ALTERNATIVE OPTIMAL TRADE POLICIES IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN INPUT MONOPOLY

Abstract.  This paper develops a generalized three-country model with downstream and upstream industries to analyze optimal import and export trade policies in the presence of monopoly distortion in a foreign intermediate input market. It shows that the import tariff and export tax are linearly dependent. Thus, the optimal choice of the tariff gives rise to the same results as the optimal choice of the export tax, which implies that the domestic government, to avoid tariff retaliation, can use export tax as a substitute for the import tariff.     

Reducing tariff evasion: The role of trade facilitation

Can simplifying customs procedures reduce tariff evasion? We measure tariff evasion as the mis-representation of import values in response to increasing tariffs. In a dataset covering 121 countries and the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, we show that simplifying border procedures, that is trade facilitation, reduces tariff evasion. Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, improving a country’s overall trade facilitation performance from the 25th percentile to the median reduces tariff evasion by almost 20%. The moderating effect is especially due to improving the pre-shipment legal certainty of customs procedures. Among the potential mechanisms, improving trade facilitation performance is effective in reducing tariff evasion due to under-reporting of import prices, as well as in countries with weaker control of corruption. The results suggest that countries can gradually implement trade facilitation reforms to cost-effectively minimize tariff evasion.     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation*

This paper examines the equivalence among price‐modifying and quantity‐fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well‐known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open‐loop and closed‐loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff‐quota equivalence holds, while, in general, it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy (weakly) prefers a quantity‐equivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff. These results are not a consequence of the equilibrium concept we adopt (with and without market power), but directly follow from the interplay between market power and the properties of accumulation dynamics.     

Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

The trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises in importing countries

This paper focuses on the potential trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises, an issue that is likely to receive greater attention than hitherto in the context of the current agricultural negotiations in the WTO. Although state trading enterprises can arise in both exporting and importing countries, the emphasis here is on the importing country case. Our results show that state trading enterprises do distort trade, though the nature of the distortion (i.e., whether it is equivalent to an import tariff or import subsidy) depends on the nature of exclusive rights bestowed by government on the state enterprise. We also consider state trading enterprises in both developed and developing economies, the main difference being the nature of the government's pay-off function. The theoretical framework allows us to derive the tariff equivalent effects for various types of STEs, the results suggesting that the trade distorting effect is likely to vary considerably dependent on the type of STE that arises in particular circumstances.     

Import Protection Bias

Rodrik (1995) notes that trade regimes tend to be biased towards import protection, while the standard political economy models either yield no prediction on the bias of the trade regime or predict, counterfactually, a bias towards the export sector. This constitutes an important shortcoming in the political economy of trade literature. In this paper, the Grossman and Helpman (1994 ) “Protection for Sale” model is extended by adding government expenditure. This expenditure may be financed via a combination of tariff revenue and a distorting wage tax. In addition to the government expenditure, export subsidies need to be financed either via tariff revenue or a distorting wage tax. With this addition, plausible values of the model's parameters yield import protection bias.     

Trade Restrictiveness and Deadweight Loss in China’s Imports

China is believed to have gained immensely from its admission into to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. One of the direct gains comes from the lessening of deadweight loss (DWL) due to tariff reduction. Conventional measures for DWL, however, are too aggregate to capture the trade policies, which are determined at a much higher disaggregated level, and ignore the interactions between tariff and corresponding import demand as suggested by theories. In this paper, we first systematically estimate the import demand elasticities at a highly disaggregated level and then match them with the most detailed lines of the applied tariff for the most favored nations as reported by the WTO. Using the detailed matching data, we construct Feenstra’s (1995) simplified trade restrictiveness index (TRI), which captures the covariance of tariff and the corresponding demand elasticity. Finally, we use the TRI to compute the DWL from1997 to 2008 and find that the DWL due to the tariff barrier was reduced to 0.73% of GNI in 2008, noticeably lower than the highest previous mark of 4.58% of GNI in 2001.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

制度因素与东亚双边贸易:贸易引力模型的实证分析

银行与金融、政府干预、黑市活动、资本流动与外国投资、货币政策对东亚经济体出口贸易有重要影响,银行与金融、政府干预、产权、政府负担对东亚经济体进口贸易有重要影响。提高政府干预质量,积极合理地引进国际直接投资,建立并完善公正廉洁高效的司法体系应成为东亚经济体各政府未来重要的政策取向。     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

Welfare impacts of Indian apple trade policies

In April 2000, India eliminated the quantitative import restriction of apples and instituted a trade barrier in the form of lower ad valorem tariffs. This study examines the impacts of Indian trade policies on the apple market by reviewing the government policies, discussing mathematical and graphical analyses of trade policies, presenting estimated equations of demand, supply, and excess supply, and providing solutions of prices, quantities, and welfare impacts under autarky, free trade, and tariff regimes. Given the total population of more than one billion and a vast middle income population, and economic reforms and resulting income growth, India has a considerable potential to increase its apple consumption. Our study shows that under free trade, India will consume 3008 thousand metric tonnes (TMT) of apples of which 2237 TMT will be imported. Also, free trade will increase the total welfare by Rs 29?512 million. These large gains suggest that India should liberalize apple import barriers and move toward free trade.     

Preferential Liberalization,Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR

There is not yet consensus in the trade agreements literature as to whether preferential liberalization leads to more or less multilateral liberalization. However, research thus far has focused mostly on tariff measures of import protection. We develop more comprehensive measures of trade policy that include the temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies of antidumping and safeguards; studies in other contexts have also shown how these policies can erode some of the trade liberalization gains that arise when examining tariffs alone. We examine the experiences of Argentina and Brazil during the formation of the MERCOSUR over 1990–2001, and we find that an exclusive focus on applied tariffs may lead to a mischaracterization of the relationship between preferential liberalization and liberalization toward non‐member countries. First, any “building block” evidence that arises by focusing on tariffs during the period in which MERCOSUR was only a free trade area can disappear once we also include changes in import protection that arise through TTBs. Furthermore, there is also evidence of a “stumbling block” effect of preferential tariff liberalization for the period in which MERCOSUR became a customs union, and this result tends to strengthen upon inclusion of TTBs. Finally, we also provide a first empirical examination of whether market power motives can help explain the patterns of changes to import protection that are observed in these settings.     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

A short-run econometric analysis of the demand and import supply of a horticultural good: tomatoes

This paper considers the problem of estimating the short-run effects of nominal tariff and domestic production levels on the levels of imports and final market prices of fresh tomatoes in the UK during the period 1959–1968. Prior to EEC entry, tariff production was used as the main policy instrument for horticultural support; horticultural goods being exempt from guarantee or intervention price schemes. In retrospect it would, therefore, seem useful to consider the theoretical requirements for its effective use in such a market situation. The paper consists of two parts. The first section discusses a simple comparative-static specification of a simultaneous equation market model determining the prices and import levels of a single horticultural good and goes on to derive measures of the effects of tariff rate and domestic production changes on market equilibrium. The second section presents several sets of alternative estimates of the specified market model and calculated effects for the specific case of fresh tomatoes during the period 1965–68     

Misallocation and productivity effects of the Smoot–Hawley tariff

Using a newly created microeconomic archive of US imports at the tariff line level for 1930–1933, we construct industry-level tariff wedges incorporating the input–output structure of US economy and the heterogeneous role of imports across sectors of the economy. We use these wedges to show that the average tariff rate of 46% in 1933 substantially understated the true impact of the Smoot–Hawley (SH) tariff structure, which we estimate to be equivalent to a uniform tariff rate of 70%. We use these wedges to calculate the impact of the Smoot–Hawley tariffs on total factor productivity and welfare. In our benchmark parameterization, we find that tariff protection reduced TFP by 1.2% relative to free trade prior to the Smoot–Hawley legislation. TFP fell by an additional 0.5% between 1930 and 1933 due to Smoot–Hawley. We also conduct counterfactual policy exercises and examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the elasticity of substitution and the import share. A doubling of the substitution elasticities yields a TFP decline of almost 5% relative to free trade, with an additional reduction due to SH of 0.4%.     

Strategic interoperability standards and trade taxes

In a two-country international trade framework, the paper considers the interplay between the governments' incentives for conducting traditional trade policies and their incentives for the policies toward compatibility between the products of the firms competing in the international market. The model assumes that one domestic and one foreign firm supply partially incompatible products for the home country market while consumers value both variety and a network externality. Motivated by the benefits of the network externality, the home government sets a standard requiring the foreign firm to guarantee a minimum level of compatibility between its own product and the product of the domestic rival. The paper analyzes the home country standard setting and import tariff policies as well as the incentives of the foreign country for imposing the export tax and conducting a policy which enhances the degree of compatibility between the rival products in the export market.     

何去何从:贸易保护还是开放竞争?——来自微观企业创新的证据

文章基于熊彼特效应和逃离竞争效应假说,结合中国转轨时期的经济制度背景,利用2001?2008年制造业关税数据和沪深A股上市公司专利数据,研究了中国加入WTO后,关税削减所导致的进口竞争对企业创新的影响.研究发现,关税削减后,企业的发明专利申请数量显著增加,而专利申请总数和非发明专利申请数量却没有受到显著影响,表明进口竞争激励企业进行了高质量的发明创新.进口竞争的激励效应对于易受竞争影响和全要素生产率高的企业更加显著.文章认为,应以开放的心态迎接贸易自由化和进口竞争,引导企业将进口竞争转化为创新动力,推动企业创新向高质量迈进,形成国际竞争新优势.     

Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.