Unemployment and International Factor Movement in the Presence of Skilled and Unskilled Labor

Widespread unemployment has been observed in some developing countries. On the other hand, extensive movement of labor across countries has also been observed. Therefore, in order to examine the interaction between the domestic and international labor markets, this paper develops a model that includes unemployment, international factor movement, and the difference between skilled and unskilled labor. The model examines the effect of production subsidies on unemployment and evaluates their effectiveness as a possible policy in order to alleviate the problem of unemployment. Further, this paper investigates the effects of international factor movement on unemployment and welfare.     

Unskilled Labor Migration and Capital Mobility: A Diagrammatic Exposition

Conclusions about the effects of out-migration of unskilled labor on a country's wage rates and capital flows are illustrated with accessible diagrams. This article is of particular value in courses in international trade, economic development, and regional economics.     

Labor Mobility, Trade, and Social Capital

Labor market integration raises welfare in the absence of distortions. This paper examines labor and goods market integration in a general‐equilibrium model with social capital. The findings are: (i) labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare, and raises it if the goods and labor skills are sufficiently different; (ii) compared to Pareto optimum, labor mobility (social capital) is excessively large (depleted); (iii) trade is superior to labor market integration if trading costs are no higher than private migration costs, otherwise the outcome is ambiguous; and (iv) the creation of new institutions in response to labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare.     

Unemployment of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in an Open Economy: International Trade,Migration, and Outsourcing

We show how international trade, migration, and outsourcing affect unemployment of skilled and unskilled labor, in a framework that integrates the Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade with the Shapiro–Stiglitz model of unemployment. Our approach allows us to analyze changes in not only aggregate unemployment, but also the distribution of unemployment between skilled and unskilled labor. As the analysis demonstrates, the unemployment rates of these two types of labor often move in opposite directions, thereby dampening the change in aggregate unemployment. Results depend on the source of comparative advantage, based on international differences in (for example) unemployment insurance or production technology.     

企业专用性人力资本与员工流动性

本文利用中国综合社会调查(CGSS)2006年的城市调查数据,分别用企业任期和在职培训时间作为企业专用性人力资本的替代变量,分析它们对员工流动性的影响,结果显示,企业专用性人力资本与员工辞职概率显著负相关,企业专用性人力资本水平越高的员工,主动离开企业的可能性就越小.同时还发现,作为通用性人力资本的工作经验与员工辞职概率之间的关系不明确;受教育年限和工资收入与员工辞职概率显著正相关;企业规模与员工辞职概率之间不存在显著的相关关系;相对于女性而言,在其他条件相同的情况下,男性辞职的可能性更大.     

Pollution, Capital Mobility and Tax Policies with Unemployment

In this paper we highlight aspects related to the links among unemployment, international capital mobility, and tax policies in a small open developing economy. Without international capital mobility, the joint optimal trade and environmental policies require a zero tariff and an emission tax lower than the Pigouvian tax. With international capital mobility and a capital tax (subsidy), the optimal emission tax rate is smaller (larger) compared to the rate when capital is untaxed. When both the emission tax and the capital tax/subsidy are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal policy on capital is a lower subsidy, or even a tax, compared to the standard capital subsidy of the no pollution case.     

International Capital Mobility in the Presence of Unemployment Insurance

The paper develops a general–equilibrium model with layoff unemployment to examine the effect of different unemployment insurance policies on international capital mobility. Conditions are derived under which capital will flow to the high–benefit country. Incentives for international capital movements are unaffected by how the burden of financing unemployment benefits is distributed between workers and firms. It is shown that capital outflows might have positive welfare effects for workers. This contrasts with results from standard models of international factor movements.     

劳动力流入和地方政府收入再分配政策研究

文章引入收入分配边界概念,结合劳动力流动的市场均衡模型,研究外来劳动力对某一地区收入分配水平的影响.分析表明,如果流入者是某一地区收入再分配政策的净受赠者,那么,劳动力流入使得该地区的收入分配边界收缩,至少部分居民的收入水平降低.如果此时给予流出地劳动力转移支付,将使流入劳动力的数量减少到一个合理水平,劳动力流入地区的所有居民都会获益.此结论不仅对发达地区政府针对外来劳动力流入采取的限制政策提供了一个合理解释,也为发达地区和不发达地区进行财政合作,利用收入再分配手段合理配置劳动力、提高社会福利水平提供了理论支持.     

Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants and Entrepreneurship in a Developed Country

Evidence from some OECD countries suggests that skilled immigrants are over‐represented in entrepreneurship. We offer an analytical explanation to show that it may be a direct outcome of asymmetric information between immigrants and potential employers in the rich countries. Limiting occupational choices to self‐employment and employment, we show that skilled immigrants vis‐à‐vis natives may be proportionally over‐represented in small businesses. This compensates for the income loss in the labor market. It results from higher critical risk aversion among skilled immigrants compared with natives and subsequently leads to higher average income for all immigrants in the cross‐section. Finally, we show why a lesser number of unskilled immigrants enter self‐employment and discuss the speed of income convergence between all immigrants and natives.     

Social Security Policy and International Labor and Capital Mobility

This paper studies the connection between social security policy and international factor movements within a two-country overlapping-generations model with production. Incentives for factor movements emerge because one country relies on private savings while the other country operates a social security system. The pattern of migration depends on the steady-state capital–labor ratios compared with the Golden Rule capital–labor ratios. Incentives to migrate do not vanish in the long run and one country might empty out. Capital always moves to the social-security country. Without compensation neither labor nor capital mobility represents a Pareto improvement for the economy.     

Skilled Immigration and Wages in Australia*

This paper investigates the impact of the relative growth of skilled migration on the structure of Australian wages. Unlike conventional approaches, the present study uses macro data to examine the response of wages to immigration flows. We use instrumental variable techniques to control for the potential endogeneity of immigration. The results, using alternative estimation strategies, are consistent with the dominant findings from existing empirical work. There is no robust evidence that a relative increase in skilled immigrants exerts any discernible adverse consequences on the wage structure in Australia.     

Welfare and Distribution Effects of Water Pricing Policies

In this paper, distribution and welfare effects of changes in block price systems are evaluated. A method is discussed to determine, for a Marshallian demand function, equivalent variation in case of a block price system. The method is applied to compare, for the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, alternative pricing policies on the basis of their demand, welfare and distribution effects of changing water prices. Results show that there is a trade off between average welfare and income distribution. A pro-poor price system may result in lower average welfare than a flat price system, but in higher individual welfare for the poor. Moreover, there is a trade off between revenues for the water company and income distribution. Even though pro-poor price systems may not be as good for average welfare as flat price systems, their direct effects on poverty are important. Introducing pro-poor price systems, however, may have financial consequences for the water companies.     

How Segmented are Skilled and Unskilled Labour Markets: the Case of Beveridge Curves

This paper tests whether there is evidence that two distinct Beveridge curves for the skilled and unskilled aggregate markets exist. The results support the hypothesis and specifically find that the unskilled labour segment is less efficient at matching workers with jobs, primarily due to higher labour turnover rates. Higher turnover rates can be indicative of a poor match between employers' and jobseekers' expectations. The results also indicate that other shift variables, such as the replacement rate, the incidence of long-term unemployment, the immigration rate and the market circumstances in the skilled segment were only important for the unskilled segment.     

Income Mobility, Inequality and Social Welfare

It is often argued that an observation of rising annual income inequality need not have negative normative implications. The argument is that if there has been a sufficiently large simultaneous increase in mobility, the inequality of income measured over a longer time period can be lower despite the rise in annual inequality. In this paper, it is shown by example that if normative implications are drawn from a standard social welfare function, the set of circumstances put forward in the above argument are not sufficient to guarantee that social welfare will improve. The reason is that even though rising mobility does reduce longer term inequality, it also increases the variability of income profiles over time and the latter has a detrimental social welfare effect. Hence, there are two types of mobility: one which reduces inequality (regression to the mean), but another that increases inequality (relative movements uncorrelated with incomes). Further, if individuals' aversion to income variabiltiy is sufficiently larger than the social welfare judge's aversion to inequality, then an increase in mobility, no matter how large, cannot offset the negative normative effect of rising annual inequality.     

Capital Mobility, Consumption Substitutability and the Effects of Monetary Policy in Open Economies

Abstract. I use a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country optimizing model to analyze the implications of international capital mobility for the short‐run effects of monetary policy in an open economy. The model implies that the substitutability of goods produced in different countries plays a central role for the impact of changes in the degree of international capital mobility on the effects of monetary policy. Paralleling the results of the traditional Mundell–Fleming model, a higher degree of international capital mobility magnifies the short‐run output effects of monetary policy only if the Marshall–Lerner condition, which is linked to the cross‐country substitutability of goods, holds.     

International Factor Mobility, Government Size and Welfare

An examination of the available data reveals that the size of government varies considerably across time and countries. By making use of a simple general equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates that size of government is affected by the availability of capital and labour within an economy. Specifically, this paper utilises a model of a closed economy that produces one-private and one-public good. Both goods are produced by means of capital and labour. Production functions are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition prevails in all markets. The elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good is greater than unity and there is no international factor mobility in the initial equilibrium. The size of government is measured by total spending on the public good as a proportion of the total expenditure on the private and public goods. It is shown that capital (labour) inflow can decrease (increase) the size of government. Capital inflow increases welfare if the private good is relatively capital intensive whereas labour inflow increases welfare if the public good is relatively capital intensive.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

Gender, Labor Markets and Welfare States

Books reviewed:
Review of Gender and the Labor Market: Econometric Evidence of Obstacles to Achieving Gender Equality , edited by Siv Gustafsson and Danièle Meulders; and Gender and the Welfare State: Care, Work and Welfare in Europe and the USA , by Mary Daly and Katherine Rake Reviewed by Martha MacDonald     

Welfare Magnet Hypothesis,Fiscal Burden,and Immigration Skill Selectivity

In this paper, we investigate the effect of welfare state generosity on the difference between skilled and unskilled migration rates, and the role of mobility restriction in shaping this effect. We utilize the free labor movement within the European Union plus Norway and Switzerland (EUR) and the restricted movement from outside the EUR in order to compare the free‐migration regime to the restricted‐migration regime. We find strong support for the magnet hypothesis under the free‐migration regime, and the fiscal burden hypothesis under the restricted‐migration regime, even after controlling for differences in educational quality and returns to skills in source and host countries.