首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract We examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country’s government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country’s dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.  相似文献   

3.
It is possible that wealthy trading countries nevertheless have no autarkic equilibria. However, if a country has no autarkic equilibrium, the offer curve of that country may consist of disjoint segments, which implies that a worldwide trading equilibrium does not always exist, that international exchanges do not always take place in equilibrium, and therefore that econometric estimates of the structure of open economies must be viewed with scepticism. In the present paper, I provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a worldwide free-trade equilibrium and for the existence of gains from free trade for individual countries.  相似文献   

4.
This paper presents a one‐primary factor, two‐consumer good, and two‐country model of international trade where each country’s government supplies a country‐specific public intermediate good so as to attain efficient production. By introducing the Marshallian adjustment process, it is demonstrated that the country with larger factor endowment exports the good whose productivity is more sensitive to the public intermediate good. Our normative analysis of free trade shows the following results. First, at least one country gains from trade. Secondly, if a country incompletely specializes in the trading equilibrium, the country necessarily loses from trade.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.  相似文献   

6.
It is shown that, in a context of Cournot–Nash general equilibrium, free trade is potentially gainful for each trading country. No restrictions are placed on the numbers of products, factors of production or countries, or on the nature of returns to scale. Moreover, preferences, techniques and factor endowments can differ from agent to agent.
JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F12, F13, F15.  相似文献   

7.
This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles of large‐country economies in a free‐trade equilibrium. We consider a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor general equilibrium model with Cobb‐Douglas technologies and linear preferences. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in the consumption good sector. We first identify the determinants of each country's global accumulation pattern in autarky equilibrium, and secondly we show how a country's business cycles may spread throughout the world once trade opens. We thus give capital intensity conditions for local and global stability of competitive equilibrium paths.  相似文献   

8.
Abstract We develop a multi‐country model with imperfect labour markets to study the effect of labour market frictions on bilateral trade flows. We use a framework that allows for goods trade and capital mobility and show that labour market imperfections exert opposite effects in the absence of capital mobility (the short run) and its presence (the long run), respectively. In the short run, a higher degree of labour market rigidity decreases the value of total trade, but increases the share of intra‐industry trade for a country that is larger than its trading partner. The reverse effects are observed when capital is allowed to cross country borders. Using data on unemployment and income distribution for 23 OECD countries, we compute the central parameter in our theoretical model that describes the degree of labour market rigidity. We use this new empirical concept to provide evidence for our theoretical findings by means of reduced‐form regressions as well as simulation results of a calibrated general equilibrium model.  相似文献   

9.
International trade and consumption network externalities   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities. The framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture. In an extended Ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that: (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique; (ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse (network competition) under free trade, but can be if each country is homogenous (network monopoly); (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky. Consumers of imported network goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.  相似文献   

10.
In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant.  相似文献   

11.
Welfare Comparisons of Customs Unions and Other Free Trade Associations   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The main purpose of this note is to establish a precise version of the proposition that, in the context of a worldwide constituency, a customs union is more beneficial or less harmful than a comparable but distinct free trade association. It is shown that, corresponding to each feasible tariff-ridden world trading equilibrium, there is a Pareto-preferred and feasible free trade association; and, corresponding to each free trade association, there is a Pareto-preferred and feasible Kemp–Wan customs union.  相似文献   

12.
We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.  相似文献   

13.
We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.  相似文献   

14.
This paper develops and examines a discrete-time two-by-two-by-two barter trading world which incorporates populations. composed of overlapping, life-cycle-maximizing generations; each provides an economically distinguishable factor of production. It is shown that free trade without compensation can be Pareto inferior to autarky for one country. Conditions for uncompensated free trade to take place under a majority voting system are derived. The model permits intergenerational borrowing and lending to take place domestically but not internationally.  相似文献   

15.
This paper proves that in a multicountry general‐equilibrium model of international trade with local public goods, free trade is beneficial if the governments in the trading world behave strategically with respect to the provision of public goods.  相似文献   

16.
Gains from trade with overlapping generations   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary This paper examines the welfare effects of international trade in a context of overlapping generations. It shows that, for a single trading country, uncompensated free trade may be Pareto inferior to autarky. However, for each government there are compensation schemes which guarantee welfare improvements for all local individuals when free trade is allowed, or when for a small open economy the terms of trade improve or the number of tradable goods increases, or when a customs union is formed.We acknowledge with gratitude the probing comments of Henry Y. Wan, Jr. and two anonymous referees.  相似文献   

17.
Abstract This paper examines firm heterogeneity in terms of size, wages, capital intensity, and productivity between domestic and foreign‐owned firms that engage in intra‐firm trade, firms that export and import, firms that import only, and firms that export only. As previously documented, heterogeneity between different groups of trading firms is substantial. Taking into account intra‐firm trade in addition to exporting and importing yields new insights into the productivity advantage previously established for exporting firms. The results presented here show that this premium accrues only to exporters that also import and to exporters that also engage in intra‐firm trade, but not to firms that export only. Using simultaneous quantile regressions, the paper illustrates that heterogeneity within different groups of trading firm is equally large. Some of this within‐group heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in trading partners.  相似文献   

18.
This paper examines why the recent efforts to arrange free trade regimes have failed repeatedly focusing on the increased uncertainties in economic fundamentals and the asymmetric political economic characteristics of trading countries reflected in the hawkish trade retaliatory tendencies. We demonstrate that, under informational barriers due to economic uncertainties, a slight negative change in economic fundamentals as well as the signals about the economic fundamentals can lead to the collapse of free trade regimes. Moreover, the fear of a trading partner's deviation to protectionist policies might trigger preemptive protectionist measures resulting in a trade war when trade policies show strategic complementarity. However, a free trade regime is more likely to be sustained when it is commonly known that each country has strong symmetric retaliatory tendencies in case trade friction occurs. Nonetheless, if the asymmetry in retaliatory tendencies of trading countries increases the preemptive incentive, a free trade regime is more likely to collapse to a trade war.  相似文献   

19.
According to conventional home market effects, free trade tends to shrink the market share for a smaller economy in differentiated manufacturing goods, and in the extreme, leads to a complete hollowing out of the industry. Departing from the original Helpman–Krugman modelling assumptions behind the home market effects, we introduce a technology advantage in terms of the difference in fixed cost and/or marginal cost between trading partners and prove that home market effects will be offset and even reverse if a small economy has better technology than another country. With a higher elasticity of substitution, the marginal cost advantage becomes more important if it is to dominate the home market effect. We also show that even with an identical country size, the intra‐industry trade addressed in the existing literature may not occur; it will occur only if the technology differential lies within a certain range that is positively affected by the level of transport cost.  相似文献   

20.
Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three‐country model contrast with those found in a two‐country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non‐member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号