Skill Composition,Fertility, and Economic Growth

While high fertility persists in the poorest countries and fertility declines with per capita income in developing countries, fertility and per capita income are now positively associated across most developed countries. This paper presents a model where a U‐shaped relationship between overall fertility and per capita income reflects within country differences in workforce skill composition and household choice of occupation, fertility, and childrearing. The fraction of skilled workers rises with economic growth. By allowing for both differences in the fertility of skilled and unskilled workers and purchased childrearing inputs, we explain a poverty trap with high fertility, fertility decline with economic development, and the possible reversal of fertility decline in a developed economy where most workers are skilled.     

Fertility,Taxation and Family Policy*

Historically, there is clear evidence of an inverse relationship between female labour supply and fertility. However, the relationship across countries is now positive. Countries like Germany and Italy, with the lowest fertility, also have the lowest female participation rates. This paper analyses the extent to which this can be explained by public policy, in particular taxation and the system of child support. The results suggest that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.     

Education and Fertility: Evidence from a Natural Experiment*

Declining fertility is often attributed to the increased education of women. It is difficult to establish a causal link because both fertility and education have changed secularly. In this paper we study the connection between fertility and education using educational reform as an instrument to control for selection. Our results indicate that increasing education leads to postponement of first births away from teenage motherhood and towards women having their first birth in their 20s as well as, for a smaller group, up to the age of 35–40. We find no evidence, however, that more education results in more women remaining childless or having fewer children.     

Fertility,Intra‐Generational Redistribution,and Social Security Sustainability

Incorporating heterogeneity in preference to having children into an overlapping generations model of a small open economy, we examine the effects of changes in the size of pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) social security on fertility choices of individuals and population growth of the economy. It is shown that PAYG social security will raise population growth by increasing the number of individuals who have children and the number of children parents have if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, whereas, if it has no redistribution, PAYG social security does not affect the fertility decisions of individuals.     

Fertility,household structure,and parental labor supply: Evidence from China

This study examines the effects of fertility on household structure and parental labor supply in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, we use a unique survey on households with twin children and a comparison group of non-twin households. The ordinary least squares estimates show a negative correlation between fertility and parental labor supply in rural China. Using twinning as a natural experiment, we do not find evidence on the negative effects of fertility on parental labor supply. By contrast, we find that the twinning-induced increase in fertility significantly enhances the coresidence of grandparents in rural China. We suggest that the negative effects of fertility on parental labor supply are mitigated by the childcare provided by grandparents in rural China. We also find that fertility does not induce coresidence of grandparents in urban China. Our results have important implications for population and public childcare policies.     

Gender Power,Fertility, and Family Policy

The birth of children often shifts the balance of power within a family. If family decisions are made according to the welfare function of the spouses, this shift in power might cause a time‐consistency problem. In a model of cooperative family decision‐making, we show that this problem can lead to a systematic downward bias in fertility. By keeping fertility low, spouses mitigate the ex ante undesired shift in the balance of power that results from the presence of children. This provides scope for welfare‐enhancing policy intervention. We discuss to what extent existing family policy measures are suitable for overcoming the bias.     

Fertility and the real exchange rate

Abstract .  We use a quinquennial data set covering 87 countries between 1975 and 2005 to investigate empirically the relationship between fertility and the real effective exchange rate. Theoretically, a country experiencing a decline in its fertility rate can be expected to experience a real depreciation. We test and confirm this hypothesis, controlling for a number of other potential determinants. We find a statistically significant and robust link between fertility and the exchange rate. Our point-estimate is that a decline in the fertility rate of one child per woman is associated with a depreciation of approximately 15% in the real effective exchange rate.     

Endogenous Fertility, Income Distribution, and Growth

This article analyzes the interaction between growth and fertility via income distribution in a model in which fertility decisions are motivated by old-age support. It provides an explanation of the demographic transition of an economy from a stage of increasing fertility and low growth to a stage of low fertility, high human capital investments, and high growth.     

Social Security and Family Support

This paper shows how the role of the market, the state and the family in providing old‐age support has evolved over time with changes in factors such as the reliability and the effectiveness of family support, the interest rate, the cost of public funds, and earning inequality. Agents with different productivity vote over the size of a Beveridgian pension system. When children assistance is certain, agents may rely exclusively on family and prefer no pension. However, when the size and the probability of family generosity decrease, social security is more likely to emerge.     

Tax incentives and fertility in Canada: quantum vs tempo effects

Abstract.  Using inter-jurisdictional differences in the implementation of the Family Allowance Program in Canada in the mid-1970s, this paper first shows that Quebec families with two or more children prior to being exposed to the program responded quite strongly to the added incentives in the short run relative to women in other Canadian provinces. Tracking down the cohorts across Censuses, we find that the same group of Quebec families subsequently showed a decrease in fertility relative to the rest of Canada, leaving ultimate family size unaffected. These results are consistent with the program having generated only a timing effect.     

The Effect of Life Expectancy on Fertility,Saving, Schooling and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence*

We construct a simple growth model where agents with uncertain survival choose schooling time, life‐cycle consumption and the number of children. We show that rising longevity reduces fertility but raises saving, schooling time and the growth rate at a diminishing rate. Cross‐section analyses using data from 76 countries support these propositions: life expectancy has a significant positive effect on the saving rate, secondary school enrollment and growth but a significant negative effect on fertility. Through sensitivity analyses, the effect on the saving rate is inconclusive, while the effects on the other variables are robust and consistent. These estimated effects are decreasing in life expectancy.     

The Optimal Level of Debt in an OLG Model with Endogenous Fertility

Abstract. In the present work we extend Diamond's OLG model by allowing for endogenous fertility and look at the consequences of such an extension on the rules for optimal public debt issuing. In particular, we show that the condition according to which the rate of growth of population should be higher than the interest rate is no longer sufficient for obtaining welfare improvements via debt increases and that the level of optimal debt is, ceteris paribus, lower than the one arising with exogenous fertility. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal level of debt is higher the lower the capital share, the higher individuals' degree of patience, the bigger the child‐rearing cost and the lower the preference for children. On policy grounds we argue that debt‐tightening policies may be optimal in the long run provided that the cost of rearing children does not increase (or, if anything, does decrease).     

Fertility, female labor force participation, and the demographic dividend

We estimate the effect of fertility on female labor force participation in a panel of countries using abortion legislation as an instrument for fertility. We find that removing legal restrictions on abortion significantly reduces fertility and estimate that, on average, a birth reduces a woman’s labor supply by almost 2 years during her reproductive life. Our results imply that behavioral change, in the form of increased female labor supply, contributes significantly to economic growth during the demographic transition when fertility declines.      

A microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under-participation trap

This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.     

Inter‐regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism

In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two‐region, two‐good model with inter‐regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.     

The Impact of Placing Adolescent Males into Foster Care on Education,Income Assistance,and Convictions

Understanding the causal impacts of taking at‐risk youth into government care is part of the evidence base for policy. Two sources of exogenous variation affecting alternative subsets of the at‐risk population provide causal impacts interpreted as local average treatment effects. Placing 16‐ to18‐year‐old males into care decreases or delays high school graduation, increases income assistance receipt, and has alternative effects on criminal convictions depending upon the instrument employed. This suggests that asking whether more or fewer children should be taken into care is insufficient; it also matters which, and how, children are taken into care.     

Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information

Suppose that the centre wishes to make transfers between member states of a federation to reduce inequality. However, it lacks precise information concerning the cost differences that are responsible for the initial income inequality. We examine the implications of asymmetric information for the design of the transfer scheme. We show that if member states’ inherent cost levels as local public good providers take discrete values, the first best, or ‘complete information’, transfer scheme may or may not violate incentive compatibility. If inherent cost is a continuous random variable, such a scheme certainly violates incentive compatibility. We also explore the possibility of binding participation constraints. In our model, a binding incentive compatibility constraint leads to a reduction in effort devoted to cost reduction, and a binding participation constraint will also lead to a violation of Samuelson's optimality condition for public good provision.     

Reservation wages, market wages and unemployment: Analysis of individual level panel data

Using individual level panel data, we analyse the divergence between the reservation wages of individuals who are out of work and their predicted market wages, focusing upon identifying the factors that influence the potential divergence. In addition, using propensity score matching techniques, we explore the implications of such divergences for future employment and wages. Our findings suggest that having reservation wages that are high relative to the predicted market wage influence both future employment and future wages.     

A DYNAMIC DECISION MODEL OF MARRIAGE,CHILDBEARING, AND LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN JAPAN*

This paper empirically examines marriage, child bearing and labour force participation behaviour of fertile‐aged women in Japan, applying an estimable dynamic model of dis‐crete choice. Using microdata from the 1994–1999 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, the structural estimation result suggests that, overall, women are worse off with marriage and part‐time work without financial benefits. Women are better off having two or more children, but considerably worse off because of the burden of raising infants. In addition, probabilities of finding full‐time work after career interruption are estimated at about 18% for university educated women and 12–13% for less educated women.