Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Creating Value at the Intersection of Sourcing,Hedging and Trading

Higher commodity prices, along with higher currency and commodity price volatility, have combined with challenging economic circumstances to make for difficult economics within many industries today. These factors can introduce risk to both top‐line revenue and the cost structure, and wreak havoc on net cash flow and profitability. To the extent that high prices and increasing price volatility continue to be the rule in many global commodity categories, the authors suggest that both sourcing and hedging will soon be (if they are not already) near the top of the strategic agenda for many companies. Many companies now design their hedging programs—and in some cases their sourcing—to achieve the goals of reducing cash flow volatility and optimizing value (as opposed to the more conventional aim of minimizing sourced or manufactured unit cost). And a growing number of corporate managements have expressed interest in an even more systematic approach to risk management. Rising pressure for growth and profitability has led companies with large commodities exposures—both those that are naturally long and those with a natural short—to explore a more strategic role for commodity hedging and trading, as well as the use of innovative risk‐shifting mechanisms for inbound and outbound material flows. This article shows how companies can design their commodity risk management programs to make the greatest use of the expertise and capabilities of four different corporate groups: Purchasing, Treasury, Selling, and Marketing. To that end, the authors presents a five‐step program for creating a company‐wide strategic risk management program:

• ? The first step involves making active design choices about what risks to “own” and what risks to limit based on the company's strategy, core competencies, and relative competitive advantages in owning that risk.
• ? The second step is to establish relevant risk guidelines based on capacity to own risks and, to a lesser extent, risk appetite, with specific hedging targets and benchmarks. This involves defining objectives, priorities, and constraints (for example, protecting liquidity or increasing debt capacity by reducing cash flow volatility).
• ? The third step is to identify and characterize a complete inventory of all exposures—source, size and drivers—and those exposures to be managed. This involves defining, measuring and analyzing all exposures (e.g., commodities, FX, interest rates), with special attention to aggregating, netting, natural offsets, and correlations.
• ? The fourth step involves comparing the suitability of various hedging tools and determining how to incorporate these tools into a systematic program that will achieve stated goals, views, and risk preferences for each exposure.
• ? The fifth and last step is establishing an appropriate risk management operating model, which involves considerations of organizational architecture, management processes, decision rights, information flows, and governance.

     

WHY HEDGE? SOME EVIDENCE FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCERS

Despite the prevalence of corporate risk management, there are no widely accepted explanations for why companies hedge or how shareholders benefit from hedging. This article provides some evidence on these issues by reporting the results of a study of the risk management policies of 100 oil and gas producers from 1992 to 1994.
The first notable finding is the considerable variety of the hedging policies of the oil and gas producers. For example, in 1993 slightly more than half of the companies did not hedge, while a quarter of the firms in the sample hedged more than 28' of their production, and some firms hedged almost 100'. The second main finding was that the extent of hedging was related to a variety of factors, largely those related to financing costs. In particular, companies with higher leverage—and thus presumably facing greater difficulties in accessing the capital markets—tended to hedge a larger fraction of their output than firms with lower leverage ratios. This result is consistent with the idea that corporations manage risks to help ensure they have sufficient capital to finance their investment opportunities and to reduce the likelihood that low oil and gas prices will push them into financial distress. Under either of these interpretations, financial theory would suggest that corporate hedging increases shareholder value. Whether it actually does so is a matter for future research.     

Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation

Firm value is influenced in many direct and indirect ways by financial risks which consist in unexpected changes of foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. The fact that a significant number of corporations are committing resources to risk management activities, however, represents only an indication for the potential of corporate risk management to increase firm value. This paper presents a comprehensive review of positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the contribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value. It is argued that because of realistic capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing, risk management on the firm level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) represents a means to increase firm value to the benefit of the shareholders.     

Risk management and market conditions

In this paper, we investigate the relation between hedging activity by commercial/merchant/producers to commodity prices and commodity market volatility using Commitments of Traders reports from commodity futures markets exchanges. Qualifying the body of literature which attributes hedging activity to departures from Modigliani-Miller theory, market imperfections and transactions cost, we address the paradoxes of hedging which is not value creating and the absence of hedging when firms might benefit, arguing that it may be related to the market conditions and risk appetite. We discover that prices and volatility are generally statistically significant contributors to hedging activity by commercial/merchant/producers’ users but with marked differences in their elasticities. For some commodities, price levels alone and not volatility are significant. We demonstrate that analysis of hedging in commodity markets should take cognisance of conditions and the degree of risk aversion, otherwise the implicit assumption is that hedging is invariant to such matters. Through considering both market conditions and the degree of risk aversion, understanding the motivation for hedging may be enhanced.     

Financial hedging and corporate investment

Building on the well-documented relationship between corporate financial hedging and firms' borrowing costs, this study examines the impact of utilizing financial derivative instruments on corporate investment. We document that engaging in financial hedging enables firms to pursue more inorganic growth opportunities in the form of M&As. Acquiring firms with financial hedging programs have a lower borrowing cost and are more likely to pay for their deals with cash and use external borrowing. While financial hedging serves as a vehicle for firms to bring their inorganic investment plans to fruition by facilitating their financing, it also leads to inferior investment choices when conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders are more likely to arise. Our study shows for the first time that the financial flexibility emanating from corporate financial hedging can give rise to agency costs by instigating entrenched managers to overinvest.     

Three Approaches to Risk Management—and How and Why Swedish Companies Use Them

Companies can manage risk by using derivatives or through operational hedging. But there is a third possibility: to leave their operating cash flows unhedged while ensuring that the firm has access to external finance in adverse states of the world. This article reports the findings of a recent survey of over 800 Swedish companies that aims to shed light on the relative importance of these three risk management methods, as well as how they interact in corporate risk management programs. The results show that risk management practices aimed at ensuring access to external finance are the main method used by the largest number of companies, followed by operational hedging methods and financial hedging with derivatives. Large companies hedge using both operational methods and derivatives, whereas small firms are less likely to use derivatives but nevertheless attach great importance to the other two ways of managing risk. Even among the largest companies, operational hedging tends to deemed more important than hedging with derivatives—a finding that, although perhaps a surprise to financial professionals, underscores the authors’ finding that operational and derivative‐based hedges function as complements rather than substitutes. Indeed, the authors report that the most financially sophisticated companies tend to use all three of these common forms of risk management.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Limits to arbitrage and hedging: Evidence from commodity markets

We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices.     

Evidence from German Companies of Effects of Corporate Risk Management on Capital Structure Decisions

The author investigates the interaction between risk management and capital structure among publicly listed German companies. By surveying executives at these companies, she computes a risk management score for each company indicating the extent of risk management practices. The scores reflect not only the companies' use of derivatives and “at‐risk” ratios, but also the respondents' assessments of how well risk management has been integrated into existing corporate processes. Some results, though not all, are consistent with finance theory. Most important, companies with more extensive risk management activities have higher debt ratios and lower interest coverage ratios. At the same time, such companies also exhibit lower volatility of cash flow, sales, EBIT, and net income, which helps explain their ability to service more debt. And, finally, companies with more extensive—and, according to their responding executives, more effective—risk management also tend to be larger, have longer debt maturities, lower average costs of debt, and have more tangible assets.     

Exposure-Based Cash-Flow-at-Risk: An Alternative to VaR for Industrial Companies

Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) is the cash flow equivalent of Value-at-Risk (VaR), a measure widely used as the basis for risk management in financial institutions. Whereas VaR-based systems specify the maximum amount of total value a firm is expected to lose under most foreseeable conditions (for example, with a 99% confidence level), CFaR-based systems determine the maximum shortfall of cash the firm is willing to tolerate. CFaR is gaining in popularity among industrial companies for much the same reasons VaR has succeeded with financial firms: it sums up all the company's risk exposures in a single number that can be used to guide corporate risk management decisions.
The authors describe a six-step process for calculating a measure they call "exposure-based CFaR" and then demonstrate its application to Norsk Hydro, the Norwegian industrial conglomerate. Exposure-based CFaR involves the estimation of a set of exposure coefficients that provide information about how various macroeconomic and market variables are expected to affect the company's cash flow, while also accounting for interdependencies among such effects. The resulting model enables management to estimate the variability in corporate cash flow as a function of various risks, and to predict how a hedging contract or a change in financial structure will alter the company's risk profile.     

The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world

We examine the determinants of corporate cash management policies across a broad sample of international firms. We document that firms in countries with strong legal protection of minority investors are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flow than are firms in countries with weak legal protection. This relationship is most pronounced for firms that are financially constrained and those with high hedging needs. More importantly, we do not find evidence that financial development plays an incremental impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash, after controlling for the effect of legal protection. Therefore, we argue that the legal protection of investors (rather than financial development) represents the first-order effect in influencing international firms' cash management policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of country-level legal protection of investors in mitigating the effects of firm-level financial constraints and hedging needs on corporate cash management policies.     

STRATEGIC HEDGING

This article presents a new approach to financial risk management whose primary objective is to ensure that companies have sufficient internal funds and access to outside capital to carry out their strategic investments. The foundation of this approach is a comprehensive measure of corporate exposure that views the firm as a collection of current cashgenerating assets and future investment opportunities and that attempts to show how changes in fundamental economic variables can threaten the firm's ability to realize its strategic objectives. As such, the measure of exposure reflects the effect of expected changes in economic variables not only on the firm's operating cash flows but also on its future investment requirements.
Because its focuses only on the exposures that need protection when regular sources of funds are exhausted, this strategic hedging approach will generally lead to a more conservative hedging policy. In so doing, it should enable companies to avoid the excessive and costly "micro" hedging of individual transactions—an approach that can easily degenerate into speculation.     

Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms

This study investigates the relationship between family control and corporate capital structure considering the dynamic nature of the debt policy and the ownership structure of family firms. Our results show that the sensitivity of debt to fluctuations in cash flow is less pronounced in family firms and highlight that family control increases the speed of adjustment toward target debt. Four dimensions of the family business model explain these results: deviations of voting from cash flow rights, the presence of a second blockholder in the company, involvement of family members in management, and the generation in charge of the business. The weaker negative impact of cash flow on debt is driven by family firms with no control‐enhancing mechanisms, companies with active family participation in management and family businesses that are still controlled by the first generation. By contrast, the more severe agency conflicts between owners and creditors in family firms with a second blockholder lead to more pronounced pecking order behaviour. Furthermore, the higher flexibility in corporate decision‐making of family firms managed by the family and under the influence of the first generation explains why family companies are able to rebalance their capital structure faster.     

Which form of hedging matters — Operational or financial? Evidence from the US oil and gas sector

We examine the extent and impact of operational and financial hedging on commodity price risk in US oil and gas companies. We find significant exposure to underlying commodity movements. Using a combination of hand collected and publicly available data we examine the impact of hedging strategies. We find no evidence that operational hedging, defined here as multinationality, is effective. In contrast, we find that financial hedging is significant and impactful. Sub-period analysis shows that the effectiveness of financial hedging diminishes when commodity price volatility is high.     

How fair-value accounting can influence firm hedging

The potential influence of accounting regulations on hedging strategies and the use of financial derivatives is a research topic that has attracted little attention in both the finance and the accounting literature. However, recent surveys suggest that company hedging can be substantially influenced by the accounting for financial instruments. In this study, we illustrate not only why but also how the accounting regulations may affect hedging behavior. We find that under mark-to-market accounting, most firms concerned with earnings smoothness adopt myopic hedging strategies relative to the benchmark, cash flow hedging. The specific influence of the accounting regulations depends on market and firm-specific characteristics, but, in general, the firms dramatically reduce the extent of hedging addressing price risk in future accounting periods. We illustrate that the change in hedging behavior significantly dampens the increase in earnings volatility stemming from fair value accounting of derivatives. However, the adjusted hedging strategies may substantially increase the firms’ cash flow volatility.     

Corporate risk management and firm value: evidence from the UK market

The paper evaluates the effect of corporate risk management activities on firm value, using a sample of large UK non-financial firms. Following recent changes in financial reporting standards, we are able to collect detailed information on risk management activities from audited financial reports. This enables us to gain a better understanding of risk management practices and to investigate value implications of different types of hedging. Overall 86.88% of the firms in the sample use derivatives to manage at least one type of price risk. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for foreign currency derivative users, while we provide weak evidence that interest rate hedging increases firm value. The extent of hedging and the hedging horizon have an impact on the hedging premium, whereas operational risk management activities do not significantly influence the market value of the firm.     

RETHINKING RISK MANAGEMENT

This paper presents a theory of corporate risk management that attempts to go beyond the "variance-minimization" model that dominates most academic discussions of the subject. It argues that the primary goal of risk management is not to dampen swings in corporate cash flows or value, but rather to provide protection against the possibility of costly lower-tail outcomes –situations that would cause financial distress or make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy. (In the jargon of finance specialists, risk management can be viewed as the purchase of well-out-of-the-money put options designed to limit downside risk.)
By eliminating downside risk and reducing the expected costs of financial trouble, risk management can also help a company to achieve both its optimal capital structure and its optimal ownership structure. For, besides increasing corporate debt capacity, the reduction of downside risk also encourages larger equity stakes for managers by shielding their investments from "uncontrollables."
The paper also departs from standard finance theory in suggesting that some companies may have a comparative advantage in bearing certain financial market risks–an advantage that derives from information acquired through their normal business activities. Although such specialized information may lead some companies to take speculative positions in commodities or currencies, it is more likely to encourage "selective" hedging, a practice in which the risk manager's "view" of future price movements influences the percentage of the exposure that is hedged.
But, to the extent that such view-taking becomes an accepted part of a company's risk management program, it is important to evaluate managers' bets on a risk-adjusted basis and relative to the market. If risk managers want to behave like money managers, they should be evaluated like money managers.     

Oil prices implied volatility or direction: Which matters more to financial markets?

We examine the impact of oil price uncertainty on US stock returns by industry using the US Oil Fund options implied volatility OVX index and a GJR-GARCH model. We test the effect of the implied volatility of oil on a wide array of domestic industries’ returns using daily data from 2007 to 2016, controlling for a variety of variables such as aggregate market returns, market volatility, exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation expectations. Our main finding is that the implied volatility of oil prices has a consistent and statistically significant negative impact on nine out of the ten industries defined in the Fama and French (J Financ Econ 43:153–193, 1997) 10-industry classification. Oil prices, on the other hand, yield mixed results, with only three industries showing a positive and significant effect, and two industries exhibiting a negative and significant effect. These findings are an indication that the volatility of oil has now surpassed oil prices themselves in terms of influence on financial markets. Furthermore, we show that both oil prices and their volatility have a positive and significant effect on corporate bond credit spreads. Overall, our results indicate that oil price uncertainty increases the risk of future cash flows for goods and services, resulting in negative stock market returns and higher corporate bond credit spreads.     

Corporate Cash Policy and How to Manage it with Stock Repurchases

At the end of 2004 total U.S. corporate cash holdings reached an all‐time high of just under $2 trillion—an amount equal to roughly 15% of the total U.S. GDP. And during the past 25 years, average cash holdings have jumped from 10% to 23% of total corporate assets. But at the same time their levels of cash have risen, U.S. companies have paid out dramatically increasing amounts of cash to buy back shares. This article addresses the following questions: What accounts for the dramatic increase in the average level of corporate cash holdings since 1980? And why do some companies keep so much cash (with one fourth of U.S. firms holding cash amounting to at least 36% of total assets) while others have so little (with another quarter having less than 3%)? Why do companies pay out excess cash in the form of stock repurchases (rather than, say, dividends), and what explains the significant increase in repurchases (both in absolute terms and relative to dividends) over time? The author begins by arguing that cash reserves provide companies with a buffer against possible shortfalls in operating profits—one that, especially during periods of financial trouble, can be used to avoid financial distress or provide funding for promising projects that might otherwise have to be put off. Such buffers are particularly valuable in the case of smaller, riskier companies with lots of growth opportunities and limited access to capital markets. And the dramatic increase in corporate cash holdings between 1980 and the present can be attributed mainly to an increase in the risk of publicly traded companies—an increase in risk that reflects in part a general increase in competition, but also a notable change over time in the kinds of companies (smaller, newer, less profitable, non‐dividend paying firms) that have chosen to go public. At the other end of the corporate spectrum are large, relatively mature companies with limited growth opportunities. Although such companies tend to produce considerable free cash flow, they also tend to retain relatively small amounts of cash (as a percentage of total assets), in part because of shareholder concern about the corporate “free cash flow problem”—the well‐documented tendency of such companies to destroy value through overpriced (often diversifying) acquisitions and other misguided attempts to pursue growth at the expense of profitability. For companies with highly predictable earnings and investment plans, dividends provide one means of addressing the free cash flow problem. But for companies with more variable earnings and less predictable reinvestment, open‐market stock repurchases provide a more flexible means of distributing cash to shareholders. Unlike the corporate “commitment” implied by dividend payments, an open market stock repurchase program creates what amounts to an option but not an obligation to distribute funds. The value of such flexibility, which increases during periods of increased risk and uncertainty, explains much of the apparent substitution of repurchases for dividends in recent years.