THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements.     

THE NON‐TRADED SECTOR,LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET

This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low‐skilled median voter voting against predominantly low‐skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti‐immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non‐traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare‐beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

INTERNATIONAL ASYMMETRY IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND APPRECIATION OF A STAGNANT COUNTRY'S CURRENCY*

This paper develops a two‐country, two‐commodity continuous‐time dynamic optimization model that accommodates a liquidity trap and persistent unemployment. It investigates a theoretical possibility of international asymmetry in business activity and a stagnant country's currency appreciation, which has been the common experience of Japan and the USA after Japan's total capital liberalization. It is found that if the marginal utility of consumption relative to that of liquidity exogenously declines in a country, its current account improves and the home currency appreciates. Consequently, home products lose competitiveness, causing home employment to decrease and foreign employment to increase.     

FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY IN A MONETARY UNION

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country sticky‐price model to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity and government spending shocks in a monetary union. Financial market integration has a small effect on the propagation of these shocks if households can only trade in risk‐free bonds. However, financial market integration has a more substantial effect on the propagation of these shocks in a monetary union with a complete market for state‐contingent claims. This result indicates that it may be important to account for threshold effects in empirical analyses of the impact of financial market integration on business cycle volatility in a monetary union.     

INFORMATION AND THE BEAUTY PREMIUM IN POLITICAL ELECTIONS

We use data on 800 candidates from the 2012 U.S. election cycle in U.S. and state congressional races to examine the degree to which beauty affects electoral outcomes. We find that a candidate that is one standard deviation more beautiful receives a 1.1 percentage point higher vote share and is 6.0 percentage points more likely to win the election. This beauty premium is larger in situations where voters are less likely to have more information about the candidate. The beauty premium is much smaller for U.S. congressional races than for state congressional races, and is also much smaller for incumbent candidates. In addition, we find a correlation that the beauty premium is lower when a candidate spends more money on the election. (JEL D72, J70)     

ELDERLY AND NON-ELDERLY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARISON OF LIVING STANDARDS

The paper compares the living standards of the elderly vis-a-vis the rest of the population in EU countries in the late 1980s using the data of Household Budget Surveys. Elderly and non-elderly are compared in terms of consumption expenditure, income and non-monetary indicators of welfare. The results show that in all EU countries the non-elderly are better-off than the elderly. In some countries the differences in the living standards of the two groups are marginal, whereas in others they are substantial. These differences tend to be larger in the Southern European EU countries (with the exception of Spain) and smaller in the Northern European EU countries (with the exception of the U.K.).     

COMPETITIVE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CONVERGENCE AND ASYMMETRY IN THE EXPERIMENTAL DOUBLE AUCTION

We conducted a large number of controlled continuous double auction experiments to reproduce and stress-test the phenomenon of convergence to competitive equilibrium under private information with decentralized trading feedback. Our main finding is that across a total of 104 markets (involving over 1,700 subjects), convergence occurs after a handful of trading periods. Initially, however, there is an inherent asymmetry that favors buyers, typically resulting in prices below equilibrium levels. Analysis of over 80,000 observations of individual bids and asks helps identify empirical ingredients contributing to the observed phenomena including higher levels of aggressiveness initially among buyers than sellers.     

SLIP SLIDING AWAY: FURTHER UNION DECLINE IN GERMANY AND BRITAIN

This paper presents the first comparative analysis of the decline in collective bargaining in two European countries where that decline has been among the most pronounced. Using establishment‐level data and a common model, we present decompositions of changes in collective bargaining in the private sector in Germany and Britain over the period 1998–2004. In both countries, within‐effects dominate compositional changes as the source of the recent decline in unionism. Overall, the decline in collective bargaining is more pronounced in Britain than in Germany, thus continuing a trend apparent since the 1980s. Although establishment characteristics differ markedly across the two countries, assuming counterfactual values of these characteristics makes little difference to unionization levels. Expressed differently, the German dummy looms large.