THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

UNPACKING THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ON DISASTER RESILIENCE: A COMPARISON OF EXPERT PERSPECTIVES

Public managers are under increasing pressure to develop and operate physical infrastructure systems that prove resilient in the face of natural disasters. At the same time, fiscal pressures and mounting infrastructure needs are drawing more and more attention to public–private partnerships (PPP) as a mechanism for delivering infrastructure. The research question guiding this study is how can the institutional designs of PPPs influence the potential for improving infrastructure resilience? We examined the perceived relationship between infrastructure resilience and PPPs by conducting and analyzing research interviews with twenty‐four senior infrastructure experts in Washington, DC. The results reflect findings of related privatization research, indicating that market‐based incentives can advance public values such as resilience, but the responsibility for ensuring they do so rests primarily with government. We note key differences in how the infrastructure investment experts and disaster resilience experts view issues in infrastructure management, and provide suggestions for improving public‐private collaboration to improve resilience.     

THE USE OF PPP ARRANGEMENTS IN STREET LIGHTING: A WIN‐WIN OPTION?

Street lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States’ first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.     

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‒PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATION

While the contemporary academic discourse regards innovation as an inherent feature of infrastructure public?private partnerships (PPPs), the conceptual link between infrastructure PPPs and innovation is narrowly understood. While most existing studies conceptualize the innovation processes and effects within the context of PPP projects, we argue that the relevance of innovation in infrastructure PPPs goes beyond specific projects. In this conceptual article, we examine why and how infrastructure PPP innovations can shape the evolution of the involved private and public sector organizations – and therefore the respective sectors – more broadly. We show that innovation in the context of PPPs has much broader implications and potential outcomes than as emphasized in the literature so far.     

EVALUATING THE COSTS,QUALITY, AND VALUE FOR MONEY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Public?private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.     

COMPARING PPP WITH TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF SCHOOLS PROCUREMENT IN IRELAND

Advocates of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) argue that they can deliver public infrastructure more efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an in‐depth, case‐based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in Ireland. Through detailed semi‐structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.     

Public-Private Partnerships A Public Economics Perspective

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are spreading all over theworld. It may be quite plausible that they were initially startedmainly as an attempt to evade expenditure controls and hidepublic budget deficits. But if they are properly designed andtransparently reported, PPPs can play a useful role in enhancingthe efficiency of the provision of services that were suppliedbefore solely by the public sector. This article provides apublic economics perspective on PPPs. (JEL codes: H54, L33)     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

公共产品提供的逻辑

从市场失效推导出来的公共产品理论不能有效地区分公共与私人产品,也不能解释公共提供的事实。本文试图从另一个角度讨论什么是决定产品公共提供的根本原因,并以外部性—效用相互依存性—公共提供这样的顺序来推导公共产品提供的逻辑。     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS

I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective‐value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.     

INTERNAL REGULATION BY MIXED ENTERPRISES: THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN WATER SECTOR

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises in local utilities. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following it, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of 'internal' regulation. With more information, the public authority can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations. Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of these enterprises can be the suitable place where public and private representatives can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts.     

The Asymptotic Voluntary Provision of the Pure Public Goods

This paper analyzes the voluntary provision of the pure public good in a sequence of finite economies. The boundedness of this provision is established under very weak conditions. The Cournot–Nash provision of the public good is bounded. In contrast, the Lindahl provision is unbounded but the proportion of private good devoted to its production may be infinitesimal. Several examples are provided to relate this paper to the literature.     

公共品供给机制:作用边界变迁及影响因素

公共品供给机制是从供给主体和运行机理的角度抽象出的公共品供给模式,包括政府供给、市场供给和自愿供给.某一公共品的供给方式不是一成不变的,其供给机制的作用边界处于变迁之中,主要表现为政府供给与私人供给的相互转化.在公共品供给机制的变迁中,公共品的性质特征、技术进步、政府职能理念、公平效率准则、政府政策倾向、需求状况以及私人资本规模都产生了一定的影响作用.     

城市公用事业特许经营 相关问题比较研究

推行特许经营是深化我国城市公用事业市场化改革的一个重要内容。本文在讨论特许经营渊源和实质的基础上,对城市公用事业特许经营与商业特许经营、行政许可、政府购买服务、公私合作（PPP）等相关问题作了比较研究,探讨了它们之间的联系和区别,便于人们准确把握城市公用事业特许经营的内涵和特点,为有效推进城市公用事业特许经营提供理论基础。     

THE DIVERSITY GAP IN THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF WOMEN AND VISIBLE MINORITIES IN SENIOR LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

Despite intense focus on leadership diversity in industries such as high technology, business, the media and academia, to date the infrastructure sector has not received the same level of scrutiny. This paper develops a theoretical framework to explain why leadership diversity matters in the management of complex infrastructure projects delivered through public – private partnerships, and then empirically identifies the diversity gap in senior leadership in the PPP industry worldwide. The study is based on an examination of over 2,800 public and private sector executives, board members and politicians responsible for PPPs in over 90 countries. The results show that women and racial minorities are significantly underrepresented in senior leadership roles, a pattern that is deeply entrenched and consistent globally. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for the infrastructure industry, and explores how a lack of leadership diversity can influence project management outcomes.     

Constrained public goods in networks

This paper analyses the private provision of public goods where agents interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours’ provisions. We generalise the public goods in the networks model of Bramoullé and Kranton [J. Econ. Theory 135 (2007), pp. 478–494] to allow for constrained provision. In so doing, we characterise Nash equilibria with no intermediate contributors.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Kant and Lindahl*

In 1896 and 1919, respectively, Wicksell and Lindahl analyzed the public provision of public goods through parliamentary negotiation. Later, Roemer applied Kant's 1785 imperatives to the private provision of public goods by voluntary contributions. Our focal equilibrium notions are the balanced linear cost-share equilibrium for the Wicksell–Lindahl approach and the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium in the Kant–Roemer modeling. These turn out to be fundamentally equivalent, being defined by the same individual optimization problem. These notions fit well with the idea that technology is publicly owned, but we also extend them to cover private-ownership economies with exogenously given profit shares. We show that the equivalence between the Wicksell–Lindahl and Kant–Roemer notions carries over to them.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.