Liquidity and initial public offering underpricing

Using eight measures of liquidity, and addressing the potential endogeneity of initial returns, we find underpricing generally increases the secondary market liquidity of IPOs over the first year of trading, irrespective of the horizon over which liquidity is measured. For two model specifications over the eight measures, fifteen regressions display signs consistent with higher underpricing increasing liquidity and thirteen of these are statistically significant. We also find higher initial returns are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of informed trade. Furthermore, the liquidity effects of underpricing survive the lockup date, suggesting they are not quickly dissipated.     

LIQUIDITY AND ASSET PRICING UNDER THE THREE‐MOMENT CAPM PARADIGM

We examine whether the use of the three‐moment capital asset pricing model can account for liquidity risk. We also make a comparative analysis of a four‐factor model based on Fama–French and Pástor–Stambaugh factors versus a model based solely on stock characteristics. Our findings suggest that neither of the models captures the liquidity premium nor do stock characteristics serve as proxies for liquidity. We also find that sensitivities of stock return to fluctuations in market liquidity do not subsume the effect of characteristic liquidity. Furthermore, our empirical findings are robust to differences in market microstructure or trading protocols between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ.     

Liquidity Benefits from IPO Underpricing: Ownership Dispersion or Information Effect

The positive correlation between initial underpricing and liquidity in the secondary market several months after an initial public offering (IPO) has previously been attributed to ownership dispersion induced by underpricing. We find that public information production is another channel by which underpricing improves liquidity. Using a sample of IPOs from Euronext, we find that analyst coverage engendered by initial underpricing reduces information asymmetry costs and illiquidity in the secondary market. The impact of information asymmetry is statistically more significant on measures based on adverse selection costs than on those based on the proportion of informed traders in the market.     

Uncertainty,market structure,and liquidity

In this study we show that market uncertainty [measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)] exerts a large market-wide impact on liquidity, which gives rise to co-movements in individual asset liquidity. The effect of VIX on stock liquidity is greater than the combined effects of all other common determinants of stock liquidity. We show that the uncertainty elasticity of liquidity (UEL: percent change in liquidity given a 1% change in VIX) has increased around regulatory changes in the US markets that increased the role of public traders in liquidity provision, reduced the minimum allowable price variation, weakened the affirmative obligation of NASDAQ dealers, and abolished the specialist system on the NYSE.     

Underpricing in the Corporate Bond Market

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings(IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market.We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution toan information problem or a liquidity problem. We find thatunderpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings andis highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggeststhat information problems drive underpricing, with support forboth the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetricinformation theory. We do not find evidence in favor of theRock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquiditycauses underpricing.     

Can quote competition reduce preferenced trading? A reexamination of the SEC’s 1997 order handling rules

In 1997, the SEC implemented the new order handling rules (OHRs) on the NASDAQ. We observe that some uncompetitive positions gained market share without improving quote competitiveness after the implementation of the OHRs. Also observed is a significant decline in the sensitivity of trading volume to quote competitiveness, indicating lower incentive for NASDAQ dealers to engage in quote competition in the post‐OHR regime. We find that positions that gained trading volume without improving quote competitiveness were less competitive and were more closely associated with stocks showing low information asymmetry, which suggests that preferenced trading might be responsible for the decline in the trading volume sensitivity. Examining entries and exits around the periods of adopting OHRs, we observe net entry of uncompetitive positions and net exit of competitive positions, which indicates that preferenced trading crowded out quote competition subsequent to the OHRs. Our findings suggest that forcing intense quote competition alone produced an unwanted effect that preferencing emerged as a more attractive alternative to quote competition.     

The Declining Role of NASDAQ Market Makers

We compare the liquidity providing behavior of NASDAQ market makers in 2010 to their behavior in 2004. We examine how frequently market makers are at the inside quote, what market and stock specific factors influence market makers’ behavior, and the relation between market maker participation and intraday bid‐ask spread patterns. We observe a decrease in the percent of the trading day dealers’ quote at the inside, a decline in the number of market makers, and a decrease in the influence market makers have on intraday spread patterns. The results suggest that the role of NASDAQ market makers declines over time.     

IPO Trading without Market Makers or Underwriter Price Support

We investigate the trading behavior and liquidity supply of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) that trade in an order‐driven market system with pure limit order books where no market makers or price support is allowed. We find large trades and quoted depths dominate the first day of trading, but this pattern quickly reverses as small trades and quoted depths are more prevalent on subsequent trading days. Quoted depths are positively related to the number of shares offered in the IPO and trade size, but are negatively related to underpricing. Trade size and transaction immediacy are positively related, and large and positive (negative) order imbalance is associated with more aggressive buys (sells). Finally, long‐run performance is not related to initial order imbalance. Overall, our results suggest that despite underwriters not participating in the IPO aftermarket, liquidity provision evolves very quickly and price discovery is immediately reflected in prices.     

Conflicts of interest and China's A-share underpricing

The extremely high A-share underpricing in China's primary market provides us with a very interesting area of empirical research. Previous studies on China's IPO underpricing have been suggestive, but inconclusive. A significant decline in A-share underpricing is found in 2003 relative to previous years (and much less than that recorded in the literature to date). We examine the validity of previous A-share underpricing models, reported in the literature, and find a statistically significant structural break in the data during 2003 when these models are specified. We further explore conflicts of interest in the Chinese IPO market and specify an alternative model to further examine this change in observed market behavior. Our results suggest that a contract with high underwriter's fee leads to less A-share underpricing. Our results also suggest that the asymmetric information hypothesis does not apply in the Chinese IPO market in 2003. Overpricing by the secondary market and the trading activity on the first trading day are the main functions of the A-share underpricing. This study has important implications such as guiding the Chinese government policy regarding the regulations of initial public offering.     

THE PRICING OF EQUITY CARVE‐OUTS DURING THE 1990s

We examine the level of underpricing and characteristics of equity carveouts (ECOs) from 1990 to 1998 (the 1990s) and from 1999 to 2000 (the bubble period). For a sample of 458 ECOs, we find a mean initial return of 8.75% for the 1990s and 47.76% for the bubble period. The results suggest that, similar to other initial public offerings (IPOs), ECOs have been more willing to accept underpricing through time because of an increased importance in analyst coverage and the increased use of spinning, the practice where investment bankers allocate IPOs to high‐profile customers to garner potential future business.     

THE IMPACT OF MARKET MAKER CONCENTRATION ON ADVERSE‐SELECTION COSTS FOR NASDAQ STOCKS

We examine the impact of market maker concentration on adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ stocks and find that more market makers results in lower costs. Furthermore, this reduction in adverse selection exceeds the overall reduction in spreads that is attributable to market maker competition. We hypothesize that order flow internalization is increasing in market makers and allows for greater information production, and is an explanation for our findings. Our results provide an explanation for the puzzle documented by previous work that finds that adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ tend to be lower than for the New York Stock Exchange, whereas spreads tend to be higher.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

IPO Underpricing and After-Market Liquidity

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is generallyexplained with asymmetric information and risk. We complementthese traditional explanations with a new theory where investorsworry also about the after-market illiquidity that may resultfrom asymmetric information after the IPO. The less liquid theaftermarket is expected to be, and the less predictable itsliquidity, the larger will be the IPO underpricing. Our modelblends such liquidity concerns with adverse selection and riskas motives for underpricing. The model’s predictions aresupported by evidence for 337 British IPOs effected between1998 and 2000. Using various measures of liquidity, we findthat expected after-market liquidity and liquidity risk areimportant determinants of IPO underpricing.     

Tiered Information Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis of the Advance Peek into the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment

This paper studies market microstructure implications of informed high‐frequency traders (HFTs) from two seconds of advance peek into the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), provided by Thomson Reuters to its elite customers. Using individual stocks in the NASDAQ data set, we show how HFTs trade around ICS events. We find that liquidity demanders during two seconds of advance peek earn substantive profits, which are consistent with the notion that HFTs’ informational advantages may increase adverse selection costs for other market participants. This evidence elucidates the debate on regulatory oversight and its role in circumventing the potentially adverse effects from an advance peek into ICS.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

THE EFFECTS OF BANK CONSOLIDATION ON RISK CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We investigate the effects of financial market consolidation on the allocation of risk capital in a financial institution and the implications for market liquidity in dealership markets. An increase in financial market consolidation can increase liquidity in foreign exchange and government securities markets. We assume that financial institutions use risk‐management tools in the allocation of risk capital and that capital is determined at the firm level and allocated among separate business lines or divisions. The ability of market makers to supply liquidity is influenced by their risk‐bearing capacity, which is directly related to the amount of risk capital allocated to this activity.     

Underpricing,stock allocation,ownership structure and post-listing liquidity of newly listed firms

This study investigates the relationship between underpricing, ownership structure and post-listing liquidity of initial public offerings (IPOs). It is argued that higher underpricing induces both broader investor participation and creates a more diffuse ownership structure. These two factors are in turn positively associated with the level of post-listing trading, and therefore offer an explanation of how underpricing can influence liquidity. Using a sample of Australian IPOs, we provide evidence of statistically significant relationship between underpricing and various proxies for shareholding distribution and liquidity. This result remains robust after controlling for a number of potential underlying factors that may drive both underpricing and ownership allocation decisions. Overall, our analysis suggests that liquidity is a partial but important benefit of underpricing an IPO.     

偏低定价、贷款放宽与房地产价格——基于PW模型的中美比较及启示

Pavlov and Wachter(2004,2006)从市场竞争的角度发现住房信贷偏低定价是推动信贷过度扩张从而导致房地产价格膨胀的一个重要原因。本文认为流动性过剩将加剧这种现象,同时贷款放宽也是推动信贷过度扩张导致房地产价格上涨的重要原因。近年来在流动性过剩下中美两国住房信贷市场都出现了偏低定价和贷款放宽现象,其表现和产生的原因具有共性和个性。在中美比较的基础上,本文提出了对我国的几点启示。