ mean to you?” and “What is the connexion between wage claims and rices?” Findings from two national sample surveys in 1966 and 19711

Even in 1971 it is evident that a large proportion of Britain's population does not understandthe process of inflation and sees no connexion between wage claims and prices.     

Blame the baby boomers for depressed wage growth

• ? While ‘blame’ may sound harsh, the reality is that in an ageing society, the over‐60s accounting for a bigger share of the workforce equals lower wage growth. This is particularly pertinent for the eurozone right now with the baby boomer generation entering the last phase of their working life. Our analysis shows that the very sizeable over‐60 cohort is depressing aggregate wage growth by up to 0.3 ppts annually. That may also help explain why inflation is still subdued .
• ? European policy makers are scratching their heads about why wage growth has not picked up in line with economic growth over the past two years. For the ECB this is relevant as it tries to understand why inflation remains low. While much of the debate centres around unemployment and the Phillips curve, this article looks at the impact of an ageing society on wage growth.
• ? Even though this is more of a structural, rather than a cyclical, perspective, it is particularly important for the eurozone economies right now, because the large post‐World War II baby boomer generation is strongly pushing up the elderly share of employment (measured as those aged 60 and above). As the share of the over 60s in total employment grows, so does their weight in aggregate wage growth.
• ? The crucial point is that wages increase with age, but at a decreasing rate, and stay essentially flat above 55. The main reasons are that the elderly invest much less in continued education and are less inclined to switch to better‐paying jobs.
• ? Our analysis shows how substantial the negative impact of an ageing workforce is on wage growth in the eurozone. By simulating an alternative demographic scenario, we estimate that wage growth in 2015–17 would have been 0.3 ppts per year higher had it not been for the ageing baby‐boomers. Similarly, forecasts for 2018–20 not accounting for the baby‐boomers may overstate wage growth by some 0.2 ppts or more annually.

     

The Price-Wage Mechanism in Poland: An Endogenous Switching Model

This paper proposes a two-equation price-wage model that enables to test whether the inflationary pressure on wage rate is only present when the rate of inflation is greater than some threshold value. Since the likelihood function for this model is very nonstandard, we develop a small-sample Bayesian approach to estimate its parameters. Our empirical results for Poland, 1962–1993, give support to the hypothesis of the price- wage spiral with a positive threshold value of inflation. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A small linear model of wage- and price-inflation in the Norwegian economy

This paper presents a model of inflation in a small open economy which features both wage-wage linkages and a wage-price spiral. Hence we have a simultaneous structure which contains the conventional Scandinavian model of inflation as a special case. Full system estimation results are reported. Great emphasis is placed on data coherency and on parameter stability. One interesting finding is that both wage growth and the wage level in the exposed (E)-sector are strongly influenced by the outside wage. This contradicts the predictions of the Scandinavian model, which defines the wage-leading role of the E-sector by the absence of outside wage effects in E-sector wage formation. Another result is that the speed of adjustment to exogenous shocks is greater for prices than for wages. This finding may be important in explaining real wage flexibility, which is often seen as the hallmark of low unemployment economies such as the Norwegian.     

Europeanization or globalization? Transnational wage bargaining and the distribution of activity in European labor markets

This paper investigates the impact of globalization on labor markets, in terms of wage inflation and the distribution of activity across regions. Specifically, we study the effects of aggregation in the labor markets on the distribution of employment and inflation pressures, where there are differences in market structures and transmission mechanisms underpinned by relatively immobile labor. To demonstrate these ideas, we take the European experience as a “laboratory” to show what can be expected from globalization in the labor markets in practice. Using models of wage leadership vs. locational competition, we examine the extent and strength of aggregation effects on labor market costs using a sample of data from 1983 to 2007 which covers the period of the creation of the Euro. We find that the aggregation effect has decreased significantly since the start of EMU, improving the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. At the same time, while Germany played an important role in the run-up to EMU in terms of wage leader, its role has now decreased and been replaced by globalization forces. This implies increased locational competition in terms of wage formation. We demonstrate this with the emerging role of the US as the benchmark for wage setting in Europe.     

The paradox of rising wage growth and falling inflation

• ? Strong labour markets and rising wages in advanced economies stand in sharp contrast to recent declines in economists’ inflation forecasts and market expectations. In our view, though, these developments are not necessarily contradictory. Even if wage growth edges higher, we think demand factors will limit any pick‐up in prices. Instead, we expect firms’ margins will be squeezed.
• ? Although the labour share has risen more sharply than we had expected over the past couple of years, we are sceptical that this will translate into substantially stronger underlying inflation. Not only has the rise been small, it has been employment rather than wages that has surprised to the upside. The strength of employment is probably more about firms’ production preferences than workers’ capitalising on a stronger negotiating position.
• ? True, wages adjusted for productivity now look high by historical standards. But neither theory or empirical evidence suggests that this must inevitably lead to stronger CPI inflation in the short‐term. Our forecast for flat wage growth in 2019 and the absence of strong cost pressures elsewhere are also a comfort.
• ? Inflation tends to be more responsive to demand indicators – and the recent GDP growth soft patch suggests any further pick‐up in underlying inflation pressures will be limited (see Chart below).
• ? More generally, we think that the consensus view on inflation for the key advanced economies is high. Market‐based inflation expectations are typically lower than our own, which may reflect the perception that inflation risks are skewed to the downside. Positive economic surprises could lead downside risks to narrow, but ageing expansions and secular stagnation worries suggest this is unlikely, limiting any future pick‐up in bond yields.

     

A New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting under learning

This paper provides a study of the implications for economic dynamics when the central bank sets its nominal interest rate target in response to variations in wage inflation. I provide results on the existence, uniqueness, and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibrium for alternative specifications of the manner in which monetary policy responds to economic shocks when nominal rigidities are present. Monopolistically competitive producers set prices via staggered price contracts, and households set nominal wages in the same fashion. In this setting, the conditions for determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium differ from a model where only prices are sticky. I find that when the central bank responds to wage and price inflation and to the output gap, a Taylor principle for wage and price inflation arises that is related to stability under learning dynamics. In other words, a moderate reaction of the interest rate to wage inflation helps to avoid instability under learning and indeterminacy.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where wage and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is significantly simplified if we, in line with empirical evidence, assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are. We show that the price- and wage-setting relationships are substantially altered by the introduction of firm-specific labor. Specifically, the inflation response is substantially dampened, whereas the wage inflation response is increased as compared to models with freely mobile labor. These distinctive features of the model with firm-specific labor are supported by empirical evidence from a structural VAR.     

Can Germany save itself from negative rates?

• German inflation looks set to rise in response to diminishing slack in the economy. But this will be a mixed blessing for those in Germany hit by negative policy rates and ECB asset purchases. Higher German inflation may eliminate the need for further ECB policy action, but it is unlikely to trigger imminent rate hikes. As a result, the rise in inflation will merely lower real interest rates for German savers.
• Structural cross‐country differences mean that the ECB is better able to hit its inflation target when the peripheral economies rather than Germany are the region's growth engine. A key reason for this is that the German Phillips curve is flat by Eurozone standards, meaning that policymakers need to work hard to generate sufficient inflation in Germany to offset sustained weakness elsewhere.
• Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that the tightening labour market is beginning to push German wage growth higher. And if productivity growth remains subdued, this will lead to faster unit labour cost growth.
• While firms could respond by lowering their margins, the strength of household spending suggests that firms may be more inclined than in the past to pass on higher costs to consumers.
• In all, we expect German inflation to rise more sharply than elsewhere to around 2% in 2017, meaning that the ECB will not unveil further unconventional policy support. But it would take much sharper rises in German wage growth and inflation than in our baseline forecast to prompt the ECB to bring forward interest rate rises.

     

Assessing DSGE model nonlinearities

We develop a new class of time series models to identify nonlinearities in the data and to evaluate DSGE models. U.S. output growth and the federal funds rate display nonlinear conditional mean dynamics, while inflation and nominal wage growth feature conditional heteroskedasticity. We estimate a DSGE model with asymmetric wage and price adjustment costs and use predictive checks to assess its ability to account for these nonlinearities. While it is able to match the nonlinear inflation and wage dynamics, thanks to the estimated downward wage and price rigidities, these do not spill over to output growth or the interest rate.     

The Outlook for Wages

Price inflation is on the way down The most dramatic evidence of this is the fall in retail price inflation as the VAT effect comes out of the index. But as the Charts overleaf show, there are clear signs of a fall in inflation rates in wholesale output prices and, more strikingly still, in manufacturers' input prices.
This may be good news for consumers, but so far any reduction in inflation has been chiefly at the expense of profit margins as price rises have fallen below the increase in wage costs. The question for the immediate future is whether the fall in price inflation will now lead to a fall in wage inflation     

Wages,Prices and Politics: Evidence from Norway

This paper studies the empirical relevance of the close ties between a central trade union and the social democratic political party using time series data for Norway. Using a structural wage-price model we estimate that changing from a bourgeois to a social democratic government reduces manufacturing wages in the long run by 2.3 percent. This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of the union leaders. Private service wages are not directly affected by government type, but wage spillover effects imply that the long-run dampening effect in the private service sector is around 2 percent. The results also support the proposition of the Scandinavian model of inflation that the traded goods sector is the wage leader.     

BARGAINING FOR LOWER INFLATION

Industrialists are concerned about the high level of interest rates. The government is refusing to take deliberate steps to cut them, particularly at a time when the exchange rate has been falling in response to events in oil markets. However, the government has suggested that wage moderation offers the best chance of a fall in interest rates. Can this be interpreted as a promise of a reward for good behaviour? The idea of a policy bargain, whereby the authorities promise some kind of fiscal or monetary stimulus as a reward for moderation in wage settlements, is not new. An explicit bargain of this type was offered by Mr Healey in 1976 and again in 1977. In each year he offered tax cuts contingent on the negotiation of a new pay policy. Some have interpreted Mr. Lawson's comments at the recent NEDC meeting as offering a similar type of bargain on interest rates. As far as we can tell, that interpretation is incorrect; there are however interesting and important questions about whether policy should respond to lower inflation. We argue that, in general, lower inflation will itself produce favourable automatic responses for real demand within a nominal policy framework. The question of the effects of wage moderation is rather more complex. We believe that no policy adjustment is necessary. This also appears to be the government's view.