Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Strategic Environmental Policies and the Gains from Trade Liberalization

The literature on strategic environmental policy has not fully addressed welfare effects of trade liberalization from autarky. In a reciprocal market model of duopoly with transboundary pollution, we study how reductions in transport costs and import tariffs affect the Nash‐equilibrium welfare of an environmental policy game as compared to any initial state including autarky. We show three patterns of gainfulness of trade depending on the interaction between marginal damage from pollution and the degree of transboundary pollution.     

Quota Wars In Conjectural Variations*

This paper uses a two-country, two-good, conjectural-variations model of trade to show that a quota war will not end in autarky as Rodriguez (1974) and Tower (1975) concluded. Since both countries expect retaliatory responses to reductions in their quotas, both countries are willing to stop the trade war before autarky is reached. the possible equilibria are free trade, two equilibria in which one country has its optimal quota while the other country chooses free trade, and an interior solution. It is possible that some, all, or none of these equilibria will exist.     

Trade,Strategic Environmental Policy,and Global Pollution

This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs.     

Free Entry, Quasi-Free Trade, and Strategic Export Policy

This paper analyzes governments' choices between strategic export subsidies and free trade as a commitment when firms are free to enter or exit in response to these choices. Entry and exit is treated as a discrete process. Within the context of a four-stage game, two types of equilibria emerge: a quasi-free-trade equilibrium in which one of the two governments commits to free trade, while the other has a Nash equilibrium subsidy that is zero and bilateral export subsidies. Concerning welfare effects, if fixed costs are large enough, both countries achieve a welfare gain relative to free trade.     

Distance measures between free trade and autarky for the world economy

We develop a methodology to determine numerically how globalized the world economy is. We present a global general equilibrium model capturing major OECD economies and a residual rest of world for which alternative metrics of distance between observed, free trade and autarky equilibria can be developed. We use data for 2000 and report a number of distance measures between the 2000 observed trade restricted equilibrium and both free trade and autarky equilibria noting the absence of prior literature on metrics of distance between equilibria. The measures are used to determine the degree to which the world economy is globalized.     

OPTIMAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

We consider the optimal education policies of a small economy whose government has a limited budget. Initially, the economy is closed and the government chooses its education policy to maximize welfare under autarky. When the economy trades with the rest of the world the government chooses a new education policy that maximizes welfare under trade. Is it ever optimal for the government to choose its new policy so that it reverses the economy's comparative advantage? We find that if the budget stays fixed when it is optimal to ‘move up the skills chain’ it is not feasible. In such a case, a foreign loan is welfare improving. A move in the opposite direction can be optimal, and when it is optimal it is also feasible.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

Endogenous enclosure in North-South trade

Abstract .  We show that the second-best case against the optimality of free trade remains valid in the face of a well-targeted, but costly, policy response. Trade between a North, where property rights can be enforced at relatively low cost, and an otherwise identical South, yields trade patterns and welfare results nearly identical to those previously shown to arise if North and South differ exogenously in the extent of control over resources. Both nations respond optimally to world prices, and the opening of trade leads to the development of property rights in the South. Nonetheless, for a set of world prices bounded by the South's autarky price, the South is better off under autarky and is made worse off by each increase in its export price.     

International trade and consumption network externalities

This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities. The framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture. In an extended Ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that: (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique; (ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse (network competition) under free trade, but can be if each country is homogenous (network monopoly); (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky. Consumers of imported network goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.     

Why Free Trade May Hurt Developing Countries

This paper builds a general equilibrium trade model where a country produces two traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The government finances the provision of the public good by taxing the incomes of factors of production, and/or by imposing tariffs. Within this framework, the paper (i) shows that a small tariff or an income tax improves the country's welfare if there is an undersupply of public good, and (ii) identifies the circumstances in which an improvement in the country's terms of trade may reduce its welfare, and free trade can be inferior to autarky. A terms of trade improvement, or the movement from autarky to free trade, definitely improves the country's welfare if the government imposes a tariff that leaves the domestic relative price of the imported good unchanged.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

THE CLOSED-LOOP EFFECTS OF MARKET INTEGRATION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY

This paper develops a dynamic game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider welfare effects of market integration, i.e. reductions in transport costs. We show that welfare under trade is unambiguously less than welfare under autarky for any level of transport costs, which is impossible in static models where trade is profitable if the transport cost is low enough. This is because the negative effect through closed-loop property of feedback strategies dominates the positive effects.     

TRADE AND DIVERGENCE IN EDUCATION SYSTEMS

This article presents a theory on the endogenous choice of education policy and the two‐way causal relationship between trade and education systems. A country's education system determines its talent distribution and comparative advantage; the possibility of trade by raising the returns to the sector of comparative advantage in turn induces countries to further differentiate their education systems and reinforces the initial pattern of comparative advantage. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium choice of education systems by two countries interacting strategically are necessarily more divergent than their autarky choices, and yet less than what is socially optimal for the world.     

Cooperative R&D and Strategic Trade Policy with Bertrand Competition

This paper uses a strategic trade policy model to analyze the welfare effects from allowing cooperation in R&D when firms compete in a price‐setting game in the product market. A policy game between two governments is analyzed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. At the Nash equilibrium to this game only one government allows cooperation in R&D. This equilibrium is both individually and jointly optimal. International cooperation in R&D is superior to no cooperation in R&D but is inferior to the Nash equilibrium of the government policy game.     

The Gains from Trade in a Cournot–Nash Trading Equilibrium

It has recently been suggested by several authors that a Cournot–Nash free‐trade equilibrium might leave each country worse off than under autarky, in apparent contradiction of earlier findings. In the present note it is shown that the suggestion is typically based on self‐contradictory assumptions and is therefore unacceptable.     

The Gains from Trade and Policy Reform Revisited

The primary purpose of the paper is to provide characterizations of the conditions for welfare improvements in several situations that have received very little attention in the existing literature. The first aim is to exhibit the gains that can accrue to a country from the elimination of excess supplies as a result of a policy move from autarky to free trade. The second aim is to characterize the conditions under which the introduction of new goods into the economy will generate welfare gains. The third main area discussed is the extension of the authors’ methodology to a large open economy that can influence its terms of trade. The techniques used to illustrate the gains from eliminating excess supplies and from the introduction of new goods have a much wider applicability; they may be used to obtain and synthesize several welfare results from the literature.     

Gains from trade with overlapping generations

Summary This paper examines the welfare effects of international trade in a context of overlapping generations. It shows that, for a single trading country, uncompensated free trade may be Pareto inferior to autarky. However, for each government there are compensation schemes which guarantee welfare improvements for all local individuals when free trade is allowed, or when for a small open economy the terms of trade improve or the number of tradable goods increases, or when a customs union is formed.We acknowledge with gratitude the probing comments of Henry Y. Wan, Jr. and two anonymous referees.     

Free Trade versus Autarky under Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi‐country world under Cournot competition with constant returns to scale and linear demand. We derive respective conditions under which free trade will hurt a country's consumers, benefit its firms, induce it to export, increase its output and raise its welfare. We show that these conditions are linked in a clear order, with one implying the next. We further demonstrate that free trade can reduce world total output and total consumer surplus as well as world welfare. Along the way, we correct several oversights in the literature.