Experimentation in Markets

We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise.
We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows.     

Network externalities, discrete demand shifts, and submarginal‐cost pricing

Abstract.  The introduction of a new product often causes a massive (discrete) demand shift to the new product. This study demonstrates that if a large‐scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities, it may result in 'submarginal‐cost pricing,' by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost. This finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world. JEL classification: D42     

结合新产品扩散特征的实物期权定价模型研究

现有实物期权定价模型未能考虑新产品销售量所呈现的扩散特征,模型的分析结果与实际情况有较大差距。文章假设新产品价格服从几何布朗运动,并以Bass模型预测新产品的销售过程,运用二叉树方法,构建了离散时间状态下结合新产品扩散特征的实物期权定价模型,并得到新技术采用的最优时机。     

Higher order expectations in sentiment asset pricing model

In the spirit of beauty contests, we study the effect of higher order expectations on sentiment asset pricing. The sentiment asset pricing model with higher order expectations shows that, in general the higher sentiment causes the higher price, but, higher order expectations contribute to smoother price path and defend the impact of sentiment. Regarding the problem of taking higher order or first order, the investors with second order can survive in a specific area where sentiment is rather optimistic or pessimistic and investors with first order expectations are the majority.     

反垄断调查的一个鉴别：一致性定价行为背后的差异与合谋

如何区分成本上涨时企业同时涨价的行为究竟是价格合谋还是寡头竞争的企业正常的价格调整行为？这是反垄断执法机构面临的一个难题。本文通过数理模型证明了无论企业进行伯川德竞争还是古诺竞争，寡头竞争的企业的定价随着成本的变化存在一个连续调整路径，而组成卡特尔的企业的定价则会随着成本的变化出现一个不连续的跳跃。因此反垄断执法机构在观察到企业的一致性定价行为之后，如果能从以往的价格监测纪录中发现这些企业在成本下跌时，价格存在着更大幅度的下调，则可以据此怀疑这些企业存在着价格合谋，应开展更深入的调查来搜集这些企业违反《反垄断法》的全面证据。     

需求价格弹性分析

在大多数情况下,产品定价时需求价格弹性的计算多使用点弹性公式,这在营销学中是有缺陷的。本文对其进行了 分析,并提出应使用弧弹性公式指导产品定价。     

道德风险和多产出条件下技术许可中的技术定价机制

利用现代契约经济学的分析方法,从机制设计的角度,分析了道德风险和多种产出条件下技术许可中的技术定价机制。得出如下结论:当道德风险存在于技术使用者一方时,技术所有者采用纯固定费用的技术定价形式;在道德风险和多种产出的条件下,技术所有者确定的固定价格随着似然率的增大而减小,如果似然率具有单调似然率的特点,那么技术所有者确定的固定价格是技术产品产出或其状态的单调递减函数。     

政府补助、产权性质与定向增发

政府补助效果是学者高度重视的焦点话题。本文以政府补助为切入点，从一级市场、二级市场分别考察定向增发新股的定价效率以及定向增发收益背后的经济逻辑，并采用随机前沿分析法对2007—2017年间获得政府补助且实施定向增发新股的沪深A 股上市公司进行实证分析。结果发现：定向增发新股发行存在溢价现象，新股上市后也存在溢价现象，政府补助加剧了溢价程度，进而导致定价效率降低，且在国有企业中更严重；发行定价泡沫越严重，定向增发收益越高，同时政府补助对定向增发收益能产生积极影响，且在国有企业中更显著。路径检验结果发现：政府补助作用于定向增发收益可能依赖盈余管理、自主创新以及个股成长这三条路径。上述结果表明，政府补助可能被异化为操纵股价的隐形工具，导致政府补助效果“事与愿违”。     

同类产品的定价模型研究

针对完全市场经济条件下运行的库存-销售系统中同类产品定价问题,提出了多产品组合定价决策模型.考虑到多产品的需求价格弹性和交叉弹性的影响,假定在已知价格浮动比例的情况下为产品制定投放市场价,使得价格发生调整后产品在一段时期内取得的投资收益最大,从而建立了一般化的二次规划模型.最后给出两种产品组合定价决策的案例,用二次规划的有效集法计算获得最优定价结果,对于多产品组合定价问题具有理论和实际价值.     

日本药品价格政策研究及对我国的启示

本文采用文献研究法对日本的药品价格政策进行了分析。研究表明,日本的药品价格政策,尤其在新药价格管理、医疗保险制度、仿制药定价、药价调整及政府定价范围等方面有较为科学的定价流程及依据,非常值得我国借鉴。     

Monopoly,product differentiation and economic welfare

This paper discusses the pricing behavior of a monopolistic producer supplying several quality-differentiated goods by using a model of a Lancasterian characteristic approach with consumer's taste pattern dispersed. It examines how finer product differentiation, which is made by the producer by means of the introduction of a new good, changes the price structure and consumer's welfare. It will be establised that the entry of a new good imposes quite different impacts on the price of the goods of higher quality and on those of lower-quality goods.     

Product differentiation in the German soft drink market: which attributes matter?

In this study, we apply a hedonic pricing model to a unique data set of the German carbonated soft drink market. We distinguish between traditional brands and private label brands and include a variety of product attributes such as flavour, sugar content and bottle size in our analysis. Our results show that most traditional brands yield highest price premiums. However, organic niche products seem to be even more profitable. Also, unconventional flavours, small bottle sizes and retailing in supermarkets lead to higher price premiums. Private label brands are associated with highest negative price premiums.     

Advertising and pricing policies in the equine breeding industry or sex and the single stallion

A unique aspect of the equine breeding industry is the way in which the current year's demand for stud services depends on the previous year's production levels. In a monopolistically competitive market, product differentiation and product promotion and advertisement are important aspects of industry conduct. A stallion's reputation and therefore demand for his services depend on the stallion owner's ability to differentiate the product.

The price a stallion owner charges depends on the quality of the stud himself, and also on the quality of his offspring. The producer's output (foals) become advertisements for the stallion when they are raced, shown, etc. They also can become substitutes for the stallion, since they are an alternative source of the stallion's genes. Stallion owners are in the special position that they need to prove their stallion's ability to sire quality offspring, while bearing in mind they are producing possible substitutes. Outstanding offspring will generate demand for the parent's services if they are successfully shown, raced, etc. Conversely, progeny who compete unsuccessfully will decrease demand by contributing to a poor reputation for themselves, their breeder and their sire. But, outstanding individuals eventually become breeding stock and therefore offer an alternative source for the ‘winning genes’.

This intergenerational dependence has led to pricing policies and practices in the equine breeding industry which have important implications. Common practices include: incentives to compete, rebates for gelding male offspring, price discrimination in favour or quality mares and limited bookings. These policies illustrate aspects of industry conduct commonly discussed in industrial organization literature such as first-degree price discrimination, non-linear pricing and non-price competition. The use of artificial insemination and other new breeding technologies and thus the potential for a stallion to breed larger numbers of mares, further compounds the extent and results of such practices.

This paper investigates pricing policies in the equine breeding industry, using a case study approach. A model of indsutry pricing policies is developed and tested using data for American Quarter Horses.     

INFLATION AND VARIETY*

Economies undergoing high inflation often experience a reduction of product variety in the marketplace. Existing models study how inflation affects quantity, but very few have studied how inflation affects variety. In a monetary model with explicit microfoundations, I analyze how inflation affects variety as well as quantity. I consider two pricing mechanisms—bargaining and price posting with directed search. I show that inflation reduces both quantity and variety under both pricing mechanisms. Quantitatively, the model implies that the total welfare cost of 10% inflation ranges from 4.77% to 8.4% under bargaining and is 1.52% under price posting.     

Monopoly and the choice of product characteristics

Monopoly firms producing large, indivisible goods may be able to effect perfect price discrimination by charging an all-or-none implicit price for each product characteristic. In that case, a monopolist will provide the same vector of product characteristics (i.e., the same product ‘quality’) as will a competitive industry; and, perhaps more surprisingly, produce the same quantity of the good. With all-or-none pricing, monopoly power leads to a higher product price, but no change in product quality or output.     

Optimal Pricing and Entry Rules When a Regulated Dominant Firm Faces a Competitive Fringe

In this paper, we study optimal regulation of a dominant firm facing an unregulated competitive fringe. First, assuming the size of the fringe is fixed, we demonstrate that the usual Ramsey Rule for second-best efficient pricing remains applicable in this context. We also examine the suitability of the Laspeyres price cap and show that it retains its desirable properties. This implies that regulators should continue to apply Laspeyres price cap regulation to the dominant firm after competition has materialized. Then, assuming that price and entry control are regulatory instruments, we characterize the efficient pricing and entry rules. We demonstrate that the free entry equilibrium number of firms will be excessive relative to the efficient number of firms, thereby providing a new Excess Entry Theorem. Finally, we suggest a modification of the Laspeyres price cap that can incentivize the regulated dominant firm to support efficient entry into the fringe.     

高科技产业新产品定价策略研究——基于系统动力学

新产品的开发对于高科技产业来说日趋重要，需要不断的努力和巨大的市场意识，系统的价格监测对于分割市场和合理配置资源具有很重要的意义，企业应该认真考虑以确定最优定价策略。本文在不同竞争环境下建立了不同定价策略对企业综合影响的系统动力学模型，在对模型模拟分析的基础上，研究了不同定价策略对企业的影响。结果表明，高科技产业新产品采用撇脂定价策略相对于渗透定价策略具有更大的优越性，并根据企业实际的定价能力，适当地延长撇脂时间和增大撇脂价格可以带来更大的经济效益。     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly

Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination.     

A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities

We analyze dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities, focusing on pricing under negative externalities. We also attempt to generalize models in the previous literature, which encompass both negative and positive externalities, by incorporating a consumer’s discount factor for past sales as a parameter. Analyzing our model reveals oscillation as the optimal price path in the presence of negative externalities.