Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters

This paper shows that—in contrast to the received wisdom—uncertainty about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development of inflation. Uncertainty about other parameters, on the other hand, dampens the policy response.
JEL classification : E 43; E 52     

The Interaction between the Central Bank and a Single Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Monetary Policy Uncertainty Reduce Nominal Wages?

Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .     

中国货币政策与股票市场的关系

本文提出的综合理论框架全面分析描述了以稳定物价水平、促进国民经济持续增长为目的的货币政策与股票市场的关系 ,着重对中央银行干预股票市场的必要性和有效性进行理论分析和实证检验。本文应用的动态滚动式的计量检验方法适应中国经济体制不断调整的特征 ,不但可以完成我们的理论分析 ,更可以检测中央银行对股票市场干预的机制及干预的有效性 ,从而分析进一步的政策含义 ,为中央银行的货币政策制订和预期效果提供一个前瞻性的预测分析框架。     

Understanding China’s monetary policy: an institutional perspective

Given China’s status as a large transitional economy, analysing the country’s monetary policy requires an understanding of the institutional and policy environment within which monetary policy operates. As China’s monetary policy has multiple objectives and the central bank is subordinate to the State Council in monetary policy decisions, addressing deep-rooted structural issues and improving governance and institutions are essential so that monetary policy can be more focused and effective. Confronted with the Impossible Trinity dilemma, China faces daunting challenges in tackling the inevitable policy choice between monetary autonomy and exchange rate control as its capital account increasingly liberalises. This article analyses China’s unique and evolving monetary policy framework from an institutional perspective and evaluates the challenges to monetary management and reforms. Relevant policy implications for monetary policy implementation are also discussed.     

The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?

We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. Our results suggest that most of the examined regressors, including factors that capture the effects of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent. This result suggests that unobserved characteristics of central bankers and different communication strategies drive the dissent, rather than the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

货币政策能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放——基于宏观经济不确定视角的研究

本文研究在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放。首先,将货币政策引入考虑了宏观经济不确定性的银行资产组合模型中,论证货币政策、宏观经济不确定性与银行信贷资产配置的理论关系。然后利用我国181家银行2004—2018年的数据,检验在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具对银行小微企业信贷行为调控的作用效果。研究结果表明：宏观经济不确定性会抑制银行信贷行为。其中小微企业信贷占比较大的银行受到的影响更为显著。与数量型货币政策相比,价格型货币政策能够更显著地减轻不确定性对银行小微信贷的消极影响。其中银行同业拆借利率的调控效果最强。研究结论对于选择适宜的货币政策工具促进银行向小微企业信贷投放,化解经济不确定性对银行信贷行为的影响并助力小微企业发展等具有政策借鉴意义。     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

混沌理论在我国货币政策制定和执行中的应用

我国货币政策环境可视作混沌的复杂系统。混沌理论表明,系统在时空上的复杂结构通常隐含着简单的决定性准则,一旦这样的准则被发现,管理当局则可以观察或者控制系统内部的复杂状况,以达到预期目标。运用于货币政策的混沌理论,是指将货币政策环境看作是具有高度复杂性和长期行为不可预测性的混沌系统,其中必然隐含着复杂系统内普遍适用的简单决定性准则。如果我们掌握并始终遵循这一准则,就可以观察并控制货币政策环境这一复杂混沌系统,使货币政策目标向预期的方向发展。     

Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias

This paper offers an alternative explanation for the occurrence of an inflation bias with and without an output goal exceeding natural output. A monetary game model is developed from which an inflation bias emerges because the policymaker increases money growth in order to avoid a recession due to a possible negative control error. Whereas higher additive instrument uncertainty increases the inflation bias, higher multiplicative uncertainty decreases it. Delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central banker decreases the inflation bias for all types of control errors.     

基于MCI缺口的货币政策操作风险测度研究

由于受短期目标的约束以及中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,若货币政策工具及调控时机选择不当,或政策信息披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期和增加市场的不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。通过构建包含货币供应量的货币条件指数(MCI),并考察其实际值与均衡值之间的离差状况,结果表明MCI及其缺口可用于间接测度货币政策操作风险的大小,而所得到的风险指数可作为宏观调控的参考指标。     

The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.     

Monetary base and federal government debt in the long-run: A non-linear analysis

Government bonds are usually traded between the financial institutions and the Fed during the open market operations. These operations impact the bank reserves, subsequently influencing the monetary base. The monetary base and government bonds may portray a common trend and government debt could potentially bind the central bank to debt monetization. This paper, using monthly data on federal government debt and the monetary base from 1947:1 to 2018:10, investigates the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables and as to how the long-run equilibrium relationship vary in the short-run. Threshold cointegration tests find evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Estimates of the threshold vector error-correction model find statistically significant evidence of contraction in the monetary base growth in the short-run in regime 1. In regime 2, the growth in the monetary base does not adjust to accommodate faster government debt growth. These estimates find no evidence of debt monetization or otherwise in either of the regimes in the United States. The Fed, by reducing the monetary base, perhaps focuses more on the inflation target. The findings also suggest a potential scenario where the Fed and the fiscal authority are not conjoined with each other in their operations.     

货币政策不确定性对会计信息质量的影响研究*

本文探讨了货币政策不确定性对微观企业会计信息质量的影响。本文研究发现,货币政策不确定性能够促使企业提高会计信息质量,且该现象在盈利的公司中更为显著。进一步研究发现,高质量的会计信息能够缓解货币政策不确定性对上市公司信贷融资和投资效率的不利影响。本文的研究表明,加强货币政策的平稳性与一致性对于促进实体经济发展至关重要,同时,提高会计信息质量能够显著增强企业抵御货币政策不确定性带来的不良影响。     

Constructing the Monetary Conditions Index for China

How can we fit different monetary transmission channels together to understand the effect of China’s monetary policy? This paper focuses on China’s monetary conditions and aggregate demand in terms of the monetary conditions index (MCI), which has been widely used as an important indicator for central banks, financial institutions, and scholars. To construct an MCI in the context of China over 1987Q1–2010Q2, we consider three channels through which monetary conditions might influence aggregate demand: the primary lending rate, the real effective exchange rate, and the bank credit. The weights of the component variables are obtained by estimating both the IS equation and the vector autoregressive model (VAR), which yield somewhat similar results. Further empirical tests show that the MCIs we derived contain useful information about future output growth and inflation in China over the short and medium term. From a historical perspective, the MCI we derived is more informative than individual monetary variables for the understanding of the development of China’s monetary conditions between 1987 and 2010.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Evaluating the effect of monetary policy on unemployment with alternative inflation forecasts

This paper explores the role that inflation forecasts play in the uncertainty surrounding the estimated effects of alternative monetary rules on unemployment dynamics in the euro area and the US. We use the inflation forecasts of 8 competing models in a standard Bayesian VAR to analyse the size and the timing of these effects, as well as to quantify the uncertainty relative to the different inflation models under two rules. The results suggest that model uncertainty can be a serious issue and strengthen the case for a policy strategy that takes into account several sources of information. We find that combining inflation forecasts from many models not only yields more accurate forecasts than those of any specific model, but also reduces the uncertainty associated with the real effects of policy decisions. These results are in line with the model-combination approach that central banks already follow when conceiving their strategy.     

货币政策透明度指数:理论方法与实证检验

文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。     

Commitment or discretion? An empirical investigation of monetary policy preferences in China

This paper offers a first attempt to estimate the policy preferences of China’s central bank by confronting a small-scale microfounded New Keynesian model in which monetary policy is described by commitment or discretion with the Chinese macroeconomic data over the period from 1992Q2 to 2017Q4. Bayesian model comparison reveals that the data favor discretionary monetary policy. Estimates of the loss function weights under both cases show that the leading policy goal is price stability, followed by output stability and then interest rate smoothing. Finally, through counterfactual analyses we assess how macroeconomic outcomes might improve, had the Chinese central bank been able to commit. These findings shed new light on the opaque Chinese monetary policy, and are robust to subsample analysis.     

The Role of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sustaining Growth With Stability in India*

The performance of the Indian economy in recent years has attracted increasing international interest. This paper focuses on the role of fiscal and monetary policies in the evolution of the Indian economy over the years, with particular attention being given to the reforms undertaken in these policies since the early 1990s. The coordination of fiscal and monetary policies has been crucial in the sequencing of the economic reform process carried out since the early 1990s. Monetary policy aims to maintain a judicious balance between price stability and economic growth. With the opening up of the Indian economy and the spread of financial sector reforms aimed at functional autonomy, prudential strengthening, operational efficiency, and competitiveness of banks, considerations of financial stability have assumed greater importance in recent years alongside the increasing openness of the Indian economy. The biggest challenge facing the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in India is to continue the accelerated growth process while maintaining price and financial stability. Therefore, the self‐imposed rule‐based fiscal correction at both the national and subnational levels has to be consolidated and carried forward. The existence of a high level of fiscal deficit also contributes to the persistence of an interest rate differential with the rest of the world, which then also constrains progress toward full capital account convertibility. The success achieved in revenue buoyancy through tax rationalization and compliance has to be strengthened further.