Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results.     

International intellectual property rights: Effects on growth, welfare and income inequality

What are the effects of strengthening developing countries’ protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&;D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. In this growth-theoretic framework, we show that strengthening patent protection in either country increases economic growth and income inequality in both countries. Furthermore, we derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent breadth and find that it is sub-optimally low relative to globally optimal patent breadth due to the positive externality effects that are captured by a spillover parameter.     

Patent Protection,Innovation and Technology Licensing

We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is moderate, investment in innovation is maximised at a patent protection that is weaker than the strongest patent protection. Otherwise, strongest patent protection maximises investment in innovation. We also show that welfare is maximised neither at the strongest patent protection nor at the weakest patent protection but at an intermediate patent protection. Our results are important for patent policies.     

Patent Protection and R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information

When tournament effect is negative, under complete information, whether patent protection increases the incentive for R&D is ambiguous. It depends on the extent of spillover of the new technology. In particular if that amount is less than a threshold value then patent protection increases the incentive for R&D, otherwise it does not. This note considers incomplete information framework where the spillover parameter is private information. In this framework it is shown that there are situations where patent protection unambiguously increases incentive for R&D. This happens if the distribution function of the spillover parameter is sufficiently skewed and the cost of doing research is sufficiently high even when tournament effect is negative.

     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Location choice under trade and environmental policies

In this paper, we use a game theoretic model to analyze the trade-off between the attractiveness of FDI and the environmental damage caused by production under asymmetric information. In the first stage, the domestic developing country reveals the level of import tariff and pollution tax under information uncertainty about the environmental damage that the foreign firm can cause. The foreign firm from a developed country decides where to locate afterwards with complete information about its own damage. Results show that the developing country can be better off encouraging FDI if and only if the marginal damage of pollution is sufficiently low. The optimal level of pollution taxes attracting FDI is higher than the marginal damage of pollution. However, the optimal pollution tax without FDI can be lower than the marginal damage of pollution with sufficiently high demand in the developing country.     

Fiscal policy,wealth divergence,and lifetime utility

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model where the less patient country decumulates and the more patient one accumulates wealth, we analyze spillover effects of lump-sum and consumption taxes. A lump-sum tax on a country definitely harms the other country through a change in the rate of interest. A lump-sum tax on either country always improves the less patient country's asset position. A consumption tax has no spillover effect, although it is Pareto-inferior. Applying these results into a closed-country context with heterogeneous agents, we also discuss policy implications of a discriminatory tax.     

Trans-boundary Pollution and Brain Drain Migration

The economic effects of international brain drain migration in the presence of trans‐boundary pollution are analyzed. In autarky, both skilled and unskilled workers are expected to migrate from the less developed foreign country to the developed home country, if permitted. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, all workers, apart from skilled foreign ones, will gain (lose) from the migration of unskilled (skilled) foreign workers. Moreover, if skilled foreign workers are employed as unskilled domestic workers, then skilled foreign workers will gain but unskilled workers in both countries will lose. Whether or not skilled domestic workers will gain depends on the magnitude of the pollution spillover parameter. Brain drain migration persists under free trade if the demand for manufactured goods is strong.     

Outward foreign direct investment and sovereign risks in developing host country

Outward foreign direct investment can affect developing, technology-receiving host countries mainly through tax revenue, technology spillover and the competition effect. With the consideration of these three effects of the outward foreign direct investment on host country, we develop a dynamic game model of interaction between foreign investors and host country from a dynamic perspective, to reveal the dynamic evolution mechanism of the sovereign risk faced by outward foreign direct investment. The result shows that: host governments usually give a specific tax holiday for outward foreign direct investors, and during the period of tax holiday investment decision of investors would be influenced by technology spillover effect, specifically, the greater the technology spillover the slower the growth of investment stock. Once the system reaches a stable state, the host country will impose a tax on multinational corporations. If the equilibrium tax rate of industries or regions which makes it easy to obtain technology spillover is high, then the equilibrium capital stock would be low.     

Tariff,Growth, and Welfare

We develop a two‐country (Home and Foreign) by two‐good (consumption good and investment good) by one factor (capital) endogenous growth model with international knowledge spillover to study the relationship between an import tariff and economic growth and welfare. First, unlike the past literature, we do not need to make an assumption such that the growth rates between countries are identical in a balanced growth path (BGP). Second, we show that there exists a unique and saddle‐point BGP with both countries being incompletely specialized. Third, a higher import tariff on the consumption good in the domestic country may boost (reduce) the rate of economic growth when the foreign (domestic) country has an absolute advantage in the investment good. Finally, a rise in the tariff rate by one country may improve world welfare under some parameter spaces.     

Transfer Pricing Rules,OECD Guidelines,and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility in a two‐country monopolistic competition model with source‐based profit taxes. Firms can either be multinationals and serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate, or be exporters and serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. The use of the OECD's comparable uncontrolled transfer price (CUP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions, because the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors—which serve as the benchmark—are not efficient. We show that the CUP rule is detrimental to consumers in the low‐tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high‐tax country when compared to the benchmark of unconstrained profit shifting. Using the OECD rule increases tax revenue at the expense of consumer surplus. Those results also hold under the alternative cost‐plus transfer pricing rule.     

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

Corporate tax avoidance and cost of equity capital: international evidence

ABSTRACT

This study examines the association between firm’s tax avoidance activities and cost of equity capital across 17 countries. Consistent with the prior study based on the U.S. evidence, within strong investor protection countries, the extent of firm’s tax avoidance is negatively associated with its cost of equity capital. This result indicates that strong investor protection induces investors to perceive firm’s tax avoidance activities as the results of efficient tax planning to reduce tax liabilities. To the contrary, we find that the extent of firm’s tax avoidance is positively associated with its cost of equity capital within weak investor protection countries. This result suggests that investors impose equity risk premium on firm’s tax avoidance activities in weak investor protection countries, where agency conflicts prevail more on firm’s tax avoidance activities. As the first international study on the association between firm’s tax avoidance activities and its cost of equity capital, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting that such an association may vary across countries depending on the strength of investor protection within each country of domicile.     

International Knowledge Diffusion and Home‐bias Effect: Do USPTO and EPO Patent Citations Tell the Same Story?*

This paper estimates the international diffusion of technical knowledge using patent citations. We control for self‐citations and for procedural differences between patent offices using equivalent patents. We find that (1) there are clear biases in patent examination processes that generate citations in the two offices; (2) at the EPO there is a strong localization effect at the country level, and the size is comparable to that found at the USPTO; (3) technological fields have different properties of diffusion in the two patent offices that do not depend on a patent office bias; (4) using EPO data, the US is not the leading country in terms of citations made and received, as occurs at the USPTO.     

技术扩散模型中的发展中国家最优专利保护

本文在Barro and Sala-I-Martin(1997)的技术扩散模型基础上,构建了一个Ramsey问题模型讨论发展中国家内生的动态最优专利保护问题。本文给出了Ramsey问题的均衡解并讨论了其动态特征,克服了现有文献只用比较静态方式分析讨论外生最优专利保护政策的缺陷。本文的主要结论是,发展中国家在发展早期阶段,理应设定相对较低的专利保护程度,然后随着经济成长不断地提高专利保护水平,但其长期的稳态专利保护水平有可能比发达国家高,也可能比发达国家低。     

Taxation and Tournaments

This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labor supply and income distribution in the context of the rank‐order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non‐zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society's welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.     

Equilibrium audit strategies against tax treaty shopping

This paper examines game‐theoretic models of tax treaty shopping. An investor can choose a direct or indirect investment route across countries to minimize tax. A tax agency can audit the investor. The audit is costly but it can give additional revenue to the tax agency. In simultaneous‐move games, regardless of whether incomplete information exists and whether a home country allows foreign tax credits, there are mixed‐strategy equilibria where the investor may choose tax‐minimizing indirect routes and the tax agency may audit the investor. This equilibrium random audit strategy helps the tax agency raise revenue and reduce treaty shopping. Comparative statics yields an implication consistent with empirical evidence. However, if the home country has a foreign tax credit system with a high tax rate, or if the tax agency observes the investor's action in a sequential‐move game, the investor always chooses the direct route, and no treaty shopping occurs in equilibrium.     

Unilateral climate policy and the green paradox: Extraction costs matter

I analyze the effect of unilateral climate policies in a two‐country model where fossil fuel extraction costs depend on both current extraction and remaining stock and where a constant marginal‐cost clean substitute is available. An intensification of climate policy in the country with an initially stricter policy does not increase early fossil fuel extraction (i.e., there is no “weak green paradox”) or the present value of pollution costs (i.e., there is no “strong green paradox”) if energy demand in that country is initially met with a mix of fossil fuel and a substitute. Whether a stricter climate policy in the country with an initially laxer policy causes a weak green paradox depends on the price elasticity of energy demand and the strength of the flow and stock dependence of extraction costs. If the reduction of total extraction is sufficiently strong, it overcompensates for a weak green paradox with respect to pollution costs. Thus, a weak green paradox does not necessarily imply a strong green paradox, due to stock dependence.     

Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.