Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40     

Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

Interest Rate Volatility Prior to Monetary Union under Alternative Pre-Switch Regimes

Abstract. The volatility of interest rates is relevant for many financial applications. Under realistic assumptions the term structure of interest rate differentials provides an important predictor of the term structure of interest rates. This paper derives the term structure of differentials in a situation in which two open economies plan to enter a monetary union in the future. Two systems of floating exchange rates prior to the union are considered, namely a free-float and a managed-float regime. The volatility processes of arbitrary-term differentials under the respective pre-switch arrangements are compared. The paper elaborates the singularity of extremely short-term (i.e. instantaneous) interest rates under extensive leaning-against-the-wind interventions and discusses policy issues.     

The Euro and Internal Economic Policy Coordination

This paper reviews, mainly from an institutional angle, the objectives, forms, scope, levels, implementation and challenges involved for internal economic policy coordination after the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. In particular, it identifies six different aspects of coordination (procedures, exchange of information, analytical framework, monitoring, policy interactions and joint determination of policies) and analyses the rationale for coordination in eight different policy areas. After presenting some of the challenges lying ahead, the paper concludes that although an appropriate institutional framework seems in place, it still has to undergo its baptism of fire.     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis

Abstract. We show that, in a two‐stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

The business cycle implications of the euro adoption in Poland

This article analyses the macroeconomic impact of the loss of autonomous monetary policy after the euro adoption in Poland. Using a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages, we find that the euro adoption will have a noticeable impact on the magnitude of economic fluctuations. In particular, the volatility of output, interest rate, consumption and employment is expected to increase while the volatility of inflation should decrease. Also, in order to quantify the effect of the euro adoption, we compute the welfare effect of this monetary policy change. Our findings suggest that the welfare cost is not large.     

The Interaction between the Central Bank and a Single Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Monetary Policy Uncertainty Reduce Nominal Wages?

Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .     

析货币政策的科学性与艺术性

货币政策的制定和实施离不开科学原则作指导,但货币政策的实时决策又是极其复杂的,需要中央银行家的审时度势和敏锐判断,也即货币政策的艺术性。详细分析了货币政策科学性和艺术性的具体表现,认为货币政策的科学性与艺术性在实践中是难以分割和同等重要的,好的货币政策总是需要好的政策实施者,需要将科学性原则与中央银行家们的决策艺术完美地结合起来。     

Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Abstract. This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation‐targeting and non‐targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non‐targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999–2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation‐targeting (versus non‐targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy‐makers' backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs' experience is much greater in inflation‐targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.     

Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

Abstract. This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.     

略论中国货币政策有效性

在界定货币政策有效性的概念基础上对中国的货币政策效果进行实证分析,进而提出提高中国货币政策有效性的对策建议。货币政策目标的实现程度是衡量货币政策有效性的标志。货币政策有效性的内涵就是货币政策具有真实效应,能够对真实经济变量产生影响。货币政策有效性就是货币政策能够在保持物价稳定、国际收支平衡的前提下促进经济增长和降低失业。     

中国货币政策与股票市场的关系

本文提出的综合理论框架全面分析描述了以稳定物价水平、促进国民经济持续增长为目的的货币政策与股票市场的关系 ,着重对中央银行干预股票市场的必要性和有效性进行理论分析和实证检验。本文应用的动态滚动式的计量检验方法适应中国经济体制不断调整的特征 ,不但可以完成我们的理论分析 ,更可以检测中央银行对股票市场干预的机制及干预的有效性 ,从而分析进一步的政策含义 ,为中央银行的货币政策制订和预期效果提供一个前瞻性的预测分析框架。     

Co-ordinating Stability: Some Remarks on the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy under EMU

The launch of Monetary Union in Europe has prompted calls for enhanced policy co-ordination among economic policy-makers. This paper sounds a note of caution and argues that the problem of policy co-ordination needs to be placed in the broader context of the efficient assignment of tasks and responsibilities among separate actors. In the presence of incentive and information problems, overly ambitious attempts at EXPLICIT forms of policy co-ordination may actually turn out to undermine the IMPLICIT co-ordination properties of the clear division of responsibilities enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. A single monetary policy that is credibly geared to the maintenance of price stability and national fiscal policies that genuinely accept the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact already go a long way in securing macroeconomic stability. Additional channels for dialogue among policymakers should be helpful to the extent that they enhance the understanding of individual responsibilities and do not dilute accountability.     

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.     

中国货币政策中介目标与经济增长

货币政策中介目标是货币政策体系中的重要组成部分,合适的货币中介目标对保持国民经济持续稳定增长具有重要意义。采用基于ARDL模型的协整分析方法,对货币中介目标与中国国民经济增长的关系进行了深入研究,发现通货膨胀率对国民收入的影响幅度最大、货币供应量对国民收入的影响次之,而利率对国民收入的影响相对较小。认为在目前条件下,我国应从过于强调货币供应量指标,转向综合利用多种金融变量来指导货币政策的操作,但在将来市场体系完善后,可考虑采用通货膨胀作为货币政策中介目标。     

关于我国货币政策促进经济增长的研究

人民银行货币政策目标是:保持人民币币值稳定并以此促进经济增长,所以搞清楚货币政策与通货膨胀、经济增长的关系就十分必要。通过计量分析可以得出:货币供应量M1的增长是推动GDP增长的主要因素,财政支出增长不是推动GDP增长的因素,但是不能否定其在反经济危机中的巨大作用;货币供应量M1的增长是推动CPI增长的主要因素;在制定货币供应量政策时,既要考虑到推动GDP增长的目的,也要受到CPI上涨的制约,需要在二者之间权衡;在制定利率政策时要研究均衡的利率,实际利率要向均衡利率靠近,并且要随着经济情况的变化及时调整,以达到最大的资本积累量,保证我国的长期经济增长。     

Riding the wave: Monetary responses to aid surges in low-income countries

We focus on the management of highly persistent shocks to aid flows in the presence of currency substitution by the domestic private sector. Such shocks have beneficent long-run effects, but when currency substitution is high they can produce dramatic macroeconomic management problems in the short run. What is the appropriate mix of money and exchange rate targeting in such cases, and the role of temporary sterilization? We analyze these and related issues in an intertemporal optimizing model that allows a portion of aid to be devoted to reducing the government's seigniorage requirement. Our results show that a managed float, with little or no sterilization of increases in the monetary base, supports the smooth absorption of the increased aid without incurring higher inflation, higher real interest rates or overshooting of the real exchange rate.     

经济开放度与货币政策有效性的实证分析

通过运用Karras建立的产出增长率和通货膨胀模型,采用向量自回归VAR框架,分析经济开放度对我国货币政策效果的影响。回归结果表明,无论是以M0作为货币政策的测度指标,还是以M1作为货币政策的测度指标,它们都反映出:在长期,经济开放度的提高会削弱货币政策的有效性;但从短期来看,经济开放度的提高不一定会削弱货币政策的有效性,有时反而会提高货币政策的有效性。