EC INTEGRATION AND JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC

This study proposes two hypotheses to identify the cause(s) behind the short-term cyclical Japanese manufacturing foreign direct investment in the European Community (EC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s: (i) a catch-up process of Japanese firms in anticipation of EC single market integration in 1993 and (ii) the so-called bubble economic phenomenon caused by the overheated economy following expansionary monetary policy in Japan in the late 1980s. Applying multinomial logit models to the data on parent firms of 283 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established in the EC from 1988 to 1992 reveals strong support for the bubble economy hypothesis but not for the catch-up hypothesis. Results also show that under a bubble economy situation, tax-related incentive policies in host countries—e.g., an investment tax allowance for foreign direct investment—are quite important in attracting Japanese firms.     

PATTERNS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AGRO-FOOD PRODUCTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST INTEGRATION

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO,CRIME, AND ECONOMIC FORCES

This paper re‐examines inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 32 subnational Mexican states based on quarterly data from 2005 to 2015, which includes rising drug‐related crimes. We estimate our models using panel data methods by type of crime, state‐level indicators (real wages and electricity consumption), macroeconomic forces (the real exchange rate and interest rate), and a dummy variable for the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We employ a flexible lag‐length method and find that homicides and thefts have negative and statistically significant effects on FDI, while other crimes have no effects. Subsample work suggests higher negative effects in the most violent states. (JEL F15, F21, F23, F36)     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE KNOWLEDGE‐CAPITAL MODEL AND A SMALL COUNTRY CASE

This research looks at how foreign direct investment (FDI) in a small open economy compares with that of larger countries. I apply several specifications of the knowledge‐capital model to unique FDI data from the isolated country of Iceland, allowing for comparison with previous analysis of larger and similarly open economies. Using this together with other techniques, I seek to explain investment determinants by geography, economic size and skilled labor availability. The results of these analysis show that popular specifications do not accurately predict the effects for a small country case.     

A NOTE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS IN VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRIES

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of a multiproduct multinational firm which supplies vertically differentiated products, and show that the proximity‐concentration trade‐off can generate FDI‐export coexistence, i.e., the firm supplies the low‐quality products through FDI and the high‐quality products through exports. We also show that the opposite can never happen. Moreover, when the multiproduct multinational firm faces price competition in the target markets, it has an incentive to use trade costs to soften price competition, which can reduce its FDI incentive.     

NESTING VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

We merge the two‐sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal differentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with different consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the city. In equilibrium, the high‐quality platform sells at a higher price and captures a greater market share than the low‐quality platform, despite the indifferent consumer being closer to the high‐quality platform. The difference between market shares is lower than socially optimal. A perturbation that introduces a negligible difference between the consumer density on the left and on the right side of the city may disrupt existence of equilibrium in the model of Armstrong (2006).     

PRIVATISATION AND TIMING IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS*

This paper models a mixed oligopoly with both a domestic and a foreign private firm and examines the resulting timing in the quantity setting game. We demonstrate that with a single simultaneous pre‐game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has either the public firm leading or the two private firms leading. An alternative characterisation of the pre‐game stage results in the single timing in which the two private firms lead and the public firm follows. For all timings that emerge endogenously, we show that privatisation will always lower domestic welfare but its influence on global welfare is ambiguous.     

CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A PANEL GRAVITY MODEL APPROACH

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of 15 transition countries by using a panel gravity model approach and suggests that corruption does not deter FDI.     

外商直接投资区域变化与中西部地区引资困境

根据中国内陆地区对外开放程度逐渐加大、国家对西部开发的重视程度不断加强,以及外资投资区位转移的“雁行理论”等条件推理,内陆地区近年来引进外资的增长幅度应该快于沿海地区。然而,实际分析结果表明,1979年以来的外资由沿海向内陆地区的转移,从1997年开始停滞,中西部地区引进外资总体表现不佳。文章从“路径依赖”、市场规模、基础设施、劳动力素质、产业关联和投资软环境诸方面分析了形成这种现象的原因。在此基础上,提出了加快中西部地区引资的思路。     

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

产业集聚、所有制结构与外商投资企业的区位选择

产业集聚理论认为,同一产业内的企业由于正的外部性具有聚集在同一地理范围内的倾向。在本文中,我们运用条件Logit概率模型,结合国家统计局对外商投资企业的调查数据,估计产业集聚程度、所有制结构以及其他传统的地区特征因素对外商投资企业地理区位选择的影响。我们发现存在非常显著的集聚效应,这意味着偶然的政策和历史因素将长久地影响企业生产活动的地理分布,这对理解中国的地区差异具有重要意义。     

THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro-labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro-capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left- and right-leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left-leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right-leaning governments.     

HARD OR SOFT? INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AS DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA*

We examine whether hard infrastructure in the form of more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions and deeper reforms lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). We use data on FDI from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Korea to various regions of China from 1990 to 2002. We control for the standard determinants of FDI—regional market sizes, wage rates, human capital and tax policies. Then we add indices of hard and soft infrastructures. We found that empirically soft infrastructure consistently outperforms hard infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.     

环境规制、外商直接投资与“污染避难所”假说——基于中国30个省份面板数据的实证研究

本文基于1998—2008年我国30个省份的面板数据对我国外商直接投资与环境规制之间的关联进行了实证研究。结果表明,环境规制对我国各个地区外商直接投资的流入存在一定的负面影响,但这种影响并不显著;相对而言,经济规模、基础设施状况和外资的集聚效应等对外商直接投资的影响更为显著。而且,环境规制和FDI的格兰杰检验结果表明,环境规制和FDI之间不存在因果关系。因此,可以认为,"污染避难所"假说在中国成立的证据不足。