ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment*

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantity‐setting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well‐known tension between the fixed set‐up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and exports.     

Overseas business costs and firm export performance

Abstract.  The recent microeconomic literature on international trade has highlighted the importance of firm characteristics and trade costs for exports. This study provides evidence on one type of those costs, the costs of doing business overseas, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Controlling for firm- and industry-level covariates, we find that improvements in the business environment of foreign countries lead to an increase in the export intensity of exporters in the UK manufacturing sector and additional export market entry. Further investigation suggests that important determinants of foreign business costs include factors relating to legal structure, property rights, and business regulation.     

Trade and Endogenous Formation of Regions in a Developing Country

The authors present a model of regional catching‐up and development without scale effects. Regional growth is driven by technological imitation which is determined by positive externalities from international trade, the regions’ geography, and regional institutions. For the two regions considered, factor endowments are immobile land and human capital which is perfectly mobile between the two regions. Endogenous formation of regions is analyzed by introducing a non‐symmetric decrease in international transaction costs, reflecting the different geography and institutions in the two regions. Using panel data from 354 South African magisterial districts over the period 1996 to 2000, we find that geography is important in explaining trade patterns. As predicted, regions that are larger in terms of economic size, with good foreign market access and know‐how of foreign markets, competitive transport costs and a good local institutional support framework will be more successful in exporting manufactured goods than other regions.     

On Mergers and Agglomeration

We formulate a model of mergers and acquisitions assuming a monopolistic competitive industry that exhibits agglomeration economies. We provide the conditions for the existence of a non‐trivial Nash equilibrium in the acquisition market at which the most productive firm acquires a range of less‐productive firms. Most importantly, we show that domestic merger and acquisition activities are international trade promotionary. We also show that such types of mergers and acquisition will improve the competitive position of foreign firms leading to an increase in their market share. In addition, domestic mergers and acquisitions will increase the number of imported varieties.     

INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

Are Public Firms Always Less Innovative than Private Firms?

The effect of information spillovers is analysed in a mixed duopoly where a profit‐maximizing private firm and a market‐share‐maximizing public firm decide whether to invest in a process innovation. It is shown that, when the spillover effect is rather strong, the public firm innovates in order to acquire a larger market share, while the private firm prefers that its rival invests in the new technology and reaps the benefits of technological leakages if investment costs are moderate. Thus, when information spillovers are taken into account, the public firm sometimes behaves more innovatively than the private firm, which is contrary to the well‐known results. Furthermore, in a mixed duopoly where only the public firm invests, its average cost exceeds that of its competitor, but investment remains an efficient strategy compared with non‐investment.     

Determinants of intra‐firm trade: Evidence from foreign affiliates in Sub‐Saharan Africa

By exploiting a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub‐Saharan Africa, we study previously examined and unexamined firm‐level determinants of intra‐firm trade. We document that foreign affiliates engaging in intra‐firm trade are relatively few and that the majority of these also engage in trade at arm's length, which accounts for an important fraction of their total trade. The identified firm‐level determinants of intra‐firm trade are consistent with property rights and intangible asset theories of the multinational firm, with international production hierarchy theories, as well as with theories of complex FDI and of multinational activity under credit constraints.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

Sunk costs of exporting and the role of experience in international trade

This paper estimates the importance of destination‐specific sunk costs of exporting and investigates the role of firms' previous experience in international trade for the decision to export to a market. While destination‐specific sunk costs are important, firms' experience in international trade can help to overcome these costs more easily. In particular, import experience from a market is found to facilitate exporting to this country and export experience from other markets can increase the probability of exporting to a country. This latter effect turns out to be conditional on the characteristics and number of markets served by a firm.     

Optimal tariffs with inframarginal exporters

This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents earned by foreign exporters even in a perfectly competitive setting. To demonstrate this, I develop a new model of international trade that incorporates fixed costs of exporting and firm heterogeneity within a perfectly competitive framework. In this setting, despite the fact that there are no preexisting distortions, the optimal tariff is positive even for a small country with no world market power. In the limit, as either firm heterogeneity or the fixed costs of exporting vanish, the optimal tariff approaches zero.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

STAY OR LEAVE? CHOICE OF PLANT LOCATION WITH COST HETEROGENEITY

Using a two-country model, we examine location choices by two domestic firms when they serve only the domestic market and their cost structures differ. The findings indicate that whether the firm that has a greater incentive for foreign direct investment is more or less efficient depends on the differences in domestic and foreign marginal costs, trade costs, and the presence of fixed costs. Plant locations may not be uniquely determined. In particular, a small change in trade costs may reverse plant location. Moreover, a decrease in transport costs in the presence of foreign direct investment may deteriorate domestic welfare.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Foreign Market Entry Strategies under Asymmetric Information*

A home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signaling to deter counter‐entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports), and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signaling may be welfare‐reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be socially desirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signaling interpretation of international expansion makes it possible to explain some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical ground.     

Strategic Environmental Policies when Waste Products are Tradable

The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste‐importing and waste‐exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple‐stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less‐developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste‐processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste‐exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.     

Firm integration strategies and imperfect labour markets

This paper introduces labour market imperfections into a three‐country model to study the determinants of firm integration strategies in an open economy. Accounting simultaneously for the decision upon in‐house production versus international outsourcing and the decision upon exporting versus horizontal foreign investment, the analysis points to a crucial role of labour market frictions for the interaction of vertical and horizontal aspects of firm integration strategies in a general equilibrium environment. Beyond that, the analysis sheds light on the consequences of integrating developing countries into the global market, thereby pointing to hitherto unexplored effects arising from adjustments of firm integration strategies. In a welfare analysis, we show that the existence of gains from trade crucially depends on whether firm integration strategies are endogenous or not.     

Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership

Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI.     

Export,Exchange Rate Risk and Hedging: The Duopoly Case

Abstract. This paper studies a Cournot duopoly in international trade with firms exposed to exchange rate risk. A hedging opportunity is introduced by a forward market on which one firm can trade the foreign currency. We investigate two settings: First, we assume that hedging and output decisions are taken simultaneously. It is shown that hedging is exclusively done for risk‐managing reasons as it is not possible to use hedging strategically. Second, the hedging decision is made before the output decisions. We show that hedging is not only used to manage the risk exposure but also as a strategic device.     

Who Gains from Restructuring the Post‐Soviet Transition Economies,and Why?

To explore the mixed economic results and huge distributional changes experienced by post‐Soviet economies, I set up a series of theoretical and numerical simulation models using an approach based upon heterogeneous firms, where ‘reform’ means closure of inefficient capacity. In the presence of significant costs to new firm entry and international capital mobility, restructuring and privatisation can lead to falls in GDP and real wages, while capital is transferred abroad. This situation can occur even under perfect competition, but is worse when industrial production is concentrated and trade costs are high. By contrast, workers can gain when costs of establishing new firms are low, and/or when the inefficient industries are capital‐intensive. For countries with high costs of firm set‐up and of trade, capital controls may be justified to protect wages.