Liquidity constrained exporters and trade

We present a model of a risk-averse exporting firm subject to liquidity constraints. We show that preferences and expectations become important for optimum export and hedging decisions. Only firms that have sufficient financial resources can fully materialize gains from trade.     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS UNDER CORRELATED REVENUE AND EXCHANGE RATE RISK

This paper examines the behaviour of a competitive exporting firm under joint revenue and exchange rate risk. The firm can trade unbiased currency futures contracts for hedging purposes. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full‐hedging theorem holds when the revenue shock prevails. If the correlation between the revenue shock and the random spot exchange rate is non‐positive, the firm optimally produces less than the benchmark level when the revenue shock is absent. If, in addition, the firm is prudent, the optimal futures position is an under‐hedge. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions under which the firm's optimal output level is higher in the presence than in the absence of the revenue shock. Operational hedging and financial hedging as such interact in a complicated way to better cope with the multiple sources of uncertainty faced by the firm.     

HEDGING AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER AMBIGUOUS PRICE AND BACKGROUND RISK

This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The separation theorem holds in that the firm's optimal output level depends neither on the firm's attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full‐hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean‐preserving spreads. We as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.     

Imperfect Forward Markets and Hedging

This paper considers a hedging model of a risk-averse competitive firm facing output price uncertainty. Imperfections exist in forward transactions in that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function for its forward sales. We show that the optimal output and hedge ratio of the firm are, in general, not separable, and are related in a deterministic manner. We also derive some economic implications of production and hedging decisions when firms differ in their attitudes towards risk. A more risk-averse firm is shown to produce less and hedge more than a less risk-averse firm.
(J.E.L.: D21, D81).     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

Price uncertainty,future markets and correlation

This paper examines the optimal trade and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm which faces concurrently hedgeable exchange rate risk and non‐hedgeable inflation risk. The macroeconomic interaction between exchange rate and domestic inflation rate risk is described by a state variable. The (strong) correlation is pivotal in determining the optimal risk management. It is shown how optimal hedging strategies are affected by state‐dependent preferences of the firm. The optimal hedge policy is to minimize the variation of marginal utility of final wealth across states of nature instead of minimizing the variance of final wealth.     

Currency hedging with options and futures

This paper examines the optimal hedging decision of a competitive exporting firm which faces concurrently hedgeable exchange rate risk and non-hedgeable price risk. We show that the hedging role of currency options is due to two distinct sources of non-linearity: (i) the multiplicative nature of the price and exchange rate risk; and (ii) the marginal utility function of the firm. In particular, we show that a long put option position is optimal when the price risk is negatively correlated with the exchange rate risk and/or the firm is prudent.     

Operational and financial hedging for exporting firms

This paper examines the interaction between operational and financial hedging in the context of an internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Operational hedging is modeled by letting the firm make its export decision after it has observed the true realization of the then prevailing spot exchange rate. Financial hedging, on the other hand, is modeled by allowing the firm to trade fairly priced exotic derivatives that are tailor-made for the firm's hedging need. We show that both operational and financial hedging unambiguously entice the firm into producing more. We further derive sufficient conditions under which operational hedging dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting the firm's optimal output.     

CROSS‐HEDGING OF EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A NOTE*

This note studies the optimal production and hedging decisions of a competitive international firm that exports to two foreign countries. The firm faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Cross‐hedging is plausible in that one of the two foreign countries has a currency forward market. We show that the firm's optimal forward position is an over‐hedge, a full‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, respectively.     

Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Risk Management Using Quasi–static Hedging

In this paper, we try to develop a comprehensive theory of risk management for illiquid trading instruments and exotics by examining the consequences of a quasi–static hedging strategy. In contrast to a static hedging strategy, in which an initial hedge once executed is kept in place for the life of the trade, and a dynamic hedging strategy, in which hedges are frequently adjusted over the life of the trade, a quasi–static hedging strategy utilizes hedge adjustments but tries to minimize the frequency. Almost all the examples studied in the framework introduced here take this minimization to the extreme by limiting hedge adjustments to at most one during the life of a trade. We examine the application of this approach to long–dated forwards, long–dated options and exotic options such as cliquet and barriers. The model we present for barriers is a new generation of the Derman–Ergener–Kani approach which combines the flexibility of the approach with a sizable increase in model independence.     

(Asymmetric) trade costs,real exchange rate hedging,and equity home bias in a multicountry model

There has been controversy between (two‐country) theory and the empirics about whether hedging against real exchange rate fluctuations in the goods market influences foreign equity holdings. This study reconciles the theory with the empirics by introducing a multicountry framework with asymmetric trade costs. We find that the incentive to hold foreign equities to hedge real exchange rate risk is negligible because multiple trade partners act as a hedging channel for real exchange rate fluctuations. Further, our theory calls for a country's covariance–variance ratio to be constructed as the sum of the bilateral covariance–variance ratios of the multiple partners. The empirical analysis of 24 advanced countries confirms the theoretical prediction.     

ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TO DIVERSIFY CONTRACTUAL RISK*

Are hedging transactions that diversify a manager’s compensation risk detrimental to incentives, or can they improve contracting efficiency? If hedging provides efficiency benefits, should the manager or the firm undertake it? In our model, both the firm and the manager can trade financial portfolios to diversify the manager’s compensation risk. Prior to the portfolio selection, the parties need to acquire information on how different financial portfolios fit their diversification purposes. We illustrate that financial portfolios correlated with firm‐specific risk improve contracting efficiency. For equal information costs, it is optimal for the firm to undertake the hedging on the manager’s behalf.     

Inflation Risk, Hedging, and Exports

This paper analyzes optimal production and hedging decisions of a risk-averse exporting firm in a developing country. The firm cares about real profits, since the spot exchange rate and the domestic price level are uncertain. It is demonstrated that a separation property holds although there are two sources of risk and only one hedging instrument exists. The authors examine the optimal risk management of the firm. In contrast to most hedging models, the real risk premium is important for the optimal hedging strategy.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.     

Exchange Rate Volatility,Earnings Uncertainty and Bidirectional Trade Flows: Empirical Evidence on Ghana

Although the empirical findings on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade is diverse, the growing consensus in the literature appears to suggest that for developing economies, the theoretically expected negative relationship almost always exists. The paper takes a different approach to empirically assess this relationship by analysing the impact of exchange rate volatility independently on total trade, imports and exports. The intuition behind this approach is to assess exactly how exporters and importers are incentivised (differently or similarly) by exchange rate volatility costs. Whereas adequately risk-aversed Ghanaian exporters in the presence of higher exchange rate volatility and the absence of hedging facilities effectively compensated against exchange rate risk by increasing volume of exports, import decisions were to some extent (although not effectively) negatively affected by exchange rate volatility. The different responses by Ghanaian exporters and importers to higher exchange rate volatility costs are reflected in the relationship between volatility and total trade. The useful policy lessons and the challenges that the empirical evidence present are discussed.     

Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?

Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. But this allows risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of the other decisions. So can we trust the existing belief-elicitation results? And can we avoid potential hedging confounds? We propose an experimental design that theoretically eliminates hedging opportunities. Using this design, we test for the empirical relevance of hedging effects in the lab. Our results suggest that hedging confounds are not a major problem unless hedging opportunities are very prominent. If hedging opportunities are transparent, and incentives to hedge are strong, many subjects do spot hedging opportunities and respond to them. The bias can go beyond players actually hedging themselves, because some expect others to hedge and best respond to this.     

Exchange rate volatility and international trade: A general-equilibrium analysis

We analyze the relation between exchange-rate volatility and the volume of international trade, in a general-equilibrium stochastic-endowment economy with imperfect international commodity markets, and treating both variables as endogenous. Even in the simplest model, the sign of the relation depends on the source for the change in volatility. For instance, more volatility of the endowments and higher costs to international trade both boost exchange risk (and lower welfare); but the first increases the expected volume of trade, while the second decreases trade. Note that even the (inter-equilibria) relation between trade and welfare is ambiguous.