Corruption,illegal trade and compliance with the Montreal Protocol

This paper studies the effects of corruption, rule of law and tariffs on illegal trade in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Since data on illegal trade is not available, it is not possible to test any theoretical conclusions about smuggling. The paper, however, attempts to circumvent the problem by developing a model of illegal trade in CFCs that derives predictions about the effects of corruption, rule of law and tariffs on both legal and illegal imports of CFCs. Then the theoretical predictions concerning legal imports are tested using panel data on CFC consumption. Using the estimates of legal imports, inferences about illegal trade are made. The basic findings indicate that knowledge about the degree of rule of law, corruption and the level of tariffs is needed for the correct interpretation of the data on environmental performance reported to international monitoring agencies.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: Comment

We take issue with the reasoning of Coniglio et al. ( 2009 ) that whereas better‐skilled illegal migrants will prefer to return‐migrate, lower‐skilled illegal migrants will not. We argue that under asymmetric information, all the illegal migrants are initially paid a wage based on the average productivity of the group of illegal migrants. The better‐skilled illegal migrants thus face two “taxes:” being paid less than if they were legal, and being averaged down. Therefore, better‐skilled illegal migrants can be expected to expend more effort to become legal than lower‐skilled illegal migrants. And once legalized, there is no reason for the better‐skilled illegal migrants to want to return to their country of origin more than the lower‐skilled illegal migrants. Thus, it is the lower‐skilled illegal migrants that are likely to dominate the return migration flow. We argue that in other respects too, the model of Coniglio et al. is not based on reasonable assumptions, and that even under the postulated assumptions, the model suffers from several inconsistencies. In particular, when the rate of return to savings is an increasing function of skill level, we would expect there to be few better‐skilled individuals among illegal migrants in the first place. Also, an obvious distinction between savers and borrowers is ignored.     

Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?”

Becker's result that fines should be maximized is also applicable to some social environments where law enforcers are corrupt. If the regulated activity is legal, the principal may efficiently deter crime without an anti‐corruption unit. An opportunistic anti‐corruption unit, even when corrupt, becomes useful for the principal when the activity is illegal, since the principal's goal of maximizing fines motivates the unit to collect bribes from the enforcer, which subsequently induces the enforcer to be nearly completely honest, minimizing corruption. Therefore, we show that there is not necessarily an infinite regress originating with the puzzle of who polices the police.     

The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America,Sub‐Saharan Africa,and Transition Countries*

Most of the empirical studies that analyze the impact of corruption on investment have three common features: they employ country‐level data on investment, corruption is measured at the country level, and data for countries from several regions are pooled together. This paper uses firm‐level data on investment and measures corruption at the firm and country level, and allows the effect of corruption to vary by region. Our dependent variable is firms' investment growth and we employ six measures of corruption from four different sources—two firm‐level measures and four country‐level measures. We find that the effect of corruption on investments varies significantly across regions: corruption has a negative and significant effect on investment growth for firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact for firms in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa. Furthermore, for Transition countries, corruption is the most important determinant of investment.     

The case against eliminating large denomination bills

When large denomination bills are preferred in illegal activities, what is the optimal policy response? We construct a dual currency model where illegal activity can be reduced by modifying the payment environment. In our model, legal (goods) traders are indifferent between small and large bills, but illegal (goods) traders face a lower transaction cost of using large bills in comparison to small bills because it is easier to conceal. We show that eliminating large bills can reduce illegal trade and its associated social cost. However, this pooling equilibrium is sub-optimal because the government can collect more seigniorage by allowing illegal traders to use large bills with a lower rate of return. When the transaction cost of using small bills for illegal traders is sufficiently large, a separating equilibrium, where legal traders use small bills and illegal traders use large bills, can maximize welfare by making an implicit transfer from the illegal traders to the legal traders.     

Organizational Cultures of Corruption

Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.     

ECONOMY‐WIDE EFFECTS OF REDUCING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. EMPLOYMENT

We use an economy‐wide model to analyze the effects of three broad programs to reduce illegal immigrants in U.S. employment: tighter border security; taxes on employers; and vigorous prosecution of employers. After looking at macroeconomic industry and occupational effects, we decompose the welfare effect for legal residents into six parts covering changes in: producer surplus and illegal wage rates; skilled employment opportunities for natives; aggregate capital; aggregate legal employment; the terms of trade; and public expenditure. The type of program matters. Our analysis suggests a prima facie case in favor of taxes on employers. (JEL J61, C68)     

Common political culture: Evidence on regional corruption contagion

Although there are indications of common regional corruption characteristics, empirical studies of corruption have assumed that influences on corruption are country-specific. In this paper we report evidence based on a cross-section of 123 economies confirming that, with few specific exceptions, corruption is a regional phenomenon. Institutional change that reduces corruption in one country affects, therefore, neighboring countries.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth

We study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth in a framework that takes into account that corruption also affects growth through its impact on institutions. We use a formal growth framework in which corruption affects growth negatively because of individual rent‐seeking and stealing of public goods, but where corruption may serve a positive role by taking over the role of institutions. We find that the overall effect of corruption on economic growth is highly dependent on the institutional setting of a country. Particularly in situations where institutions are not well developed corruption may be conducive to economic growth. We also find that the interaction among institutions themselves matters. This underscores the importance of taking into account the complete institutional setting when studying corruption, both in theory as well as empirically.     

Non-random selection into entrepreneurship in the realm of government decentralization and corruption

For the past few decades, the extant literature on corruption has primarily relied on firm-level survey measures – for example, those from the World Bank – to explore the relevant empirical determinants of this illegal practice. However, these studies have potentially overlooked an underlying econometric problem – namely, non-random selection into entrepreneurship – that may bias all the estimated determinants to date if ignored in the analysis. Here, I assess this possibility by applying the traditional Heckman (1979) correction procedure in a novel way: using two different samples. I use my proposed solution in the context of government decentralization and firm-level corruption as a plausible application. Specifically, I revisit the question of the causal impact of government decentralization on firm-level corruption when the underlying sample selection issue is addressed. Results are worth noting. I find reasonable evidence of selection bias. On controlling for this, fiscal decentralization substantially decreases firm-level bribery, in general. This finding is in contradiction to the results reported by naive estimation strategies where the sample selection issue is completely ignored.     

CROSS‐COUNTRY EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION SPILLOVERS TO FORMAL AND INFORMAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Using cross‐country data this paper examines the spillovers of corruption to formal and informal entrepreneurship in neighboring countries. Whereas research has shown that entrepreneurs move underground to escape corruption, we argue that entrepreneurs may also seek refuge in neighboring countries. Indeed, the empirical results show that in response to a ceteris paribus increase in corruption in neighboring countries formal entrepreneurship increases in the home country with no effect on informal entrepreneurship. This is consistent with entrepreneurs circumventing corrupt public officials by immigrating to countries with presumably less corruption. These results withstand a battery of robustness checks. (JEL D73, L26)     

The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non‐linear Hypothesis

This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruption‐minimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision‐making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent‐seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non‐linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.     

Complex Goods' Exports and Institutions: Empirics at the Firm Level

This paper analyzes the role of institutions in the exporter's country in promoting the exports. Firm‐level evidence from 22 developing and transition countries is provided to show that institutions matter for complex goods. A poor legal system, weak contractual enforcement, and corruption significantly reduce the exports of complex goods. In contrast, the effect of such institutions on the exports of simple goods remains ambiguous. Our main results are robust to the use of different econometric methods.     

Sourcing from conflict regions: Policies to improve transparency in international supply chains

In this paper, we study how unilateral policies concerning certain conflict raw materials influence prices, illegal mining activities, and welfare. Firms in the North import natural resources from the South to produce final consumption goods. In one of the countries in the South, local groups attempt to access natural resources, which results in rent‐seeking conflicts with the government and in illegal mining. We find that a unilateral embargo against the conflict country as well as certification of legal mines can reduce rent‐seeking and illegal mining with different welfare consequences in the countries involved.     

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics are important questions. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Using cross‐country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are that in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking.     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.