Globalization and financial development

This paper argues that globalization is a key factor in stimulating institutional reforms in developing countries that promote financial development and economic growth. Advanced countries can help in this process by supporting the opening of their markets to goods and services from emerging-market countries. By encouraging these countries to increase their participation in global markets, advanced countries can create exactly the right incentives for developing countries to implement the reforms that will enable them to have high economic growth.     

Globalization,product differentiation,and wage inequality

Abstract This paper develops a two‐country, general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which the degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by firms’ strategic investments in product innovation. Consumers seek variety and product innovation is more skill intensive than production. Stronger import competition increases innovation incentives, and thereby the relative demand for skill. An intra‐industry trade expansion following trade liberalization can therefore increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. As long as some industries remain shielded from international competition, the welfare implications of globalization are found to be generally ambiguous.     

FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: PUBLIC SPENDING AND PRIVATE EFFORT*

This paper explores governments' and private agents' incentives to implement or postpone fiscal structural reform attempts. Both fiscal consolidation and fiscal reorganization often create spillover effects and thereby induce free‐riding problems. It is thus important to cope with the free‐riding behaviour of interest groups. It is often argued that in order to attain successful outcomes, a good macroeconomic situation is needed, since we expect positive income effects. In this paper, we first explain the dynamic aspects of insufficient fiscal consolidation due to free‐riding problems in the framework of private provision of public goods. Then, using a static model between central and local governments, we examine the sign of income effects for reform attempts to pursue fiscal reorganization. It is shown that good economic circumstances do not necessarily enhance reform of reorganizing fiscal expenditures, although it could enhance fiscal reconstruction.     

The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.     

COMPETITION, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COST-REDUCING INNOVATION

Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.     

Unemployment and welfare consequences of international outsourcing under monopolistic competition

This paper challenges the conventional academic view that international outsourcing is just another form of gainful trade. Contrary to that view, we show that labour‐service outsourcing can reduce the high‐wage country's welfare even when product‐market trade is beneficial, within a model that combines involuntary unemployment and monopolistic competition. Outsourcing's impact on welfare is worsened by a definite loss of jobs and a possible contraction in the range of varieties produced worldwide. While owners of capital benefit from outsourcing under certain conditions, labour's welfare always falls.     

Evidence on the Convergence of Per Capita Income: A Comparison of Founder Members of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

This paper investigates the per capita income convergence patterns of a set of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. We obtained a time‐series analysis for stochastic convergence by applying unit‐root tests in the presence of two endogenously‐determined structural breaks. We then supplemented the results by tests that produced evidence for β convergence. The evidence shows that the relative per capita income series of ASEAN‐5 countries were consistent with stochastic convergence and β convergence, but this was not found for SAARC‐5 countries. For the ASEAN‐5 countries, the structural breaks associated with the world oil crisis and the Asian crisis impacted heavily on the convergence/divergence process.     

Trade liberalization and institutional reforms1

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non‐tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro‐trade effect of institutional similarity.     

Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries

Abstract We examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country’s government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country’s dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.     

Deforestation and the real exchange rate

Deforestation is a phenomenon that has largely been concentrated in the developing world. We construct a theoretical model of deforestation that focuses on the factors affecting the incentives to transform forested land into agricultural land. We show that: (i) lower discount rates and stronger institutions decrease deforestation; (ii) a depreciation in the real exchange rate increases deforestation in developing countries whereas the opposite obtains in developed countries; (iii) paradoxically, better institutions may exacerbate the deleterious impact of a depreciation in developing countries. These hypotheses are tested on an annual sample of 101 countries over the 1961–1988 period, and are not rejected by the data. Our results suggest that short-term macroeconomic policy, institutional factors, and the interaction between the two, are potentially important determinants of environmental outcomes.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS*

This paper analyses export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander‐Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine welfare‐enhancing policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity value of the slope of the inverse demand curve and the market share. It is also shown that for policy makers, export quotas are superior to export subsidies under certain conditions.     

Models of trust-sharing in Chinese private enterprises

This paper presents two related models of development patterns of Chinese private enterprises. They illustrate incentive-based reasons for ownership arrangements of private enterprises, and highlight how institutional foundations of trust, particularly government and family-based cultural values, play an important role in influencing the development of private enterprises. These models attempt to explain why government and family-based culture are crucial for the ownership structure and management of private enterprises. The main argument in the models is that the structure of family businesses can be viewed, in essence, as a form of trust-sharing (Guanxi-sharing) arrangement within the firm. Furthermore, the increase in the prevalence of family businesses can be seen as a result of family trust replacing government trust in the firm's economic activities.     

The impact of institutions on financial development: Evidence from East Asian countries

This paper examines the impact of institutions on regional financial development using a panel data model of 11 East Asian countries during 1996–2017. It divides the institutional factors into six economic factors and six legal‐political factors. The analysis demonstrates that the legal‐political institutional factors have a stronger impact on financial development than the economic institutional factors in East Asia. Improvement in institutional quality such as fiscal freedom, business freedom, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law can promote financial development. Improvements of these institutional factors facilitate the ability of enterprises to allocate resources and improve the strength of business operations, thereby reducing transaction costs and making the financial operating environment fairer and more efficient. With the improvement of institutional factors, financial development will have more opportunities to develop better. Institutional impacts are more pronounced in the financial development in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar than in the other countries such as China, Japan, Korea and Singapore.     

Watching out for regional separatism in the Russian far East: Ideological cueing of territorial security,economic incentives and cultural identity

Why has regional separatism failed to materialise in the post‐Soviet Russian Far East despite the region's remoteness from Russia's European heartland, its proximity to the Pacific Rim economies, the decline of economic support from Moscow, and a ‘frontier’ culture of resistance to Moscow's rule? Focusing on political developments in Primorskii Krai ‐ the key frontier province in the Russian Far East ‐ the study finds that territorial security, economic incentives, and cultural identity affect proclivities for regional separatism selectively, depending on ideological and institutional constraints in which centre‐periphery relations are embedded. In the absence of ideological commitments and enforceable institutional rales and norms, centre‐periphery conflicts devolve into economic bargaining and rule‐manipulation by elites for quick material gains. The changing ideological context amidst post‐Soviet institutional transition in Russia provide the most consistent explanation of conflict dynamic between Primorskii Krai's leaders and Moscow, of the non‐emergence of regional separatism, and of gross economic mismanagement of the province.     

COMMERCIAL REVITALIZATION IN LOW‐INCOME URBAN COMMUNITIES: THE HOLDUP PROBLEM AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

A commercial development model, based on Fujita's monopolistic competition model of spatial agglomeration, addresses firms' decisions to enter urban communities. The model focuses on commercial developers and large department stores, and identifies a potential holdup problem in the commercial development market arising because developers incur costs before negotiating with anchor tenants over profit sharing; the holdup problem is more likely to occur in low‐income communities where the profitability of commercial projects is small. The model predicts that direct incentives to developers are preferred to general tax incentives for addressing this market failure. (JEL R58, H50, H76)     

Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

Abstract This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented.     

Corporate Tax Reductions,Cross‐Border Ownership and Welfare

In this paper, a three‐country model incorporating the cross‐border ownership of stock and international firm relocation is constructed. Using this model, the effects of a reduction in the corporate tax on welfare in all three countries is examined. The findings indicate that if the country undertaking the reduction is moderately rich, and one of the two remaining countries is rich while the other country is poor, the tax reduction not only brings about a positive effect on its own welfare, but also increases the welfare of the rich foreign country and lowers that of the poor foreign country.     

Saving–investment Association and Regional Capital Mobility in China: A Nonparametric Panel Approach

Using a nonparametric panel data model, this paper estimates the degree of time‐varying and province‐specific capital mobility in China during 1970–2006. We estimate the savings–investment association, that is, the savings retention rate à la Feldstein and Horioka, as a measure of capital mobility. We also split the total savings (investment) into private and government savings (investment) to explore the role of government in improving capital mobility. Over time, we find an improvement in capital mobility after the mid‐1990s. Across provinces, we observe higher capital mobility in eastern/coastal regions. From the 1990s, the government is found to play a less important role in promoting capital mobility. Across provinces, the government is found to be more important in either the municipalities (Shanghai and Beijing) or the less developed inland provinces.     

When does FDI have positive spillovers? Evidence from 17 transition market economies

We use rich firm-level data and national input–output tables from 17 countries over the 2002–2005 period to test new and existing hypotheses about the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the efficiency of domestic firms in the host country (i.e., spillovers). We document that backward linkages have a consistently positive effect on productivity of domestic firms while horizontal and forward linkages show no consistent effect. We also examine how the strength of spillovers varies by sector, FDI source, institutional environment (corruption, red tape, level of development), firm’s distance to the technological frontier, and other firm- and country-specific characteristics.     

Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.