Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

Firm Productivity Differences From Factor Markets

We model firm adaptation to local factor markets in which firms care about both the price and availability of inputs. The model is estimated by combining firm and population census data, and quantifies the role of factor markets in input use, productivity and welfare. Considering China's diverse factor markets, we find that within an industry interquartile labor costs vary by 30–80%, leading to 3–12% interquartile differences in TFP. In general equilibrium, homogenization of labor markets would increase real income by 1.33%. Favorably endowed regions attract more economic activity, providing new insights into within‐country comparative advantage and specialization.     

Unions,Wage Gaps,and Wage Dispersion: New Evidence from the Americas

Using a common methodology, the effects of unions on wage levels and wage dispersion are estimated for two neighboring countries, Bolivia and Chile, and for the United States. The analysis shows that unions have broadly similar effects on the wage distribution within these three economies. The findings suggest that the political economy of unions, coupled with market constraints on labor costs, produce commonality in union wage effects that transcend other economic and institutional differences.     

A Two–Tier Wage Structure in a Nonunion Firm

This study examines the perceptions of nonunion workers in a permanent two–tier wage structure. Consistent with the predictions of equity and justice theories, low–tier employees are found to be more likely to perceive the wage structure as unfair, have lower pay satisfaction and organizational commitment, and report poorer worker–management relations than high– tier employees. These attitudes may make nonunion firms more vulnerable to certification campaigns since they are the same factors that have been repeatedly linked to employee intentions to vote for a union.     

Dissecting Between-Plant and Within-Plant Wage Dispersion: Evidence from Germany

Using rich linked employer–employee data for (West) Germany between 1996 and 2014, we conduct a decomposition analysis based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions to analyze the relative contributions of various plant and worker characteristics to the rise in German wage dispersion. Moreover, we separately investigate the sources of between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion. We find that industry effects and the collective bargaining regime contribute the most to rising wage inequality. In the case of collective bargaining, both the decline in collective bargaining coverage and the increase in wage dispersion among the group of covered plants have played important roles.     

HRM Practices and the Within‐Firm Gender Wage Gap

The effect of HRM practices on the within‐firm gender gap in wages in manufacturing is investigated merging a 1999 survey on work practices among Danish firms to matched employer–employee panel data. Self‐managed teams, project organization and job rotation schemes are the most widely introduced practices. Accounting for non‐randomness in adoption, the pay gap is reduced among hourly paid workers but increases among salaried workers. Considering practices individually, wage gains from adoption accrue to males except for salaried workers in firms that adopt project organization and for hourly paid workers in firms that introduce quality control circles.     

企业中的信息技术生产率悖论

信息技术 (IT)生产率悖论描述了从信息技术投资所获得的实际收益和期望收益的不匹配。本文综合国外最新研究进展 ,将关于企业层面的信息技术生产率悖论研究分为三个阶段 :2 0世纪 90年代中期之前为悖论的证实和解释阶段 ;2 0世纪 90年代中期悖论消失 ;2 0 0 0年以后新悖论出现。对新悖论的成因进行分析并探讨了新悖论存在的问题。最后 ,给出企业信息技术生产率悖论对我国企业信息技术投资的启示。     

Wage Discrimination, Segregation, and Sex Differences in Wages and Productivity Within and Between Plants

We use panel data on Israeli manufacturing plants to test two explanations of lower wages and lower productivity in plants with a higher percentage of females: (1) within plants women are paid less and are less productive, consistent with no discrimination, and (2) women are segregated into lower-wage and lower-productivity plants. Although the variation in productivity across plants appears to stem from differences in productivity between men and women, the estimates suggest no within-plant wage differential between men and women.     

Collective Wage Contracts,Opt‐Out Clauses,and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.     

Flexible Wage Contracts,Temporary Jobs,and Firm Performance: Evidence From Italian Firms

This study focuses on the effects of decentralized wage schemes and temporary forms of employment on firm performance. The effect of monetary incentives on workers' effort and firm performance is a central topic in economics. According to the principal‐agent paradigm, firms (the principal) have to link employees' remuneration schemes to any verifiable indicator of performance to avoid opportunistic behavior. The empirical evidence shows that financial incentives have the potential to exert strong effects on indicators of firm performance, such as productivity and worker absenteeism, although the degree of effectiveness of such schemes varies significantly according to the institutional/economic context in which firms operate. From both a theoretical and empirical point of view, the prediction on the effects of temporary types of employment on effort and productivity is less neat. In light of these considerations, this study uses a sample of Italian firms to provide further empirical evidence on whether and to what extent performance‐related pay schemes and contract flexibility affect workers' effort (in terms of absenteeism) and, in turn, firm productivity. These effects are analyzed for different types of workers (white collar vs. blue collar), working in workplaces characterized by a different degree of uncertainty and risk and in firms operating in different economic and institutional settings. Our results show that wage flexibility has a significant effect on effort and then on firm's productivity and that white‐collar workers are more responsive to monetary incentives than blue‐collar workers. Moreover, the presence of a large share of temporary contracts, implying a lower dismissal probability for permanent workers and a deterioration of the working environment, appears to reduce workers' motivation and effort.     

Wage Cyclicality Under Different Regimes of Industrial Relations

We analyze the effect of collective wage agreements and of works councils on the cyclicality of real wages. Using employer–employee data for western Germany (1995–2004), we find that wage adjustments to positive and negative shocks are generally not symmetric. Wage growth increases in all industrial relations regimes when unemployment is falling, but this inverse relationship is weaker when unemployment is rising. Moreover, in plants with individual‐level bargaining, wages do not adjust at all to rising unemployment. Works councils increase wage growth only in firms covered by sectoral agreements, but they do not affect the cyclicality of wages.     

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data, our findings show that firm-level agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity (with respect to sector-level agreements). Relying on approaches developed by Bartolucci and Hellerstein et al., they also indicate that firm-level agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect mostly holds in sectors where firms are more concentrated or less exposed to international competition. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond labour productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firm-level agreements benefit both employers and employees — through higher productivity and wages — without being very detrimental to firms’ performance.     

企业网络与企业边界理论

在对现有企业边界理论进程重新梳理之后，我们从管理理论中抽象出经济学意义上的企业网络概念。在此基础上，我们对企业的类型进行了重新分类，并界定了每种企业的边界以及相应的经济含义．希望对进一步理解企业和市场的关系提供新的研究视角和思路。     

Menu Costs, Nominal Wage Revisions, and Intracontract Wage Behavior

We use data from indexed and nonindexed Canadian wage agreements to study the intracontract profile of nominal and real wages. Allowing for endogenous switching between the two indexation categories, we conclude that the number of nominal wage revisions depends on contract duration, expected inflation, and the cost of adjusting wages. Our results have implications for the menu cost, overlapping contracts, dynamic monopoly union, and efficient bargain literatures.     

Changes in Working Practices in British Manufacturing Industry in the 1980s: A Study of Employee Concessions Made During Wage Negotiations

The 1980s witnessed a considerable increase in the rate of growth of manufacturing productivity in Britain. This paper attempts to reveal the extent of systematic change at the work-place which was associated with this improvement. The study focuses on changes in working practices introduced concurrently with negotiations over wage increases; in every year throughout the decade around one third of wage settlements involving trade unions included productivity enhancing change. It is argued that the discipline of competitive pressure and the absence of incomes policy gave rise to the growth in the incidence of wage negotiations which featured a productivity element.     

Unpacking Firm Exit at the Firm and Industry Levels: The Adaptation and Selection of Firm Capabilities

Evolutionary theory of business activity studies how firms are selected out of environments in which they do not fit, but most existing work underemphasizes the distinction between acquisition and dissolution as selection processes. We address this gap with a multilevel analysis that investigates how managerial and functional organizational capabilities affect whether struggling firms exit by acquisition or dissolution. We demonstrate that managerial and functional capabilities have heterogeneous effects on selection processes, with managerial capabilities having particularly strong influence on acquisition exits by struggling firms. The work provides a bridge between adaptation and selection views on organizational change; exit by dissolution represents selection of both firms and capabilities, while exit by acquisition represents firm selection but capability adaptation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sex and Interoccupational Wage Differences in Israel

An examination of the influence of the sex identification of an occupation on earnings reveals that: (1) male occupations earn more than female occupations; (2) nonsegregated occupations tend to be more similar in earnings to female than to male occupations; (3) the majority of female occupations earn below the mean for occupations at each level of education; the inverse is true for male occupations; (4) men in female occupations earn less than they do in male occupations; and (5) women in male occupations do not consistently earn more than women in female occupations at comparable levels of education. Our data indicate that they tend to gravitate toward the lower earning male occupations. These findings support the hypothesis that in Israel, as elsewhere, occupational segregation is an important factor underlying earning differentials between women and men. Wage differentials are the result not only of differences in human capital resources, but also of unequal opportunities within the occupational structure. The division of labor by sex does not cause inequality—rather it permits the perpetuation of a system of social relations in which the work women do is allocated inferior status and economic rewards. The social forces which produce and sustain this reality are worthy of further investigation.