THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)     

Will Sub-Prime be a Twin Crisis for the United States?

We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, the additional costs associated with a sudden stop of net capital flows to the United States could be quite substantial. But we observe that emerging market governments have continued to acquire US assets even as yields have fallen, and the incentives for continuing to do so remain strong. Moreover, the Bretton Woods II system, which has clearly been the most resilient of the forces driving current markets, continues to generate low real interest rates in industrial countries and growth in emerging markets that will help limit the damage from the liquidity crisis.     

Price convergence in US cities: a cointegration approach with two structural breaks

This article investigates how the price indices of major cities of the US respond to the shock from a city and from monetary policy. We find that the crisis of Bretton Woods system in 1968 and the oil crisis in 1974 should be incorporated as structural breaks in monetary policy variables and price indices. Using cointegration technique with structural break in our aggregated data, we find that the average half-life is 1.75 years, which is closer to what some of others found in disaggregated data, and that the interest rate is an effective tool for controlling cities’ price in short run.     

现行国际货币体系的不公正性与发展中国家的策略

现行国际货币体系的基本特征是储备货币多元化和以浮动汇率制为主流的汇率制度选择自由化，发展中国家似乎摆脱了原有的布雷顿森林体系和纪律和约束。但实际上，在现行国际货币体系下，发展中国家在储备货币依赖、江率制度选择、国际收支调节和抑制国际投资本冲击等方面均受到不利的影响（甚至是伤害）。本文首先论述了现行国际货币体系对发展中国家不公正性的表现，然后深入分析了其根源，最后提出了发展中国家应采取的若干策略。     

Monetary Non-Neutrality and the Intertemporal Approach to the Balance of Trade: The UK Trade Balance under Bretton Woods

Previous research on the intertemporal approach is based on the standard, real model of the balance of trade. This paper outlines a more general model that allows for monetary non-neutrality, and tests the general model against a restricted version that embodies neutrality. While the empirical analysis focuses on the UK trade balance during the Bretton Woods era, the fundamental issues are of interest to more than just students of Bretton Woods.     

The exchange rate regime in Asia: From crisis to crisis

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged to the US Dollar. During the crisis, many economies experienced a brief period of extreme flexibility. A ‘fear of floating’ gave reduced flexibility when the crisis subsided, but flexibility after the crisis was greater than that seen prior to the crisis. Contrary to the idea of a durable Bretton Woods II arrangement, Asia then went on to slowly raise flexibility and reduce the role for the US dollar. When the period from April 2008 to December 2009 is compared against periods of high inflexibility, from January 1991 to November 1991 and October 1995 to March 1997, the increase in flexibility is economically and statistically significant. This paper proposes a new measure of dollar pegging, the “Bretton Woods II Score”. We find that Asia has been slowly moving away from a Bretton Woods II arrangement.     

Is real GDP stationary? Evidence from a panel unit root test with cross-sectional dependence and historical data

We use historical data that cover more than one century on real GDP for industrial countries and employ the Pesaran panel unit root test that allows for cross-sectional dependence to test for a unit root on real GDP. At first, we find strong evidence against the unit root null. Our results seem to be robust to the chosen group of countries and, in most cases, the sample period. However, the sequential panel selection method reveals that the rejection of the unit root null is due to the stationarity of real GDP in a few countries only. Real GDP is less stationary mostly in fixed exchange rate regimes like the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods system.     

BRETTON WOODS - ORIGINAL INTENTIONS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS

The Bretton Woods institutions have been subjected to a variety of criticisms in recent years and have been faced with severe problems in carrying out their objectives. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have not performed in accordance with the original intentions of their founders. As shown in this article, this is in large measure because the world economic environment has been quite different from that envisaged by the participants in the Bretton Woods conference. Many of the original intended functions for these institutions are no longer relevant. This article examines the current problems facing the IMF and World Bank, with special attention to how they are related to the original intentions. For example, in recent years, a major problem has been the financial crises of member countries that have liberalized their economies in line with trends toward globalization. These crises have resulted in demands on the IMF and World Bank for financial assistance for purposes other than those for which their assistance was originally designed. Other problems of the two institutions include providing assistance to the world's poorest countries that have made virtually no development progress in recent years, and assisting the former communist countries in transition to market economies. The author gives his personal views on how these and other problems of the IMF and World Bank should be dealt with.     

A Tribute to Hyman P. Minsky

In this article, we examine financial crises after the Bretton Woods period using a new virulence index. After summarizing financial crises after Bretton Woods, we analyze aspects of four separate crises in a virulence index. The index includes measures of contagion, as well as impacts on economic, financial and social indicators. We find that financial crises have increased in virulence over time.     

Reassessing the Social Foundations of Welfare (State) Regimes

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was formed in 1964 to ‘create a forum in which the more prosperous member countries [of the United Nations] would come under pressure to agree to measures benefiting the less-developed countries’. More specifically, its formation was ‘a deliberate effort to use international bureaucracy and conference diplomacy to alter current norms affecting trade and development’. UNCTAD's founding reflected the growth in membership of the United Nations of newly independent states. A large number of the e´lites of these new entities keenly felt the iniquity of the world order which had ushered in their formal statehood. UNCTAD and the later call for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO) therefore were rejoinders to problems encountered by developing countries as a result of the creation and operation of the Bretton Woods system.     

Systems GMM estimates of the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle for the OECD countries and tests for structural breaks

A systems GMM estimation method is used to estimate the Feldstein–Horioka equation from 1960 to 2007 with a panel of 13 OECD countries. It is found that the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle exists in a weaker form with a much reduced saving retention coefficient. The Bretton Woods agreement in particular seems to have weakened the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle by significantly improving international capital mobility. In comparison the Maastricht agreement seems to have improved capital mobility only by a small magnitude. The Blundell and Bond systems GMM method and structural break tests of Mancini-Griffoli and Pauwels are used in this paper.     

The BRICS’s Bank,Institutional Framework,and Other Current Limitations

Abstract:

Based on Polanyi’s concepts of embeddedness, disembeddedness, and the double movement, the aim of this article is to show that the new development bank (NDB) established by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (grouped as BRICS) lacks an institutional context to spur growth and development, similar to the growth that occurred during the Bretton Woods era. First, I examine some of the BRICS’s strengths, such as growth rates, share of world GDP (gross domestic product), and the level international reserves as a percent of the world total. Second, I outline the BRICS’s and other Third World countries’ need for financing. I maintain that the main flaw in the BRICS’s bank is that it follows market rationality in obtaining and granting resources, and that China (the most important member of the BRICS) is still dependent on the G7’s economies. Finally, I remark that as long as the NDB follows market fundamentals, it will be less likely to achieve growth.     

Unit root tests of the current account balance: implications for international capital mobility

The extent of international capital mobility is assessed in a time series context. The possibility that the current account balance of different 0ECD countries contains a unit root is explored. It is shown that if the ratio of the current account balance to GDP is found to be integrated of the order of one, the country is likely to be part of the world capital market. The results for the whole period 1950–1988 indicate that the current account balance of at least Germany, Japan and the United States contains a unit root. Considering the subperiods before and after 1972 it is shown that international capital mobility increased after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System.     

The Great Escape: The Multinational Trade Deficit in Historical Perspective

During the Bretton Woods era, the debate surrounding U.S. export sales versus U.S. multinational production focused primarily on the maintenance of pegged exchange rates and labor’s concern over the export of jobs. The collapse of Bretton Woods gave at least the hope that a decline in the dollar would expand exports and limit imports. Yet, the forty-year secular decline in the dollar has been one with a secular expansion of U.S. trade deficits. The older concerns of U.S. multinational sales competing with U.S. exports retain a current relevance. They help explain the unending nature of U.S. trade deficits.     

Nonlinearity and time-variation in the monetary model of exchange rates

In this paper we analyze the existence of nonlinear relationships between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates for some major industrialized countries using an error correction model with time-varying parameters for the post Bretton Woods period. We find that inflation rate differentials with respect to the US inflation rate are the driving forces for the nonlinear relationships in the monetary model for exchange rates for the data from Germany, the UK, Canada, France and Italy. In addition to the variables in the traditional monetary model, also the relative interest rates are relevant in determining exchange rate changes only when the inflation differentials are either very large or very small. In contrast to previous studies we find significant long-run effects in the error correction representation of the monetary model for exchange rates when the nonlinear dynamics is taken into account in the analysis.     

Purchasing power parity revisited: evidence from old and new tests for an organisation for economic co-operation and development panel

The objective of this article is to study long-run Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for a panel of 21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from the end of the Bretton Woods era by applying a wide range of the econometric techniques available. This will allow us to present a comprehensive up to date examination of the empirical validity of PPP, covering the weak and strong versions of the hypothesis with individual and panel analysis, including the absence or presence of cross-dependency, the linear or nonlinear behaviour of the real exchange rates and the degree of persistence. Overall, the results provide evidence in favour of PPP.     

Improving International Comparisons of Prices at Basic Heading Level: An Application to the Asia‐Pacific Region

The International Comparisons Program (ICP) run by the World Bank compares prices and real incomes across countries, and plays a pivotal role in the Penn World Table. Using a unique dataset consisting of over 600,000 price quotes from nine countries in the Asia‐Pacific region, we consider ways of improving the basic heading price indexes that form the building blocks of ICP. Current ICP methodology computes these price indexes using the country–product–dummy (CPD) method applied to the country average prices. We contrast this approach with: (i) a weighted version of CPD; (ii) CPD applied directly to the individual price quotes; and (iii) extended versions of CPD that include adjustments for unrepresentative products, urban–rural price differences, and different outlet‐types. Also considered are new CPD‐based methods for measuring urban–rural price differences, and the implications of our findings for the downward revision in China's GDP in ICP 2005.     

Does Trade Liberalisation Promote Economic Development?

The last twenty years have seen an extraordinary number of trade liberalisation episodes in developing countries. Some have been voluntary, most have been policy conditioned under the aegis of the Bretton Woods agencies. This paper begins by setting out the background to these trade reform programmes and details their ingredients. It then goes on to review the evidence extant on liberalisation and growth and reports new evidence. The latter suggests that liberalisation does tend to enhance growth, albeit with a lag. The paper concludes with an analysis of the lessons learned from experience with liberalisation in terms of credibility, timing and sequencing.     

(When) Should cointegrating regressions be detrended? The case of a German money demand function

If an economic relationship is superimposed by a linear time trend, the regression without detrending is misspecified. The estimators of such a regression do not converge to the true parameter values. First, the asymptotic limit arising from such misspecified regressions is characterized. Second, we observe with data before 1975 a significant time trend but no cointegrating relation between real money (M1), income and a long-term interest rate. The price level as a significant omitted variable is considered as an economic explanation for this feature. We find a price elasiticity larger than one. Third, with data after the breakdown of Bretton Woods (and the beginning of monetary targeting by the Bundesbank), real money, income and the interest rate alone are cointegrated. The long-run estimates seem to be fairly stable with data after the German union provided a step dummy accounts for a break in the mean. First version received: November 1996/final version received: June 1998     

Keynes's last time at the Political Economy Club: Editorial Introduction

Maynard Keynes died on Easter Morning 1946. Since 1937, he hadbeen a sick man but had nevertheless carried a huge load duringthe war years in the Treasury. There, he advised and workedon wartime finances and represented Britain through the Treasuryat Bretton Woods and