股权的家族化、家族高管与家族企业业绩

文章利用2004-2015年中国A股家族控股上市公司的相关年度数据,从家族企业股权家族化视角出发,实证检验了股权家族化对家族企业业绩以及对企业是否聘任家族成员担任公司高管的经验影响关系。结果发现：（1）同等条件下,控股家族股权分配的家族化水平越高,其经营业绩表现越差;（2）家族成员担任CEO或董事长等关键高管会加剧股权家族化对家族企业业绩的负向影响关系;（3）同等条件下,公司股权的家族化更可能促使家族企业聘请家族成员担任CEO或董事长。此外,文章进一步分析发现,非核心家族成员参股企业会降低股权家族化与聘请家族成员担任公司CEO之间的正向影响关系。     

Do Shareholders Fight for Firm Value or Market Value in Emerging Markets? The Mediating Effect of Board Structure Dynamics on Dividend Policy Decision

The paper examines the mediating effect of board structure dynamics on the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders’ wealth at the firm level and market level. Panel regression models are used by applying data from 27 listed firms in Ghana between 2010 and 2017. We find that board structure dynamics have a direct effect on shareholders’ wealth at both levels. However, the results reveal new evidence that board structure dynamics play a mediating role on the relationship between dividend policy decision and shareholders’ wealth only at the market level. We find that independent directors and CEO duality significantly reduce market value of shareholders through dividend payout decision. However, independent directors and longer CEO tenure in office mediate a positive effect on the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level. Thus, the mediating effect of board structure dynamics, particularly independent directors and CEO tenure, are important in predicting a positive relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level than at the firm level. Therefore, regulatory bodies and investors should provide strong board structure dynamics that serve as a mediating mechanism for prudent dividend policy decisions that add value to shareholders’ wealth.     

Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors

Existing literature on the evaluation of the economic consequences of board reforms has some limitations including: their estimation results fail to show the causal effects of the regulatory reforms; they have limited policy implications for an economy where family businesses are dominant; and there is a lack of consensus on the impacts of the reforms.Using a unique dataset and program evaluation methodologies, this paper investigated the performance of share prices in response to the newly introduced outside director system in Korea, where family businesses have been dominant. First, we find that the positive impact of the appointment of outside directors on returns is observed only when the proportion of outsiders on a board increases significantly and their appointment is accompanied by the lead-and-lag effect of regulatory reforms. Second, the buy-and-hold abnormal return is more evident for independent firms than for chaebol affiliates, due partly to the high monitoring costs for cross-shareholdings among affiliates.     

股权结构与独立董事对大股东侵占的治理效果

本文以2004年在沪深股市交易的1172个A股非金融上市公司为样本,将样本分别按第一大股东持股比例、所有权性质和独立董事占董事会成员比例分咸3组、2组和3组,共组成18个组合,先後考察了股权集中和私有制封大股东侵占的治理效果,在第一大股东持股比例与股权性质没有差异的情况下独立董事的治理效果。研究发现私有制并没有提高、也没有降低大股东侵占的概率;股权集中则在一定程度上降低了大股东侵占的概率;国有企业的独立董事比例与大股东侵占概率负相关;当私有产权控股股东持股比例较低时,独立董事比例的提高有利于降低大股东侵占的概率。     

Professional Directors and Governance Quality

We examine professional directors—board members with no employment outside of serving as independent directors. We find that boards with a higher percentage of professional directors engage in more acquisitions, experience lower acquisition announcement returns, and exhibit lower performance‐turnover sensitivity and lower financial performance. We also examine the returns surrounding the appointment‐announcement dates of professional directors and find that firms experience significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns upon the appointment announcement of professional directors as compared to nonprofessional directors. The negative returns are primarily experienced by firms that face greater agency issues, suggesting that the market does not value professional directors for stricter monitoring. Overall, our findings do not lend support for calls to professionalize corporate boards.     

Effect of CEO power and board strength on bank performance in China

Given that a powerful CEO is more likely to overcome problems and control performance in a firm, this study first focuses on exploring whether CEO power positively affects certain measures of bank performance and which sources of CEO power have these positive impacts. Next, this study further analyzes whether the positive impact of CEO power on performance is negatively mediated by board strength. Our sample includes data on the three main types of Chinese banks for 2006 to –2016.Our results show that CEO structural power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability, risk-taking ability and lending quality, CEO ownership power significantly raises a bank’s lending quality, and CEO expert power significantly increases a bank’s overall and shareholder profitability. As considering the endogeneity, CEO prestige power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability. Next, we use the proportion of independent directors as our measure of board strength and find that a stronger board reduces the beneficial effects of CEO structural power on a bank’s lending quality, of CEO ownership power on shareholder profitability, and of CEO expert power on lending quality. There are similar harmful mediating effects when we use the proportion of foreign investors and board size as measures of board strength. Our results can help Chinese bank authorities develop policies to appropriately raise bank CEOs’ power and reduce board supervision of CEO power.     

Do politically connected independent directors matter? Evidence from mandatory resignation events in China

This paper investigates the contributions of politically connected independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to their mandatory resignations. Employing an event study, we find that, if a private firm loses its politically connected independent director due to mandatory resignation, its stock price drops 4.61% on average within ten trading days, compared with control firms. We observe that, compared with independent directors from academia, politically connected independent directors are absent from more board meetings and are reluctant to express dissenting opinions even if they attend meetings. So the negative stock price reaction cannot be mainly explained by the loss of supervisory functions after politically connected independent directors were forced to resign from positions. By employing DID estimation, we further find that the economic benefits obtained by private firms decrease after the mandatory resignation. The heterogeneity and robustness checks further confirm that private firms indeed were unable to get the same amount of economic benefits from the government as before, which provides a reasonable explanation for the negative stock price reaction after mandatory resignations of politically connected independent directors.     

Board Gender Diversity,Auditor Fees,and Auditor Choice

We examine whether the presence of female directors and female audit committee members affect audit quality in terms of audit effort and auditor choice by using observations from a sample of U.S. firms, spanning the years 2001–2011. We find, after controlling for endogeneity and other board, firm, and industry characteristics, that firms with gender‐diverse boards (audit committees) pay 6 percent (8 percent) higher audit fees and are 6 percent (7 percent) more likely to choose specialist auditors compared to all‐male boards (audit committees). Our findings suggest that boards (audit committees) with female directors (members) are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.     

Control–ownership Disparity and Business Performance: A Study of Korean Firms

In Korea, there is a large disparity between voting and cash flow rights (control–ownership disparity). Using firm‐level data from Korea for the 2004–2009 period, the present study examines whether control–ownership disparity influenced firm performance. Specifically, the study analyzes whether the effects of control–ownership disparity on firm performance vary according to the type of firm (publicly traded vs private firms) and to the major shareholder's ownership stake (greater than 50 percent vs less than or equal to 50 percent). According to the results, the negative effect of control–ownership disparity on firm performance was weaker for publicly traded firms, and control–ownership disparity had a negative effect on firm performance when the major shareholder's ownership stake exceeded 50 percent.     

家族承诺何以影响企业的风险承担?

企业创新创业活动具有很强的风险承担属性，创新创业研究离不开对风险承担的关注。本文考察家族承诺对家族企业风险承担的影响机制，基于2015年全国范围内非公有制企业调研，对877个家族企业样本的研究结果显示，家族承诺正向促进企业的风险承担，企业长期导向在家族承诺和企业风险承担的关系中起部分中介作用。通过引入企业长期导向，文章弥补了家族涉入到企业产出之间"缺失的一环"。与此同时本文验证了企业长期导向在中国家族企业情境下，并非有碍而是促进了家族企业风险承担。     

家族管理涉入如何影响并购战略行为——基于中国上市家族企业的实证研究

相比所有权涉入,家族成员参与企业经营管理将对战略行为产生更直接的影响。基于委托代理理论,文章对2010年-2018年中国上市家族企业的实证研究发现,家族高管参与对企业的并购倾向及横向并购行为具有促进作用,与纵向并购则表现为不显著的负向关系。组织冗余使家族高管参与与并购行为间的正向关系得到增强,而家族二代的进入则削弱了家族高管对企业并购的积极作用。进一步讨论家族权威在企业权力体系高度集中的情境,发现家族成员担任企业董事长及总经理与并购倾向的正向关系变得不显著,冗余资源的正向调节机制亦被抑制,但此时家族二代参与反而表现出正向的调节效应。结果表明跨代情境下家族管理涉入层面的多元化而衍生的不同委托代理问题将约束企业并购行为发生的边界,深化了家族企业谋求家业长青与顺应制度经济转型的讨论,为中国家族企业治理提供实践建议。     

家族涉入与企业技术创新:国际化战略与人力资本冗余的调节作用

基于控制家族保护自身情感财富的视角,文章利用2010-2013年度中国上市公司数据,研究了家族涉入与企业技术创新投入之间的关系,并关注了国际化战略与人力资本冗余程度的调节作用。研究发现：家族涉入程度越高,企业技术创新投入越少;当企业国际化程度或人力资本冗余程度较高时,家族涉入所致的负向影响均受到削弱。上述结论验证了家族企业将情感目标视为核心利益的观点;并证明家族涉入会导致企业决策偏离单纯经济目标,这为家族企业将其情感目标作为决策参照点的观点提供了新的证据。研究还发现,家族涉入对技术创新的阻碍作用主要来源于家族控股的控制性质而非股权集中的控制结构。     

上市公司总经理更替与董事会特征的实证研究

本文以2002—2004年间我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了上市公司总经理更替的影响因素。本文的研究发现,上市公司总经理更替受企业绩效影响非常显著;董事会领导权结构影响了董事会在总经理更替中有效性的发挥;独立董事基本不能发挥监督控制作用。本文的研究结果表明,政府监管层对上市公司独立董事比例的强制性制度安排在提高董事会监督效率上基本是无效的,上市公司存在比较明显的“弱”董事会和“弱”独立董事问题。     

Equity‐Based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality

We examine the relationship between a firm's disclosure quality and equity‐based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management's earnings guidance and information flowthrough financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity‐based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm's disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity‐based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors’ equity‐based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity‐based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.     

高技术行业上市公司高管薪酬与经营业绩研究

文章通过我国192家高技术行业上市公司面板数据的实证分析,发现其高管薪酬与公司业绩无显著相关性,与公司规模显著正相关,非公有制控制的公司高管薪酬高于公有制控制的公司,而股权激励比例偏低,高技术行业上市公司高管薪酬机制的有效性有待提高。建议提高高管薪酬水平,完善薪酬结构,积极加大股权激励力度,逐步降低国有持股比例。     

家族涉入方式的差异如何影响企业双元创新意愿?

文章以2012-2017 年中国上市家族企业的数据,基于社会情感财富理论,分析了家族在股权与管理层两种不同涉入方式下的战略偏好与目标导向,进而探究出其对于双元创新的影响,并结合产品市场竞争环境下的情形,进一步分析了市场竞争的加剧对于股权涉入和管理层涉入与双元创新关系的调节效应。结果发现：家族在股权涉入与利用式创新呈显著的正相关,但与开发式创新呈负相关,而家族管理层涉入与利用式创新和开发式创新均呈现显著的正相关;产品市场环境的竞争能够加强家族股权涉入与利用式创新的正向关系和家族管理层涉入与开发式创新的正向关系。     

内部控制有助于提升公司价值吗?

近年来的研究发现,公司所处的良好外部制度环境有助于提升公司的价值。论文聚焦公司内部制度环境,使用厦门大学内控指数课题组构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,研究了内部控制对公司价值的影响。研究发现:(1)内部控制的改善有助于提升公司的价值,并且内部控制的改善能够减轻政府控制对公司价值造成的负面影响(相对于非政府控制的公司);(2)内部控制的变化对公司价值变化的影响逐渐减弱,尽管政府控制能缓和这种递减的趋势;(3)当公司所面临的外部制度环境较好时,内部控制的改善对公司价值的提升作用更加明显。研究建议监管机构应进一步推进我国上市公司的内部控制建设。     

Ownership, performance and executive turnover in China

To better understand the relationship between different types of firm ownership and management turnover, this study classifies ownership along two dimensions: the type of owner and the concentration of ownership. Within this framework, a unique data set is used to study the impact of management turnover on a company's performance. This study, in addition to confirming some of the results from previous studies, includes interesting and important new results. Most importantly, it finds evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is weaker in state-controlled firms than in non-state firms, and varies according to different subtypes of private ownership. We also demonstrate that the turnover–performance relationship is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but that this relationship moves in opposite directions under state and private ownership. Important policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

制度视角的家族治理与企业绩效研究——来自中德上市家族企业的对比证据

家族集中所有权、控制权和家族涉入管理对企业绩效到底有利还是有弊？相对于发达资本主义国家的企业,处于转型经济中的中国企业面临的外部不确定性更高,上述关系在不同经济体之间是否有区别？企业的治理效果取决于内外两种机制,内部的家族治理系统是对外部制度环境的不完善的补充。我们选取处于成熟市场经济的德国上市家族企业与处于转型经济中的中国上市家族企业进行实证对比,从制度的视角来探讨上述问题。研究结果显示两国上市家族企业的家族治理与企业绩效之间的关系是不一样的。结论表明治理结构并不一定对企业绩效产生直接影响,不同的制度环境会导致不同的作用机制产生。     

Parents’ Use of Subsidiaries to “Push Down” Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms.