DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

TRADING‐VOLUME SHOCKS AND STOCK RETURNS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We examine high‐volume premiums based on weekly risk‐adjusted returns. Significant average weekly abnormal high‐volume premiums up to 0.50% per week are documented for 1962–2005. Most premiums are generated in the first two weeks and monotonically decline as holding periods are extended. Evidence of reversal is found as the holding periods are extended. Premiums depend on realized turnover in the holding period. The last finding supports the theories of Miller and Merton. Finally, we test whether premiums are compensation for taking additional risk. Negative skewness, idiosyncratic risk, and liquidity risk do not explain the high‐volume premiums.     

INTANGIBLE ASSETS,BOOK‐TO‐MARKET,AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS

I examine two anomalies where the Fama and French three‐factor model fails to adequately explain monthly industry and index returns. Both anomalies are consistent with a bad model problem where the book‐to‐market factor introduces a negative bias in the intercepts. I propose the intangibles model as an alternative where the three‐factor model is known to have difficulty. This alternative model, which replaces the book‐to‐market factor with zero investment portfolio returns based on prior investments in intangible assets, is well specified in random samples, has comparable power, and fully explains both anomalies.     

IS THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET RATIO A MEASURE OF RISK?

We develop a leverage‐based alternative to traditional asset pricing models to investigate whether the book‐to‐market ratio acts as a proxy for risk. We argue that the book‐to‐market ratio should act as a proxy because of the expected relations between (1) financial risk and measures of capital structure based on the market value of equity and (2) asset risk and measures of capital structure based on the book value of equity. We find no relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in all‐equity firms after controlling for firm size, and an inverse relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in firms with a negative book value of equity.     

THE TIME‐VARYING EQUITY PREMIUM AND THE S&P 500 IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

I present a new hindcast stock market index for the United States over the twentieth century. This is constructed by calibrating a rational asset pricing model that allows for a time‐varying equity premium driven by heteroskedasticity in consumption growth. By incorporating this variation in risk, the mean square error of the generated index series, when compared to the observed levels of the S&P 500, is significantly reduced. The model also explains the broad magnitudes and timings of the major bull and bear markets of the twentieth century, particularly before 1973, and the excess volatility puzzle is largely resolved.     

EX‐DIVIDEND DAY PRICE BEHAVIOR OF EXCHANGE‐TRADED FUNDS

We document that for exchange‐traded funds (ETFs), the price falls on average by the dividend amounts on the ex‐dividend day, and there are significantly positive abnormal volumes. This is because trading in ETFs entails lower transaction costs and lower risk than trading in equity closed‐end funds (CEFs) and individual stocks. Similar results are also found for equity CEFs. However, regression analyses indicate that transaction costs and risk are indeed negligible for ETFs but not for equity CEFs and that risk remains important for a sample of stocks matched based on transaction costs. Overall, the results support the short‐term traders hypothesis.     

THE FAMA‐FRENCH MODEL,LEVERAGE, AND THE MODIGLIANI‐MILLER PROPOSITIONS

For a cost‐of‐equity model to conform to the Modigliani‐Miller cost‐of‐capital propositions, any sensitivity coefficients in the model must be related to the firm's leverage. In this paper I apply these principles to the Fama‐French model for the cost of equity and develop the relation between its sensitivity coefficients and firm leverage. I then examine an empirical process developed by Fama and French (1997) to model the evolution through time of their sensitivity coefficients and show that this empirical process is inconsistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions. Separable functions are proposed for these sensitivity coefficients that are consistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions.     

SHORT SELLING AND MISPRICINGS WHEN FUNDAMENTALS ARE KNOWN: EVIDENCE FROM NYSE‐TRADED CLOSED‐END FUNDS

The larger a closed‐end fund's premium over its portfolio value, the more intensely it is sold short. This behavior should reduce mispricings. However, short selling affects neither the observed rate at which premia revert to fundamental values nor the rate of return on a fund's shares. This apparent contradiction can be explained as follows: short selling does reduce prices, but the effect is impounded into prices by the time short positions are tabulated by the NYSE each month. Consequently, the monthly short selling data do not predict future price movements.     

WHEN‐ISSUED SHARES,SMALL TRADES,AND THE VARIANCE OF RETURNS AROUND STOCK SPLITS

The increases in volatility after stock splits have long puzzled researchers. The usual suspects of discreteness and bid‐ask spread do not provide a complete explanation. We provide new clues to solve this mystery by examining the trading of when‐issued shares that are available before the split. When‐issued trading permits noise traders to compete with a more homogenous set of traders, decreasing the volatility of the stock before the split. Following the split, these noise traders reunite in one market and volatility increases. Thus, the higher volatility after the ex date of a stock split is a function of the introduction of when‐issued trading, the new lower price level after the split date, and the increased activity of small‐volume traders around a stock split.     

DAY‐END EFFECT ON THE PARIS BOURSE

We study the day‐end effect on the Paris Bourse, a computerized order‐driven market with competing dealers. The day‐end return is approximately double the magnitude found in U.S. data and is nearly four times larger for stocks trading with a registered dealer. However, this is largely explained by the time between trades and the bid‐ask spread. Unlike the U.S. data, the effect does not decline as stock price increases, probably because of a variable tick size in the Paris market. Finally, a change to a closing call auction in May 1996 for a subset of stocks did not reduce the day‐end effect.     

THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.     

EXPECTED VOLATILITY,UNEXPECTED VOLATILITY,AND THE CROSS‐SECTION OF STOCK RETURNS

The existing literature finds conflicting results on the cross‐sectional relation between expected returns and idiosyncratic volatility. We contend that at the firm level, the sample correlation between unexpected returns and expected idiosyncratic volatility can cloud the true relation between the expected return and expected idiosyncratic volatility. We show strong evidence that unexpected idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to unexpected returns. Using unexpected idiosyncratic volatility to control for unexpected returns, we find expected idiosyncratic volatility to be significantly and positively related to expected returns. This result holds after controlling for various firm characteristics, and it is robust across different sample periods.     

UNDERSTANDING SIZE AND THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET RATIO: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF BERK'S CRITIQUE

Because they are scaled by price, the ability of size (i.e., the market capitalization of a firm) and the book‐to‐market equity ratio to determine expected returns may, according to Berk (1995) , reflect only a simultaneity bias. The two‐stage least squares approach is used to control for this bias and to investigate the economic meanings of these variables. We discover that size and the book‐to‐market ratio contain distinct and significant components of financial distress, growth options, the momentum effect, liquidity, and firm characteristics. Our findings support Berk in his contention that that size and the book‐to‐market ratio reflect a combination of different economic mechanisms that are misspecified in the expected return process.     

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION UNCERTAINTY AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS IN THE UNITED STATES

There is substantial evidence on the influence of political outcomes on the business cycle and stock market. We further hypothesize that uncertainty about the outcome of a U.S. presidential election should be reflected in pre‐election common stock returns. Prior research pools returns based on the party of the winning candidate, assuming that the outcome of the election is known a priori. We use candidate preference (i.e., polling) data to construct a measure of election uncertainty. We find that if the election does not have a candidate with a dominant lead, stock market volatility (risk) and average returns rise.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF LIQUIDITY AS A FACTOR IN ASSET PRICING

We employ the Fama‐French time‐series regression approach to examine liquidity as a risk factor affecting stock returns. Prior studies establish liquidity as an important consideration in investment decisions. Here, liquidity is found to be an important factor affecting portfolio returns, even after the effects of market, size, book‐to‐market equity, and momentum are considered. Nonzero intercepts remain, however, indicating continued missing risk factors.     

FORECASTING STOCK INDEX VOLATILITY: COMPARING IMPLIED VOLATILITY AND THE INTRADAY HIGH–LOW PRICE RANGE

The intraday high–low price range offers volatility forecasts similarly efficient to high‐quality implied volatility indexes published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) for four stock market indexes: S&P 500, S&P 100, NASDAQ 100, and Dow Jones Industrials. Examination of in‐sample and out‐of‐sample volatility forecasts reveals that neither implied volatility nor intraday high–low range volatility consistently outperforms the other.     

VOLATILITY FORECASTS,TRADING VOLUME,AND THE ARCH VERSUS OPTION‐IMPLIED VOLATILITY TRADE‐OFF

We investigate empirically the role of trading volume (1) in predicting the relative informativeness of volatility forecasts produced by autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models versus the volatility forecasts derived from option prices, and (2) in improving volatility forecasts produced by ARCH and option models and combinations of models. Daily and monthly data are explored. We find that if trading volume was low during period t?1 relative to the recent past, ARCH is at least as important as options for forecasting future stock market volatility. Conversely, if volume was high during period t?1 relative to the recent past, option‐implied volatility is much more important than ARCH for forecasting future volatility. Considering relative trading volume as a proxy for changes in the set of information available to investors, our findings reveal an important switching role for trading volume between a volatility forecast that reflects relatively stale information (the historical ARCH estimate) and the option‐implied forward‐looking estimate.     

ASYMMETRIC COVARIANCE,VOLATILITY, AND THE EFFECT OF NEWS

We propose that covariance (rather than beta) asymmetry provides a superior framework for examining issues related to changing risk premiums. Accordingly, we investigate whether the conditional covariance between stock and market returns is asymmetric in response to good and bad news. Our model of conditional covariance accommodates both the sign and magnitude of return innovations, and we find significant covariance asymmetry that can explain, at least in part, the volatility feedback of stock returns. Our findings are consistent across firm size, firm leverage, and temporal and cross‐sectional aggregations.     

THE PRICING OF EQUITY CARVE‐OUTS DURING THE 1990s

We examine the level of underpricing and characteristics of equity carveouts (ECOs) from 1990 to 1998 (the 1990s) and from 1999 to 2000 (the bubble period). For a sample of 458 ECOs, we find a mean initial return of 8.75% for the 1990s and 47.76% for the bubble period. The results suggest that, similar to other initial public offerings (IPOs), ECOs have been more willing to accept underpricing through time because of an increased importance in analyst coverage and the increased use of spinning, the practice where investment bankers allocate IPOs to high‐profile customers to garner potential future business.     

UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE OF CLOSED‐END FUNDS

I find a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the initial and long‐run aftermarket performance of closed‐end funds. This relation persists even after controlling for fund characteristics, types, and investment strategies. The positive relation between underwriter reputation and initial returns supports the notion that prestigious investment bankers tend to promote a price run‐up in the immediate aftermarket to enhance their reputation with the issuers and the investors. The better long‐run performance for funds underwritten by prestigious underwriters suggests that prestigious underwriters protect their reputation by underwriting only high‐quality issues that will perform well in the long run.