A NOTE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS IN VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRIES

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of a multiproduct multinational firm which supplies vertically differentiated products, and show that the proximity‐concentration trade‐off can generate FDI‐export coexistence, i.e., the firm supplies the low‐quality products through FDI and the high‐quality products through exports. We also show that the opposite can never happen. Moreover, when the multiproduct multinational firm faces price competition in the target markets, it has an incentive to use trade costs to soften price competition, which can reduce its FDI incentive.     

VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT*

This paper analyses the welfare effects of a market‐share Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) in the presence of foreign direct investment utilizing a duality approach. Introducing the cost burden of VIE explicitly, this paper considers the conditions under which a market‐share VIE is voluntary to the importing country. It is shown that the voluntary nature of VIE depends upon the capital import, cost burden and price difference effects and that a VIE is truly voluntary if it is accompanied by direct investment. We also show the existence of a complementary relationship between VIE and direct investment in attaining a particular level of welfare.     

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL*

Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three‐country model contrast with those found in a two‐country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non‐member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.     

CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A PANEL GRAVITY MODEL APPROACH

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of 15 transition countries by using a panel gravity model approach and suggests that corruption does not deter FDI.     

REFORM CREATING REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: APPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIA

Abstract. We estimate the investment creation and diversion effects of RTAs by using an extended gravity equation focusing on domestic reform as a commitment device for RTA membership. As a case study, we estimate the impact of proposed East Asian RTAs on inward FDI. We find that: (i) reform creating RTA membership, larger market size, better skilled labour and lower trade costs all contribute positively and significantly to inward FDI; and (ii) most of the proposed East Asian RTAs promote intra‐bloc FDI. In particular, both South–North and North–North RTAs prove to be more preferable membership combinations to South–South RTAs in East Asia.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE KNOWLEDGE‐CAPITAL MODEL AND A SMALL COUNTRY CASE

This research looks at how foreign direct investment (FDI) in a small open economy compares with that of larger countries. I apply several specifications of the knowledge‐capital model to unique FDI data from the isolated country of Iceland, allowing for comparison with previous analysis of larger and similarly open economies. Using this together with other techniques, I seek to explain investment determinants by geography, economic size and skilled labor availability. The results of these analysis show that popular specifications do not accurately predict the effects for a small country case.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.     

外商直接投资区域变化与中西部地区引资困境

根据中国内陆地区对外开放程度逐渐加大、国家对西部开发的重视程度不断加强,以及外资投资区位转移的“雁行理论”等条件推理,内陆地区近年来引进外资的增长幅度应该快于沿海地区。然而,实际分析结果表明,1979年以来的外资由沿海向内陆地区的转移,从1997年开始停滞,中西部地区引进外资总体表现不佳。文章从“路径依赖”、市场规模、基础设施、劳动力素质、产业关联和投资软环境诸方面分析了形成这种现象的原因。在此基础上,提出了加快中西部地区引资的思路。     

STRATEGIC TRADE AND DELEGATED COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE: IS EXPORT POLICY NEEDED?

This paper introduces the relative‐performance contract into a vertically differentiated product market and examines how the optimal trade policy and quality choice respond to the incentive mechanism. We find that the high quality firm makes better use of the delegation than the low quality firm in a cross‐border decentralized model. The main difference between the present paper and the strategic trade theory literature is that in this paper the optimal policy is free trade, which does not depend on whether firms compete by prices or quantities, and on whether the goods are substitutes or full complements.     

THE ABSENCE OF THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET EFFECT IN THE TAIWAN STOCK MARKET: A DECOMPOSITION APPROACH

This paper examines the absence of the book‐to‐market equity (BM) effect in the Taiwan stock market, applying the BM decomposition proposed by Daniel and Titman (2006 ). First, we do not observe a significantly negative correlation between future stock return and intangible return on research‐and‐development‐intensive firms in Taiwan, which is inconsistent with the US evidence documented by Daniel and Titman. Second, undervaluation of research‐and‐development‐intensive firms possibly leads to the absence of the BM effect. Those firms, most of which have low BM, perform well not only in the past, but also in the future, thereby obscuring the BM effect.     

STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A LABOUR‐MANAGED DUOPOLY

Developing a Cournot two‐stage game model with strategic capital interaction, we compare two different kinds of equilibrium in a labour‐managed (LM) duopoly. An LM firm's reaction function is negatively sloped when capital and output are simultaneously determined, while the slope of its reaction function in the second stage changes in sign depending on the magnitude of its labour‐expansion elasticity. Hence, whether the LM firms employ more capital and produce greater output at the equilibria in the two‐stage game model than at the equilibria resulting from the simultaneous selection of capital and output depends on the magnitude of their labour‐expansion elasticity.     

鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资时空格局研究

通过对鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资绝对差距、相对差距、集聚特征、外资利用水平和发展速度时空格局的深入分析,发现鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资时空格局呈现以下特征:外商直接投资相对差异有所扩大,绝对差异有所缩小;区域集聚程度总体有所缩小,集聚格局由"二"型向"┴"转变;低水平区域由均衡向东北方向演化,高水平区域向南昌市和浙赣线集聚;低水平区域发展速度较快,缩小了区域总体差距。     

Redistribution,state trading enterprises and ‘politically optimal’ tariffs

State trading enterprises (STEs) are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy. We analyse two aspects: the first is their potential trade distorting effect; the second is how they modify the case for the ‘politically optimal’ tariff. We show that the STE can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution. This result introduces some ambiguity about how STEs are interpreted: from a multilateralist perspective, they should be dealt with in the same way as other non‐tariff barriers; from a nationalistic perspective, they can reduce the need for ‘politically optimal.’     

外商直接投资对中国的技术溢出-一个基于中国省区面板数据的研究

利用中国29个省区1994—2003年的面板数据,本文研究了外商直接投资对中国省区经济增长效率的影响,结果显示,相对于国内企业,外资企业具有相对较高的技术效率,外商直接投资对中国省区技术效率的提高有显著的溢出效应,外商直接投资的技术溢出呈现一种区域的差异性,而对外贸易对中国省区的技术效率并没有产生明显的技术溢出,在分区域研究的时候发现,对外贸易对西部省区技术效率的提高产生了显著的抑制作用。     

外商直接投资对中国的技术溢出-一个基于中国省区面板数据的研究

利用中国29个省区1994-2003年的面板数据,该文研究了外商直接投资对中国省区经济增长效率的影响,结果显示,相对于国内企业,外资企业具有相对较高的技术效率,外商直接投资对中国省区技术效率的提高有显著的溢出效应,外商直接投资的技术溢出呈现一种区域的差异性,而对外贸易对中国省区的技术效率并没有产生明显的技术溢出,在分区域研究的时候发现,对外贸易对西部省区技术效率的提高产生了显著的抑制作用.