The Determinants of Stock Option Compensation: Evidence from Finland

A new, long, and rich panel data set consisting of all Finnish publicly traded firms is used to study how firm characteristics and stock market developments influence the adoption and targeting of stock option compensation. Stock option adoption is found to be a procyclical phenomenon. Findings from firm‐level econometric analysis often corroborate those based on U.S. data, but important differences also emerge. Findings include: (i) firms with higher market value per employee are more likely to use stock option compensation; (ii) share returns from the past year affect the adoption of targeted stock options, but not broad‐based plans; (iii) our results are consistent with the hypothesis that selective and broad‐based plans arise as solutions to differing monitoring difficulties. Broad‐based schemes are observed when production is human capital‐intensive and employee performance is hard to monitor, while selective schemes are adopted when ownership is dispersed and therefore owners may have weak incentives to monitor management.     

Intellectual Capital,Monitoring, and Risk: What Predicts the Adoption of Employee Stock Options?

We use empirical analysis to analyze company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of broad‐based stock option plans. First, a cross‐sectional analysis evaluates what company characteristics are now associated the incidence of such plans. Second, a longitudinal analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. Our results show that firms with higher levels of intellectual capital and capital intensity are more likely to adopt and maintain employee stock option plans.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Non‐Expensed Employee Stock Bonus on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese High‐Tech Firms

The choice of whether to expense broad‐based stock incentives has been a highly controversial debate in both academic research and practice circles. We provide insightful findings to reconcile certain debates regarding the effectiveness of non‐expensed, broad‐based stock incentives. Using a unique longitudinal dataset from Taiwanese high‐tech firms over the 1997–2008 period, our results indicate that non‐expensed employee stock bonus incentives exerted positive effects on short‐term organizational value added creation. The dilution effects of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan, however, exerted a negative influence on profitability and eroded share return. The negative effects were even more severe in the following year, and overexploitation of employee stock bonus also damaged the long‐term organizational performance of Taiwanese high‐tech firms. This negative aspect of non‐expensed employee stock incentives resulted in more evidence for changing the regulatory context of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Broad-based Employee Stock Options in US 'New Economy' Firms

This paper compares the performance of 229 'New Economy' firms offering broad-based stock options to that of their non-stock option counterparts. A simple comparison of these firms reveals that the former have higher shareholder returns, Tobin's q and new knowledge generation. Multivariate analysis using panel data also suggests that the adoption of a stock option plan results in higher levels of value added per employee. However, we do not find evidence that these plans result in superior growth in Tobin's q or new knowledge generation.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The structure of ownership and corporate acquisition strategies

In this study, we examine in an agency‐theoretic context the influence of executive equity stakes upon corporate strategy and firm value. We argue that beneficial, risk‐increasing corporate strategies may initially be emphasized but non‐value‐maximizing, risk‐reducing strategies may subsequently be emphasized as managers expand their stock ownership. We alternatively contend that stock options may have a consistently positive impact on firm risk taking and acquisition returns. The empirical findings are supportive of our expectations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

经理人股票期权价值的理论及应用

股票期权激励的研究和实践中广泛应用布莱克——斯科尔斯模型进行股票期权的公允价值计价,然而对经理人而言的股票期权价值还要考虑经理人的风险偏好、财富的多元化程度等因素的影响。经理人期权价值不等于公司期权成本的基本理论可以解决及解释在股票期权实践中的一些关键性问题,如期权激励有效性的衡量、激励期权的风险溢价、最优行权价的确定、行权时间的确定。该理论的应用对我国上市公司股权激励的实施也有重要启示。     

Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?

Profit-sharing and employee ownership in companies have attracted considerable interest, yet there has been little research on factors predicting the adoption and maintenance of these plans. This study uses new data from a survey of 500 US public companies, and panel data on corporate financial variables, to examine factors predicting the presence and adoption of profit- sharing and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the 1975–91 period. Several findings support productivity-related motivations for such plans (including higher R&D levels among old profit-sharing firms, and recent adoption of job enrichment programmes among new profit-sharing firms), while others support flexibility-related motivations (including higher variance in profits prior to the adoption of profit-sharing plans and ESOPs). Unionized firms were less likely to have either type of plan in 1975, but equally likely to adopt them subsequently (often in concessionary contracts). Comparisons of cross-sectional and panel results illustrate advantages of panel data in disentangling the causes and effects of profit-sharing and ESOPs.     

Executive turnover in the stock option backdating wave: The impact of social context

While boards are known to react to corporate misconduct by removing the executives responsible, little is known about whether the board's response is shaped by the firm's social context. Using the 2006 stock option backdating scandal, in which firms manipulated stock option grant dates, we examine the impact of two dimensions of social context—the pervasiveness of the misconduct and the media attention to the misconduct. We find that firms implicated later in the backdating scandal are less likely to experience executive turnover than those implicated earlier. We also find that the amount of media attention to backdating at the time a firm is implicated in the scandal increases the likelihood that the firm experiences executive turnover.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Smallholder productivity and weather shocks: Adoption and impact of widely promoted agricultural practices in Tanzania

We investigate the impact of maize-legume intercropping, soil and water conservation practices (SWC), organic fertilizers, inorganic fertilizers and high yielding maize varieties on maize productivity under weather shocks in Tanzania using panel data. First, we estimate the determinants of adoption by applying a multivariate panel data model capturing their complementarities and/or substitutabilities. Second, after testing for their potential endogeneity, we study the impact of these practices (and combinations of them) on maize productivity controlling for weather shocks. Finally, we disaggregate results by presence/absence of seasonal rainfall and temperature shocks to explore the heterogeneous impact of adoption under weather shocks. We find strong complementarities between agricultural practices both in terms of adoption and yield impacts. Long-run variability in rainfall decreases the adoption of organic fertilizers and increases that of improved seeds. Farmers in areas where the cropping season’s rainfall has been highly variable and temperature has been unexpectedly high have significantly lower maize yields. SWC emerges as one of the most important practices in increasing yields with significant benefits by itself, in combination with other practices, under average weather conditions as well as under rainfall and temperature shocks. Overall, increasing the adoption of SWC appears a promising policy option to buffer food security from increasingly frequent weather shocks in Tanzania.     

The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multiagent perspective

Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION ON PRODUCTIVITY AND INDUSTRY GROWTH: A STUDY OF STEEL REFINING FURNACES*

This paper examines the impact of new technology on plant‐level productivity in the Japanese steel industry during the 1950's and 1960's. We estimate the production function, considering the differences in technology between the refining furnaces owned by a plant. We find that a more productive plant was likely to adopt the new technology and that the adoption would be expected to occur immediately following the peak of the productivity level achieved with the old technology. The adoption of the new technology primarily accounted not only for the industry's productivity slowdown but also for the industry's remarkable growth.     

The impact of work‐life programs on firm productivity

This research examined the adoption of work‐life programs and the impact of work‐life programs on firm productivity. Human resource executives in a national sample of 658 organizations provided survey data on firm characteristics and work‐life programs. In these 658 organizations, the percentage of professionals and the percentage of women employed were positively related to the development of more extensive work‐life programs. Productivity data were obtained from CD Disclosure for 195 public, for‐profit firms. Significant interaction effects indicated that in these 195 firms work‐life programs had a stronger positive impact on productivity when women comprised a larger percentage of the workforce and when a higher percentage of professionals were employed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

U.S. Monetary Policy Surprises and Mortgage Rates

This article examines how the U.S. monetary policy surprises impact the mortgage rates in the nation and across five regions from 1990 to 2008. Regression analysis based on bootstrapping shows that surprises in the target federal funds rate (the target factor) have a significantly positive impact on the 1‐year adjustable‐rate mortgage (ARM) rate within the week of the Federal Open Market Committee announcements and the positive impact lasts up to 1 week after the announcements. Surprises in the future direction of the Federal Reserve monetary policy (the path factor) have significantly positive impacts on both the 1‐year ARM rate and the 30‐year fixed mortgage rates in the first week after the announcement. Furthermore, the responses of mortgage rates are asymmetric and affected by the size of monetary policy surprises, the stage of the business cycle and whether the monetary policy is tightening or loosening. There also exists heterogeneity in the mortgage rate pass‐through process across regions and monetary policy surprises have differential impacts on the regional mortgage rates. The cross‐region variations are mainly correlated with the regional housing market conditions, such as home vacancy and rental vacancy rates.