THE ARGENTINEAN CURRENCY CRISIS: A MARKOV‐SWITCHING MODEL ESTIMATION

In 2002, the Argentinean currency board came to a sudden and dramatic end. Although the country had been suffering from weak economic fundamentals for years, the timing and severity of the currency crisis surprised most observers. The present study analyzes the role of fundamentals and self‐fulfilling speculation in the Argentinean crisis. Arguing within a theoretical model of a fixed exchange rate system that allows for multiple equilibria, we show that the crisis, although associated with weak fundamentals, cannot be explained by these macroeconomic factors alone. Estimating a univariate Markov‐switching model, the current study shows that shifts in agents’ beliefs did indeed also play a crucial role.     

Why are currency crises contagious? A comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998

Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998.—This paper analyzes three channels through which currency crises are transmitted between countries: contagion based on unsustainable economic fundamentals; contagion resulting from herding behaviour in financial markets; contagion induced by close trade integration. The presented model that links currency crises with these three types of contagion is employed to analyze the transmission of the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 and the Thai crisis in 1997 to other emerging economies. The empirical results show that, first, the most important contagion channels were based on close financial and trade integration rather than on the weakness of macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, the vulnerability to capital flow reversals and weak financial sectors made countries particularly prone to a currency crisis, while external imbalances and currency misalignments were much less important. JEL no. F30, E60, E65, E44     

China's vulnerability to currency crisis: A KLR signals approach

In this paper we use the Kaminsky–Lizondo–Reinhart (KLR) [Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C., 1998. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45, 1–48.] approach to conduct an ex-post study of the probabilities of China suffering a currency crisis during the period of January 1991 to December 2004. Two high-probability periods are identified: July 1992–July 1993 and August 1998–May 1999. The first period correctly predicts China's 1994 devaluation. The second period predicts currency devaluation in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, which did not occur. The results of the model indicate that the fundamentals were weak enough for China to experience contagion of the Asian crisis, and raise the question of the possible role of China's institutional arrangements in preventing the crisis. The paper further analyzes the economic fundamentals of China that drive the high probability of crises, and provides some suggestions for further reform.     

What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?

The paper explores the view that the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 and 1998 reflected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even if market overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The first part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial ‘overlending’, banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows. The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian crisis from the antecedents in 1995–1996 to the recent developments in early 1999 in parallel with a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international intervention, and the costs and benefits of capital controls.     

Crisis Vulnerability

Earlier attempts to explain the East Asian crisis of 1997 have overemphasised the importance of contagion, missing the central role of vulnerability. According to conventional accounts, Thailand experienced a financial panic due to such factors as corrupt government and corporate practices, inadequately supervised banks and venal currency speculators. Confidence in the Thai currency and banking system collapsed, provoking capital flight, a float of the Thai currency and a drastic decline in its value. This undermined confidence in the prospects of other East Asian countries, also provoking crises there. This article clarifies the concept of vulnerability and demonstrates its relevance by showing the long-term development of vulnerability in each of the three 'IMF bail-out' countries: Thailand, Indonesia and Korea. By 1996 all three were vulnerable to a currency crisis. Contagion provided the short-term trigger for the crisis but was not its underlying cause. The policy lesson is to avoid vulnerability, not to attempt to avoid contagion.     

Currency Crises and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

The currency crisis literature has identified two possible types of crisis: fundamentals based crises and self-fulfilling crises. A fundamentals based crisis arises when some state variable, such as foreign exchange reserves, reaches a critical level and triggers the abandonment of the fixed rate. A self-fulfilling crisis is triggered by an autonomous change in the beliefs of speculators. This paper demonstrates how these two types of crises generate different behaviour in the term structure in the period before the crisis. JEL Classification Numbers: E43, F31     

The Asian crisis: what did we learn and when did we learn it?

This paper steps back from the detail of the Asian crisis, to ask whether the 1997 crisis advanced our broad understanding of the age‐old problem of economic crises. Some immediate lessons were learned from the failures of the crisis‐response in Indonesia, which was the worst‐affected economy. It is notable, however, how little changed to address the ongoing systemic weaknesses. Three areas of unresolved vulnerability can be identified. First, the sudden stops and reversals of international capital flows. Second, the intrinsic fragility of a financial system that borrows short and lends long. Third, unanchored exchange rates, where the market's price‐discovery can take the rate to levels far from equilibrium, for sustained periods. For more than a decade after the Asian crisis, international capital flows continued to be seen as unambiguously beneficial, with any attempts at capital flow management rejected. At a global level, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that widespread financial fragility was addressed through tighter regulation and higher capital requirements. On exchange rates, misleading advocacy of corner solutions—either pure floating exchange rates or immutable fixed rates—continued in the face of the real‐world experience that sometimes intervention is needed to maintain an exchange rate close to equilibrium.     

The Simple Analytics of Sudden Stops

Currency crises in emerging and developing countries have often been characterized by “sudden stops” of capital flows. A variety of mechanisms have been adduced to explain the emergence of this phenomenon. This paper integrates these mechanisms into a simple and transparent analytical model in which currency mismatches, large current account deficits, and large stocks of short-term debt interact with low reserve stocks to generate dual equilibria. In this context, the “panic” equilibrium is characterized by a currency crisis, a sudden stop, and an output collapse. The potential for various policies to avoid this outcome is explored, as are the implications of the analysis for reserve accumulation.     

Exchange-rate policy in East Asia after the fall: how much have things changed?

This paper evaluates the changes in the exchange-rate policies of East Asian economies in the aftermath of the currency crisis and the process in which the exchange-market stability was re-established. The empirical analysis evaluates the changing roles of the yen and the US dollar in the currency baskets, the shifts in the volatility of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals and their implications on exchange-rate management, the exchange-market perception of credibility and risk of the postcrisis exchange-rate regimes, and the process of reversion to fundamental values after the massive currency depreciation.The analysis shows that after the abandonment of the quasi-dollar peg, the yen had gained a greater weight in the currency baskets and the greater flexibility in which the exchange rates are being managed serve to accommodate the greater volatility in the macroeconomic fundamentals. The improvement in the macroeconomic conditions and the greater credibility that has been acquired by the regional monetary authorities had allowed the exchange market to stabilize and enabled the exchange rates to revert back to their fundamental values.     

Nonlinear Capital Flow Tax: Capital Flow Management and Financial Crisis Prevention in China

How to promote capital account liberalization while preventing financial crises is a challenging task for policymakers. This study proposes a nonlinear (progressive) capital flow tax as a solution. We first demonstrate that the collateral requirement of international borrowing can give rise to multiple equilibria and self‐fulfilling financial crises. We then show that the crisis equilibrium characterized by large exchange rate depreciation, capital flight and welfare loss can be eliminated by imposing a nonlinear (progressive) tax scheme on capital outflows with the marginal tax rate increasing with the size of individual capital outflows. The implementation of such a tax scheme in China is also discussed.     

TRADE PATTERNS AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES: TESTING THE ASIAN CURRENCY BASKET USING AN INTERNATIONAL INPUT‐OUTPUT SYSTEM

This paper aims at analyzing exchange rates and trade patterns of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, China, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in relation to Japan and the United States, with reference to the Asian currency crises in 1997. In order to analyze these issues, we constructed an international input‐output model linked with macroeconometric models of the ten countries/regions. Analyses on the Asian exchange rates with a currency basket peg framework show that the Asian exchange rate policy was the de‐facto dollar peg policy. As for trade patterns in relation to the yen‐dollar rate; when a country/region's industrial structure is similar to that of Japan's and the yen is weak, the appropriate change of the yen's weight proves to hold its competitiveness. By contrast, the weak yen shows a decrease of its imports, regarding complementary structure. In either case, however, effects are limited.     

Foreign devaluation as a coordinating device of heterogeneous investors: A game‐theoretic analysis of financial contagion

This paper investigates financial contagion by extending the Morris–Shin (1998) model of financial crises. It is assumed that before a devaluation in a foreign country, home investors have only private information on the state of the home country. It is demonstrated that the occurrence of a currency crisis in the foreign country may trigger a similar crisis in the home country by coordinating heterogeneous beliefs of home investors. The model is designed to describe the Asian currency crisis of 1997.     

Sovereign Spreads and Contagion Risks in Asia

In the aftermath of the recent global financial turmoil, sovereign spreads have exhibited a significant degree of volatility. This paper explores how much of these movements in the spreads of Asian economies reflected shifts in global risk aversion or country‐specific risks, directly from worsening fundamentals, or indirectly from spillovers originating in other sovereigns, or risks and uncertainty surrounding their exchange rates. This analysis finds that earlier in the crisis, the increase in market‐implied contagion led to an increase of sovereign bond yields relative to the swaps. Higher‐rated sovereign bonds in Asia benefited from the flight to quality that accompanied the increase in global risk aversion during this period. Once the systemic risks in the financial sectors worldwide were contained, the risk of sovereign spillovers eased, which, together with a fall in perceived currency‐related risks, led to a fall in sovereign bond yields relative to swaps yields across the board. Comparing the situation to that of Europe, the present paper concludes that the debt crisis in the euro area has not affected the perception of sovereign risks of Asian economies. In fact, a fall in exchange rate and spillover risks, combined with stronger fundamentals, have led to a continued normalization of Asian sovereign spreads since the height of the financial crisis.     

人民币升值与银行危机的历史启示

历史上,许多国家在汇率制度改革后经历了银行危机。在对五个银行危机指标进行分析后,对中国与18个退出固定汇率制度后经历货币升值的国家进行了对比研究。实证分析结果表明,中国在实际退出固定汇率制度并保持人民币小幅升值的经济背景下,发生银行危机的概率没有明显变化。     

Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises, 1797–1994

We argue that recent currency crises reflect clashes between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, just as did crises in the past. We reject the view that crises reflect self-fulfilling prophecies that are not closely related to measured fundamentals. Doubts about the timing of a market attack on a currency are less important than the fact that it is bound to happen if a government's policies are inconsistent with pegged exchange rates. We base these conclusions on a review of currency crises in the historical record under metallic monetary regimes and of crises post-World War II under Bretton Woods, and since, in European and Latin American pegged exchange rate regimes.     

Speculative attacks and currency crises: The Mexican experience

By using data from the Mexican economy, this paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. A deterioration in fundamentals appears to generate high one-step-ahead probabilities for the observed regime changes during the sample period 1982–1994. Particularly, foreign reserve losses, expansionary output, monetary and fiscal policies, an increase in inflation differentials and the share of short-term foreign currency-indexed debt, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate appear to have contributed to the speculative pressures and the associated regime changes.     

FORECASTING CURRENCY CRISES: WHICH METHODS SIGNALED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS OF JUNE 2006?

In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast South African currency crises with a special emphasis on their out‐of‐sample performance. We choose the latest crisis of June 2006 to conduct an out‐of‐sample experiment. The results show that the signals approach was not able to forecast the out‐of‐sample crisis correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but only with models, that were based on raw data. The Markov‐regime‐switching approach predicts the out‐of‐sample crisis well. However, the results are not straightforward. In‐sample, the probit models performed remarkably well and were also able to detect, at least to some extent, out‐of‐sample currency crises before their occurrence. The recommendation is to not restrict the forecasting to only one approach.     

Currency crisis and contagion: evidence from exchange rates and sectoral stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand

This paper analyzes empirically the recent Asian financial crisis by using high-frequency data of exchange rates and stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand. With time-series techniques, this study confirms that benchmark stock indices often fail to provide valuable insights into currency crises, but there is evidence that developments in some sectoral indices—including those of banking and financial sectors—seem to have caused upward pressure on exchange rates. Our evidence therefore confirms the importance of financial markets as a transmission channel during the currency crisis period.     

High‐Frequency Contagion of Currency Crises in Asia*

Using daily data from the Asian currency crisis, the present paper examines high‐frequency contagion effects among six Asian countries. The ‘origin’ (of exchange rate depreciation, or decline in stock prices) and the ‘affected’ (currencies, or stock prices) in the daily spillover relationship were defined and identified. Indonesia is found to be the main origin country, affecting exchange rates of other countries. Contrary to conventional wisdom, evidence of high‐frequency crisis spillover from the Thai exchange rate to other currencies was weak at best. There exists a high‐frequency contagion in stock markets among East Asian countries. Contagion coefficients are positively correlated with trade indices, indicating that investors lower their financial assessment of a country that has trade linkage to a crisis origin country within days, if not hours, of a shock.     

Is a Common Currency Area Feasible for East Asia? A Multivariate Structural Vector Autoregression Approach

In this paper the feasibility of forming a common currency area in East Asia is investigated. A three‐variable structural vector autoregression model is used to identify three types of shocks: global, regional and domestic shocks. The empirical results show that in the post‐crisis period the importance of asymmetric domestic shocks has declined sharply, whereas that of symmetric global and regional shocks has increased. Furthermore, although a ‘prevalent shock’ cannot be uniquely defined, most East Asian economies respond to global and regional shocks in a symmetric way. Although the findings do not provide strong support for forming a common currency area in this region at the current stage, they suggest that most East Asian economies have become relatively symmetric in terms of economic shocks and adjustments, implying that a common currency area might become viable through deepening regional integration.