Bank capital shocks and portfolio risk: Evidence from Japan

Despite the downward trend of land prices and the ex post low return on real estate loans, Japanese banks increased their lending to the real estate sector during the 1990s. We argue that this phenomenon can be explained by the risk-shifting incentives of banks and discover that banks with low capital-to-asset ratios and low franchise value chose high-risk assets such as real estate loans. Unlike previous studies, we show that the capital–risk relationship is non-linear and changes from positive to negative as franchise value falls. We also find that a capital adequacy requirement did not prevent risk-taking behavior of under-capitalized banks since they then just issued more subordinated debts to meet this requirement. In contrast, government capital injections led banks to reduce risky loans at the margin. Recapitalization by issuing subordinated debts helped banks recover their capital losses and mitigated the credit crunch, but consequently allowed them to increase their exposure to the real estate sector and worsened the bad loan problems.     

Does Property Rights Reform Improve the Efficiency of China＇s State-owned Banks？

China ＂s state-owned banks have undergone radical changes over the past two decades, including partial privatization and listing in both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This paper evaluates the effects of these changes by analyzing the efficiency of Chinese banks over the period 1998-2012 using two frontier techniques and comparative analysis. The findings suggest that the performance and technical efficiency of the Big Four banks improved considerably after property rights reform, but this improvement is not sufficient to keep the banks at the production frontier. Tobit regressions confirm that static ownership effects are negative but that the property rights reform has had significant and positive effects on the technical efficiency of state-owned commercial banks. GDP growth and the financial crisis have had positive effects on the efficiency of Chinese banks, which is more significant for joint stock commercial banks than state-owned commercial banks. The results indicate the value of ownership reforms of state-owned asset management companies and insurance companies and the establishment of a countercyclical capital buffer.     

Impacts of Ownership Balance and Nonexecutive Directors on Bank Performance and Risk Taking: Evidence from City Commercial Banks in China

This paper investigates the impacts of nongovernmental stake, ownership balance, and nonexecutive directors on bank performance and risk taking in city commercial banks (CCBs) in China. We find that ownership balance can improve CCBs’ financial performance and reduce their bankruptcy risk as well as nonperforming loan level. Nonexecutive directors can help reduce bankruptcy risk, but have no significant effect on performance or nonperforming loans. The impacts of ownership balance and nonexecutive directors become more prominent when the nongovernmental stake is relatively high, suggesting that mixed ownership reform can promote bank performance and risk control via these two avenues.     

Cost and profit efficiency of Chinese banks: A non-parametric analysis

Using a non-parametric technique for data from 1995 to 2004, we investigate the cost and profit efficiency of 28 Chinese commercial banks. We examine the influence of ownership type, size, risk profile, profitability and key environmental changes on the bank efficiency using a Tobit regression. Consistent with the existing literature, we find that profit efficiency levels are well below those of cost efficiency. This suggests that the most important inefficiencies are on the revenue side. Our findings are also consistent with prior evidence on ownership and efficiency: joint-stock banks (national and city-based), on average, appear to be more cost- and profit-efficient than state-owned banks while medium-sized banks are significantly more efficient than small and large banks. These and other results suggest the need for speedier reforms to open the banking market, improving risk management, minimizing the government's capital subsidy and diversifying ownership of Chinese banks.     

Discretionary Accounting Accruals,Managers' Incentives,and Audit Fees*

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.     

Financial Determinants of Corporate R&D Investment in Korea

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate investment in R&D and finance. By using panel data on Korean manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2008, we find that R&D investment is sensitive to fluctuations in internal cash flow and that debt is more important than equity in financing R&D expenditure. This empirical result supports the traditional theory of financing hierarchy. In relation to equity ownership, the empirical result shows that ownership concentration and foreign ownership positively affect R&D investment, but institutional ownership does not show any significant effect on investment. This study synthetically analyzes the relation between finance and investment by simultaneously considering corporate finance, equity ownership structure, macroeconomic environments and the institutional setting of Korea.     

Competition in Turkish Banking: Impacts of Restructuring and the Global Financial Crisis

This paper investigates the evolution of competition in the Turkish banking industry by taking into account the transformation in the sector in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the global financial crisis. The results demonstrate that the level of competition in the system did not increase despite the restructuring that was undertaken and the increased foreign bank participation. In addition, the level of competition in the sector deteriorated during the global crisis. There is also some evidence that the market power of banks with different ownership characteristics varied and did not converge over time.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Officials on boards and the prudential behavior of banks: Evidence from China's city commercial banks

From the perspective of officials-and-directors (OADs), who are commonly appointed by the Chinese government to the banks it owns, this paper takes studies of government ownership and banks' behavior to the micro level of boards. We analyze the relationship between the special political connection of the OADs and banks' prudential behavior, using a sample of China's City Commercial Banks during 2006–2010. We further explore the impact of OADs' characteristics and the role of independent directors and female directors. The results indicate that banks with OADs exhibit lower prudential behavior, and the higher is the administrative rank of the OADs, the larger is the effect. And the older is the OADs, the larger is the effect. More importantly, the government ownership of banks does not have a significant and robust influence on their prudential behavior. Meanwhile, independent directors can significantly weaken the effect of the OADs, while female directors can enhance the prudential behavior of banks in the absence of OADs. Finally, our results persist even after controlling for sample selection bias and alternative variable measures. Our research contributes to the practice of improving bank governance and regulating systematic risk.     

Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

Using a propensity score matched sample and a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that stock price crash risk increases after a firm voluntarily incorporates clawback provisions in executive officers' compensation contracts. This heightened crash risk is concentrated in adopters that increase upward real activities‐based earnings management and those that reduce the readability of 10‐K reports. Based on cross‐sectional analyses, we also find that the increased crash risk is more pronounced for adopters with high ex ante fraud risk, low‐ability managers, high CEO equity incentives, and low dedicated institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that the clawback adoption per se does not curb managerial opportunism but rather induces managers to use alternative channels for concealing bad news, which may contribute to a greater stock price crash risk; and the increase in crash risk is more likely in cases where incentives are strong or monitoring is weak. Our results should be of interest to regulators and policymakers considering the effects of clawback adoption on the investing public.     

Does Organizational Form Impact Pricing Asymmetry? Evidence from Nonprofit Financial Institutions

Why output prices tend to rise faster in response to input cost increases than they fall in response to input cost decreases is a hotly debated issue in modern economics. In this article, I contribute to this asymmetric pricing debate by expanding the domain of organizational forms where this question has been investigated. More specifically, previous research has focused on for‐profit firms. I expand the investigation by focusing on nonprofit organizations. Credit unions are the nonprofit organization used in my analysis. Credit unions provide essentially identical types of consumer financial services and products as commercial banks but do so from a very different not‐for‐profit orientation. However, in this study, I document similar asymmetric rate‐setting behavior by credit unions. This suggests that pricing asymmetry is likely to be much more widespread, as it relates to nonprofit institutions as well as those in the for‐profit sector.     

Motivations for Loan Herding by Chinese Banks and Its Impact on Bank Performance

This study uses a dynamic herding model that considers intertemporal and cross‐sectional correlation to confirm that loan herding occurs among joint‐stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). We clarify the motivations for bank loan herding. We find that loan herding by both JSCBs and CCBs results more from following the behavior of other same‐type banks than different‐type banks because of characteristic herding or reputational concerns. Loan herding by JSCBs is motivated by investigative herding, whereas loan herding by CCBs results from informational cascades. Moreover, loan herding has a significantly harmful impact on the operating performance of CCBs but not JSCBs, which may be explained by the irrational behavior of CCBs. Our results will help Chinese bank supervisors develop appropriate policies for handling loan herding.     

管理层持股对家族控制的影响:150家上市公司样本

选取2006年在上海、深圳 A 股市场正式交易的150家上市家族企业为样本,并分为创业型家族企业和非创业型家族企业。研究表明,由于两类企业面临的代理冲突不一样,管理层持股的激励效果也不一致。创业型家族企业管理层持股对企业价值有正面影响,非创业型家族企业管理层持股比例与企业价值呈倒 U型关系。     

Control–ownership Disparity and Business Performance: A Study of Korean Firms

In Korea, there is a large disparity between voting and cash flow rights (control–ownership disparity). Using firm‐level data from Korea for the 2004–2009 period, the present study examines whether control–ownership disparity influenced firm performance. Specifically, the study analyzes whether the effects of control–ownership disparity on firm performance vary according to the type of firm (publicly traded vs private firms) and to the major shareholder's ownership stake (greater than 50 percent vs less than or equal to 50 percent). According to the results, the negative effect of control–ownership disparity on firm performance was weaker for publicly traded firms, and control–ownership disparity had a negative effect on firm performance when the major shareholder's ownership stake exceeded 50 percent.     

Efficiency of the Banking Industry Structure in Korea*

This paper analyzes whether the efficiency of the Korean banking industry has improved since the bank restructuring in 1997, and whether a bank with high efficiency has a larger market share. This paper uses an efficient structure hypothesis model to examine the relationship between the banks' efficiencies and their profitability. The data envelopment analysis method is applied to measure the efficiency and profitability of the banking industry in order to minimize possible bias due to the inflow of public funds for the bank consolidation. The two‐step Heckman selection method is used to correct for survivorship bias in the model. The derived result indicates that banks with higher efficiencies tend to record higher profit. Moreover, higher pure technological efficiency and scale efficiency have a positive effect on a bank's market share and concentration.     

Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.     

Restructuring of financial institutions and the corporate sector in Korea

This paper explores causes of the Korean currency crisis which started in November 1997. This paper also presents restructuring proposals and introduces the progress made so far. The urgency for quick restructuring and the necessity of the injection of money from both the government and foreign investors are emphasized. Restructuring of financial and corporate sectors should be pursued simultaneously. In the financial sector, the restructuring of banks should take precedence over other financial institutions. The key task in terms of bank restructuring involves the resolution of bad loans, recapitalization and the expedited reorganization of nonviable banks. Corporate reform is also important. Banks should play a central role in corporate workouts, especially in lowering excessive corporate debt and triggering corporate restructuring based on core competence. Transparency of corporate management, internationally accepted accounting practices, fuller disclosure requirements and stronger monitoring by minority shareholders are prerequisites for effective market discipline. Reform of ownership and governance structure are also important in enhancing managerial accountability of corporates as well as financial institutions.     

Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Business Performance in Japan: New Evidence Using Micro Data*

This paper examines the relationship between the level of managerial compensation and the quality of corporate governance in Japan in the period following the bubble burst of 1991–1995. There are three main findings. First, Japanese firms with weaker governance have greater agency problems in that managerial opportunism extracts higher compensation and the firm performs relatively worse. Second, these agency problems were more severe during the recessionary period of 1994–1995. Finally, governance structures in industries with higher managerial compensation are relatively weaker than in other industries.     

Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.