The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.     

OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS IN A FEDERATION: A SIMPLE, UNIFIED FRAMEWORK

In a federation with n≥ 2 regions the relative optimality of five regimes – autarky, centralization, unregulated devolution, regulated devolution and direct democracy – is examined. Public policy consists of redistribution and regional public good provision. Regional incomes are uncertain and correlated. Estimates of the usefulness of regional public goods are uncertain and the federal government's estimates are noisier relative to those of regional governments. The optimality of each regime is influenced by four margins – regional insurance, coarseness of federal information, internalization of spillovers and raiding the commons. Regulated devolution is the only regime that is capable of producing the constrained first best level of public goods. Federal insurance under direct democracy can be inadequate relative to that under a utilitarian federal government. An increase in the number of regions allows better risk pooling but also greater opportunities for raiding the commons.     

个体异质性与公共物品治理的关系研究

公共物品治理如何摆脱囚徒困境?研究者试图通过建立数理模型讨论个体异质性对公共物品治理成功的作用。梳理了个体异质性与公共物品治理的关系研究思路,基于前人的相关理论模型和实证工作,给出了公共物品治理中如何将个体间异质性纳入形式化讨论、并用经验现实予以检验的一个展望。     

On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

Social network and private provision of public goods

Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agent’s utility has two terms: (a) ‘ego’-utility derived from the agent’s consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of the public good. We also find that, in networks with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social network play an important role inducing an agent’s contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.     

The behavioral response to voluntary provision of an environmental public good: Evidence from residential electricity demand

This paper develops a theory of voluntary provision of a public good in which a household's decision to engage in a form of environmentally friendly behavior is based on the desire to offset another behavior that is environmentally harmful. The model generates predictions about (1) participation in a green-electricity program at the extensive and intensive margins, and (2) changes in electricity consumption in response to participation. We test the theory using billing data for participants and nonparticipants in a green-electricity program in Memphis, Tennessee. High-consumption households are more likely to participate, and they participate at higher levels. In terms of a behavioral response, households participating above the minimum threshold level do not change electricity consumption, but those participating at the minimum threshold increase electricity consumption 2.5 percent after enrolling in the program. The result is based on identification strategies that exploit before–after differences between participants and nonparticipants, and differences in the timing of enrollment among participants only. Despite the increase in electricity demand upon the purchase of green electricity for the households with a “buy-in” mentality, the net effect for the buy-in households is a reduction in pollution emissions, as the behavioral response is not large enough to offset the environmental benefit of the green-electricity purchase.     

Ramsey,Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents,and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.     

公共品供给的实验研究 及其未来可能的进展

传统经济学基于理性“经济人”基础,认为公地悲剧问题是个体理性选择的必然结果,公共品供给需采取与个体真实公共品偏好相兼容的激励机制,并由政府承担供给角色。实验经济学研究则提供个体异质社会偏好的稳健性证据,并在合适的惩罚、沟通交流和声誉等机制下提供诸多可以实现公共品自愿供给的实验证据,表明群体或自愿组织也可作为公共品供给主体。这些公共品实验研究为现实公共治理创新提供更为科学的偏好基础和公共治理思路。     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information

We characterize equilibria in a private‐provision public‐good game where individuals are allowed arbitrary contribution levels and the level of the public good equals the least contribution made by an individual. Equilibrium comparative statics are derived for the interim Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. First, improvements in the cost distribution of even only one player benefit all. Second, even with such “weakest‐link” public goods, for which greater similarity of preferences would seem to facilitate coordination, decreased heterogeneity can actually decrease payoffs. Indeed, increasing the riskiness of cost distributions has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Two mechanisms are provided for improving equilibrium payoffs: Technology transfer and cheap‐talk communication. While substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that (a) technology transfer may be futile if a “regularity” condition is not satisfied and (b) cheap talk may be useless if the language for communication is not sufficiently rich.     

Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.     

He Who Counts Elects: Economic Elites,Political Elites,and Electoral Fraud

What determines the extent of electoral fraud? This paper constructs a model of the tradeoff between fraud and policy concessions (public good provision) which also incorporates the strength of the state. In addition, we parameterize the extent to which economic elites (to whom fraud is costly) and political elites (to whom fraud is advantageous) “overlap.” The model predicts that fraud will be lower and public good provision higher when land inequality is higher, the overlap between elites lower, and the strength of the state higher. We test these predictions using a unique, municipal‐level dataset from Colombia's 1922 Presidential elections. We find empirical support for all the predictions of the model.     

The Political Economy of the Global Environment

Issues of the ‘global commons’ have secured a prominent place in environmental discourse. The temperature-regulating functions of the global atmosphere and radiation control functions of stratospheric ozone offer clear examples of true public goods. Other environmental assets, such as biodiversity and forests, are treated as if they are public goods, but in reality are complex mixtures of private goods, local public goods and global public goods. The approach to the provision and protection of these goods has tended to focus on the development of international agreements, such as those at the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. But do these agreements contain the relevant incentives to conserve the global commons? Much depends on one's view of human nature. The Scottish economic tradition suggests that unless incentives focus on ‘self love’, as postulated by Hume and Smith, improvements will, at best, be marginal. A richer array of policy measures is obtained by analysing the potential for ‘global bargains’, trades that improve the environment whilst making each party better off. The souls of Hume and Smith surely approve recent developments in practical global bargains.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

A Theory of Congregational Giving

This paper proposes a model to explain a broad range of established empirical facts about giving and attendance rates in religious congregations. We treat the religious service collectively consumed by the congregation as a “participatory” public good, in the sense that while its quality increases in contributions, individual consumption varies by the amount of time devoted toward attendance. The model predicts that lower income individuals will be overrepresented in religious congregations, with giving concentrated among higher income members. Inclusive doctrine is shown to increase membership but reduce average giving and attendance, while “tithing” requirements reduce membership and increase total giving.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.