Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Tax Principles and Tariff‐Tax Reforms under International Oligopoly

In a two‐country duopoly model, this paper compares destination‐ and origin‐based commodity taxes adjusted to tariff reductions so that the world price and foreign welfare remain unaltered. We first find that this tariff‐tax reform reduces domestic welfare under the destination principle while the opposite holds under the origin principle. Then, it is shown that this ranking is reversed if exports are taxed. In short, which is preferable between destination and origin taxes depends on the tax principle and which between imports and exports are taxed.     

Welfare‐ and Revenue‐Enhancing Tariff and Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

We examine welfare and revenue effects of tariff and tax reform in a country importing final and intermediate goods, both of which are produced under imperfect competition. We consider two reform strategies. First, lower the sum of a consumption tax and a tariff on the intermediate good, and leave the sum of the consumption tax and a tariff on the final good unchanged. Second, lower the former and change the latter to leave government revenue unchanged. We specify conditions under which each reform strategy raises welfare without decreasing government revenue.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.     

Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.     

Export Market Dynamics and Plant‐Level Productivity: Impact of Tariff Reductions and Exchange‐Rate Cycles*

In this paper, we examine how changes in tariff rates and industry‐specific real exchange rates affect the entry/exit process to export markets and productivity growth. Using the experience of the Canadian manufacturing sector over three decades, we find that firms in export markets enjoy faster productivity growth than non‐participants. The size of the growth advantage depends on whether real exchange rates are increasing or decreasing. The increase in the value of the Canadian dollar during the post‐2000 period almost completely offset the productivity growth advantages enjoyed by new exporters during this period.     

Leadership and Privatisation in a Mixed Multi‐product Oligopoly: An Endogenous Timing Model

This paper examines both leadership choice and welfare consequences of privatisation in an endogenous timing mixed multi‐product oligopoly. It shows that a multi‐product firm undermines the welfare‐maximising efforts of a public firm by cross‐subsidising. The paper demonstrates that a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium emerges in a multi‐product market, in contrast to the multiple equilibria of a single‐product market. This unique equilibrium indicates that profit‐maximising private firms retain leadership while a welfare‐maximising public firm acts as a follower. Even on the off‐equilibrium path where the public firm acts as a leader, it rarely generates maximum social welfare. However, privatising the public firm usually harms social welfare and results in a different timing structure in equilibrium.     

Trade Creation Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: Tariff Reduction versus Non‐tariff Barrier Removal

This study uses the most disaggregated tariff line‐level trade data in a large number of countries in the world to empirically decompose the trade creation effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) into those owing to tariff reduction and those owing to non‐tariff barrier (NTB) removal. Specifically, utilizing our detailed dataset, we employ the standard gravity equation and identify those effects by estimating the trade creation effects of RTAs for ineligible and eligible products for RTA preferential schemes separately. Our major findings are as follows. First, for the whole sample, there are significantly positive trade creation effects owing to tariff reduction while the effects for NTB removal are weak. Second, the trade creation effects of tariff reduction and NTB removal are substantially large in the case of trade among low‐income countries but weak among high‐income countries.     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.     

Agglomeration Economies,Division of Labour and the Urban Land‐rent Escalation: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Urbanisation

A general equilibrium model with increasing return to labour specialisation and economies of transaction agglomeration is developed to address the residential land‐rent escalation associated with the urbanisation process, which is in turn endogenised as a result of the evolution of the division of labour. The interplay among the geographical pattern of transactions, trading efficiency and the network size of the division of labour plays a crucial role in our story of urbanisation. We show that: as transaction conditions are improved, the equilibrium level of division of labour and individuals specialisation levels increase; the urban land‐rent increases absolutely as well as relative to that in the rural area, the relative per capita lot size of residence in the urban and rural areas decreases; the diversity of occupations in the urban area and the population share of urban residents increase; and the productivity of all goods and per capital real income increase.     

Multiunit Pay‐Your‐Bid Auction with One‐Dimensional Multiunit Demands*

An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two‐step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single‐unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the “relative” supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.     

Firm‐Level Analysis Using the ABS’ Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment (BLADE)

The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment (BLADE) is the most comprehensive firm‐level statistical asset in Australia. This short overview provides readers a window into what data sources are used, how they are integrated, current and future applications and how these can contribute to evidence‐based policy making in Australia. At present, direct access is limited to staff directly employed by the Australian Statistician or through secondment.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

Balanced‐Budget Rules,Elasticity of Substitution,and Macroeconomic (In)Stability

This paper examines the relation between factor substitution and (local) stability of equilibria in a one‐sector real business cycle model under balanced‐budget rules. We show that under non‐unitary elasticity of factor substitution, the Schmitt‐Grohé‐Uribe indeterminacy result can be altered. Using the two‐step normalization procedure, we highlight two opposing effects of factor substitution, namely, the efficiency effect and the distribution effect, on aggregate stability. With endogenous distortionary taxes and gross substitutability between capital and labor, the existing literature overlooks the distribution effect and finds that balanced‐budget rules are likely to deliver indeterminacy. However, if capital stock is relatively more abundant, a higher elasticity of substitution generates a source of stability due to the distribution effect. Our calibration shows that the distribution effect is always the dominating force.     

Signaling in a Rent‐Seeking Contest with One‐Sided Asymmetric Information

We consider a two‐player rent‐seeking Tullock contest where one player has private information about his valuation of the prize, which can be high or low. This player can send a costly signal to his opponent, i.e., he can commit to reduce the prize either by some absolute amount of money or proportionally, conditional on winning it. We show that both kinds of signaling imply completely opposite results for separating equilibria, both in terms of conditions for existence and the type of player who sends the costly signal.