我国公司人格否认制度的确立及其具体化

公司人格否认制度在我国的确立先后经历了三个阶段,即旧《公司法》出台前的股东补足出资责任阶段、股东有限制地承担公司债务阶段,以及新《公司法》确立公司人格否认原则阶段。但新《公司法》规定公司人格否认制度的内容简单、抽象,必须在实践中对该制度进行细化。对公司人格否认制度的细化应该包括司法解释细化和公司特别法细化两个途径。     

新《公司法》中债权人保护制度评析

保护债权人合法权益是现代公司法立法宗旨之一。我国新修订的公司法在原有债权人保护制度的基础上,进行了制度创新,增设了公司人格否认制度,这对公司债权人的保护无疑是个福音,然而反思新《公司法》中的若干制度规定,对公司债权人权益保护方面尚存在若干漏洞需要完善。     

浅析我国一人公司规定存在的不足

我国新《公司法》对一人公司作出了规定,允许一人公司的存在。一人公司对我国经济社会发展具有重要意义。新《公司法》关于一人公司的规定仍有不足之处:首先,一人公司难以清除实质上的一人公司;其次,未对一人公司股东股权转让作出规定;再次,一人公司的法人人格否认制度可能流于形式。     

浅谈资本制度变革下的公司法人格否认制度

2013年12月十二届全国人大常委会第六次会议审议通过了关于修改《中华人民共和国公司法》的决定,这次公司法的修改真正的实现了设立公司的"零门槛"。但同时它也使债权人的责任瞬间膨胀,债权人买单的情况可能会时有出现。公司法人格否认制度能够很好的解决这种问题。但是我国公司法对这一制度的规定也存在一定的问题。本文对这一制度进行了简要阐述来引起大家对公司法人格否认制度的关注。使其为公司治理结构的完善和完成十八届四中全会依法治国的战略目标以及经济新常态的突破贡献力量。     

公司法人人格逆向否认制度的问题分析

我国的《公司法》对公司人格否认制度进行了全面透彻的分析。《公司法》第20条规定:公司股东应该遵守法律、行政法规和公司章程,依法行使股东权利,不得滥用股东权利损害公司或者其他股东的利益;不得滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责任损害公司债权人的利益。作为公司的股东,如果存在滥用公司法人独立地位和逃避债务的情况,并因此损害了公司债权人的利益,应当对公司的债务承担连带责任。公司法人人格逆向否认制度最先是起源于美国的一项制度,随后便扩展到包括英国、德国和其他几个国家。本文主要从公司法人人格否认制度的概念开始,全面分析公司法人人格逆向否认制度问题中存在的一些问题,希望能够给大家更多的参考性意见。     

公司人格否认制度若干问题再思考

2005年10月修订的《公司法》正式引入公司人格否认制度后,围绕该制度的争论不仅没有停息,反而更加激烈。原因一是《公司法》规定的过于笼统,二是学术界与司法界理解的差异。本文在以前作者论述的基础上,针对公司人格否认与法人否认的根本区别、一人公司人格否认之适用、我国已具备完善该制度的理论与实践基础等方面予以阐释。     

公司法人人格否认制度新论

公司法人人格否认制度是公司法人制度的重要组成部分,对于公司债权人合法利益的保护有着其他制度不可替代的作用,我国《公司法》虽然已经有了相关的规定,但也存在着一些问题。文章首先分析了公司独立人格和法人人格否认制度的关系,然后着重探讨了股东滥用公司法人独立人格的特定情形和民事法律责任的构成要件,最后对现行公司法相关规定提出了一些个人的看法。     

论“公司法人格否认制度”对完善我国公司治理结构的重要作用

为适应我国目前新经济形势发展的需要,促使我国公司建立起完善的公司治理结构,发挥公司治理体系的积极作用,我国修订并实施了新的《公司法》。本文将就新《公司法》新增内容"公司法人格否认制度"对完善公司治理结构的作用展开论述。     

一人公司人格否认若干问题浅析

公司人格否认制度作为新《公司法》的亮点,已经取得学术界和司法实务界的高度关注和认可。作为我国公司类型中比较特殊的一人公司,其适用公司人格否认制度自有其特殊性。特别是一人公司在人格否认制度适用上的严厉性,法人股东责任以及国有独资公司方面,一人公司的特殊问题应该另作分析。     

论“公司法人格否认制度”对完善我国公司治理结构的重要作用

为适应我国目前新经济形势发展的需要，促使我国公司建立起完善的公司治理结构，发挥公司治理体系的积极作用，我国修订并实施了新的《公司法》。本文将就新《公司法》新增内容“公司法人格否认制度”对完善公司治理结构的作用展开论述。     

公司经理权的界定及其在我国的法律完善

公司经理权作为一种特殊的民商事权利在我国先行法律中并没得到很好体现。本文从考察各国有关经理权的法律规定入手,对公司经理权的内容、行使方式及其限制进行了深入细致的探讨。并对我国公司经理制度的完善提出了一些自己的建议和思考。认为对经理权的立法应从民法和商法两个层面分别作出规定,并将我国公司法上的经理职权改成经理权,并适当扩充其权利内容。     

论小股东利益的保护

在资本多数决机制下 ,小股东总是处于弱势地位 ,其利益时常会受到侵害。因此 ,公司法应针对小股东的利益保护给予法律的特别规定 ,建立起完整的保护机制 ,防止股东或董事会滥用资本多数决造成对小股东利益的侵害 ,使公司制度在中国得以顺利发展。具体应采取以下措施 :股东和董事会遵循诚信原则 ,实行积累投票制 ,股东行使代位诉讼权等。     

公司人格否认制度研究

公司人格否认是公司人格独立出现种种异化时采取的一种补救机制。作为公司制度的补充,需要对其进行扩大解释。股东诉讼代表制度作为公司人格否认程序上的保障及辅助性机制是很有必要的,我国应建构自己的公司人格否认理论与机制。     

共享单车押金性质探析

共享单车企业向消费者收取押金的性质与线下交易之押金性质不同,应被认定为债之关系,消费者在交付押金后无法保有其所有权,仅享有对共享单车企业的债权返还请求权,因而其只能向共享单车企业主张返还,不可任意穿透债的相对性原理而及于第三人。在此前提下,倘若企业破产后消费者仍无法追回其全部押金,除可适用公司法人人格否认制度向股东追偿等少数情形之外,该损失应依私法自治原则,由消费者个人承担。     

Corporate control through the criminal system — An alternative proposal

Corporate violations of the law are occurring with increasing frequency and with increasing public attention. Solutions to date have proved ineffectual because of the problem of determining whom is to be punished for the offense of the corporation. Instead of individual jail terms or corporate fines, we propose that the dissolution of the corporation be considered as a more effectual means of conforming corporate behavior to the norms of the legal system. Paul Lansing is Associate Professor of Business Law. Previous articles have appeared in theAmerican Business Law Journal, Nebraska Law Review, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, The Journal of Corporation Law and others.     

我国企业战略联盟的现状及发展对策研究

企业战略联盟作为一种有效的竞争合作方式 ,在我国正呈现较快发展的态势。但尚存对联盟的战略意义缺乏明确认识、缺乏长远规划及合作管理水平低等问题。应强化政府对企业联盟的调控功能 ,明确开放条件下的产业与技术政策 ,完善法律法规 ,不断加强战略联盟的创新与管理 ,提高核心竞争力     

食品安全之私法救济机制的完善

有鉴于食品安全事件近年来愈演愈烈的现状,本文深入探讨了食品安全的私法救济机制,即通过消费者提起民事诉讼获得赔偿的方法。目前,在诸多防止食品安全的机制中,私法救济机制被忽视了,然而其作用恰恰是最为重要的,私法救济机制可使受到损害的消费者获得充分的救济,剥夺不法厂商通过生产不安全食品而获得的不法收益。因此,应充分利用侵权责任法中的惩罚性损害赔偿制度,发挥公司法中的法人人格否认制度的功能,让控股股东承担连带责任,同时让食品生产企业的董事、监事、经理等高级管理人员承担连带责任。     

New patterns of consumer protection under warranty law: Lessons from the U.S. magnuson-moss warranty act

Warranty law appears to be a relevant instrument for granting protection to consumers against product disappointment. However, empirical studies concerning some warranty markets both in the United States and in West-European countries show that there continues to be no bargaining on warranties between sellers and buyers, that the most serious risks are all allocated to the user of the product, and that consumers are generally not granted an actual opportunity of challenging a breach of warranty and getting adequate compensation for losses sustained. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act which was enacted in the United States in 1975 constitutes a first comprehensive and consumer-oriented reform of traditional warranty law. It foresees new patterns of consumer protection under warranty statutes, combining warranty substance regulation with warranty information, administration, and litigation procedures. This paper first describes the Act's major provisions; it also points out some of its deficiencies. Although criticisms are formulated against the Act's ideology or basic assumptions, it is the author's opinion that it represents a decisive step towards legislative and administrative participation in the formulation of warranties. The Act undoubtedly suggests some, though not identical, avenues of reform that legislators and authorities of European countries and confederations should now propose in order to increase consumer protection against defective or unsatisfying products.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Will Change the Governance of Non Profit Organizations

As a public director of a NASDAQ stock exchange listed public corporation, I have seen how quickly the reforms in corporate governance imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have changed procedures and policies in public corporations. In areas such as transparency of financial records and other financial matters including compensation of top executives and conflict of interest policies affecting both corporate boards of directors and employees of the corporation the reforms of this new federal law have quickly changed corporate practices in many corporations. Many persons who have studied this new law believe that these changes will benefit the public, shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders in the modern corporation by increasing the reputation of these organizations for integrity and transparency. Stock exchanges such as NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange now require all listed companies to have (after a transition time) a majority of independent directors on their boards of directors. Only independent directors may serve on the audit, nominating and compensation committees of boards in most cases. Some exceptions are made to these rules for foreign and domestic issues of companies where a majority of the voting power is held by one person. According to Morrison & Foster LLP, Corporate Board Advisory March , 2004, NASDAQ requires that the board of directors of a listed company determine that an independent director does not have a relationship that would “interfere with the exercise of independent judgment” in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. Donald Grunewald served as President of Mercy College from 1972 to 1984. He has served as a member of the board of trustees of several colleges and proprietary educational institutions and on the boards of other charitable institutions. Currently he is a member of the Board of Directors of EVCI Career Colleges, Inc., a NASDAQ listed corporation.     

The Hungarian Cocktail of Competition Law and Consumer Protection: Should It Be Dissolved?

Hungary, a candidate country expecting to join the EU in 2004, has to approximate its laws and economic policies to those of the EU. However, it is not certain whether the Brussels standards will always improve national rules.This article will discuss one possible case. It concerns the special Hungarian legislation on competition law and certain consumer protection rules in the Competition Act of 1990 and the amended Act of 1996. The inclusion of rules governing consumer interests in the Acts greatly contributed to the recognition and the enforcement of consumer interests in Hungary.Nevertheless, the European Commission and the OECD increasingly argue that the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition should pass its competence in consumer related cases to another institution and instead pay more attention to more prominent fields of competition law such as horizontal agreements and mergers.This article will contest this argument. Although it is an understandable approach, there are several reasons why it should be carefully reconsidered. These include the position of consumers, which is still weak, the general system of consumer protection in Hungary, and the strong standing of the Office for Economic Competition. The comprehensive nature of the Hungarian Competition Act of 1996 is one of the cases in which the European guidelines should be considered with caution in order to determine whether their implementation would improve or damage a system that already functions well.