Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy–namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances–support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Hurdle models of repayment behaviour in personal loan contracts

This paper proposes a hurdle model of repayment behaviour in loans with fixed instalments. Using information on previous and current contracts, the approach yields a model of customer behaviour, useful, for example, in assessing the impact of determinants of default, a natural concern for credit and behavioural scoring. Under plausible assumptions, a debtor in each period faces a number of missed payments, which depends on his previous repayment decisions; meanwhile, as most debtors are expected to meet financial obligations, the number of missed payments is bound to display excess zeros, with reference to a single-part law. Each sequence of missed payments is modelled by using the binomial thinning, a conceptual tool that allows for dependence between integers by defining the support of consecutive counts. Under suitable assumptions on heterogeneity, the model can be produced under a random effects approach, leading to a two-part panel data model, estimable by quasi-maximum likelihood. The proposed approach is illustrated using a panel data set on personal loans granted by a Portuguese bank.     

CURRENCY UNION WITH OR WITHOUT BANKING UNION

We build a symmetric two‐country monetary model with credit to study the interplay between currency integration and credit markets integration. The currency arrangement affects credit availability through default incentives. We capture credit markets integration by the extra cost incurred to obtain credit for cross‐border transactions and, with the euro area context in mind, label as banking union a situation where this cost is low. For high levels of the cross‐border credit cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more credit rationing and lower welfare. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.     

Monetary policy through the ‘credit-cost channel’: Italy and Germany pre- and post-EMU

We present an empirical analysis of the ‘Credit-Cost Channel’ (CCC) of monetary policy transmission. This channel combines bank credit supply and interest rates on loans as a cost to firms. The thrust of the CCC is that it makes both aggregate demand and aggregate supply dependent on monetary policy. As a consequence (1) credit market conditions (e.g. risk spreads) are important sources and indicators of macroeconomic shocks, (2) the real effects of monetary policy are larger and persistent. We have applied the Cointegrated Vector Autoregression (CVAR) econometric methodology to Italy and Germany in the ‘hard’ EMS period and in the European Monetary Union (EMU) period. The short-run and long-run effects of the CCC are detectable for both countries in both periods. Simulation of the estimated model also confirms that inflation-targeting by way of inter-bank rate control stabilizes inflation through structural shifts of the stochastic equilibrium paths of both inflation and the output.     

A QUEST FOR UNFETTERED CREDIT: HOW MONETARY POLICY DRIVES CREDIT RISK TRANSFER OF STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS

This study examines the effects of monetary policy contractions on bank loans to households and firms and instruments in three different credit risk transfer (CRT) capital markets over two separate time periods (1995–2006 and 2007–2015). The findings show that in both periods, banks decrease business lending but increase lending to consumers through a combination of mortgage, auto, credit card, and student loans from more liquidity produced by consumer‐related CRT activity. Additional results reveal relative CRT movements toward securitized mortgages from bank mortgage debt over both periods and toward securitized and insured business loans from bank business debt in the latter period, which suggest vulnerabilities among interconnected credit markets. (JEL E44, E51, G21, G23)     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Understanding low interest rates: evidence from Japan,Euro Area,United States and United Kingdom

The paper investigates the factors determining long‐term interest rates. Our estimation results for major industrialized economies suggest that central banks have actually had a key influence on the level of long‐term interest rates. We thus show that 1) the customary neoclassical model of interest rate determination, on which central banks tend to rely, is neither rooted in the institutional setup of the credit markets nor supported by the data, and that 2) the Austrian explanation incorporated in the model of Wicksell–Mises–Hayek of the credit and business cycle fits better the economic reality. As central bank policy makers might lack the necessary knowledge and foresight to set market rates to levels consistent with economic fundamentals, there is a high chance of misalignments of market rates. The correction of misalignments could lead to severe economic disruptions.     

中国信贷市场匹配机制的再设计

我国的银行信贷市场呈现二元结构--目标客户与非目标客户信贷市场.两者有着不同的运行机制.目标客户信贷市场的议价过程存在一个类似企业"求婚"的递延接受程序,市场的运行结果稳定.非目标客户信贷市场不存在导致稳定结果的分散化匹配程序,市场广度和深度不够.为提高非目标客户信贷市场的稳定性和运行效率,我们建议通过公布银行信贷方案、设立非目标客户信贷中心、设立中央化的匹配清算所等,把分散化的议价过程变成中央化的匹配程序,从而完善和降低中小企业的交易成本,为中小企业的发展拓展广阔空间.     

Capital Inflows,Exchange Rate Flexibility and Credit Booms

Historically, capital flow bonanzas have often fueled sharp credit expansions in advanced and emerging market economies alike. Focusing primarily on emerging markets, this paper analyzes the impact of exchange rate flexibility on credit markets during periods of large capital inflows. It is shown that bank credit is larger and its composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes, and that these results are not explained entirely by the fact that the latter attract more capital inflows than economies with more flexible regimes. The findings thus suggest countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes may stand to benefit the most from regulatory policies that reduce banks' incentives to tap external markets and to lend/borrow in foreign currency; these policies include marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency‐dependent liquidity requirements and higher capital requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on foreign exchange loans.     

A Bank Panic Model with a Bond Market

We have constructed a model of bank failure with monetary assets (bonds), adopting the overlapping-generations model. In it, monetary assets play a role in dispersing the credit crunch from a single bank run into a nationwide bank panic. As established by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a single bank run is explained by a model without any monetary assets. In our model, however, the bond market is introduced to describe the process in which a bank run spreads. As a result, our model describes a general phenomenon—credit market failure—rather than a single bank run.
JEL classification numbers: G21, E40.     

A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle

Many individuals simultaneously have significant credit card debt and money in the bank. The credit card debt puzzle is as follows: given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? While some economists go to elaborate lengths to explain this, we argue it is a special case of the rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We extend standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt, which is interesting in its own right since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing challenge. Our model is quite tractable—for example, it readily yields nice existence and characterization results—and helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.     

Credit Markets With Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and Growth

This article presents an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time allocation of individuals with different educational abilities. Credit markets allow the more able to specialize in studying and the less able to specialize in working. This specialization can increase growth and welfare. This article also shows that in economies with high (low) levels of education abilities, the opening of credit markets induces a more disperse (equal) income distribution. The role of intergenerational transfers in overcoming the absence of credit markets is also discussed, as well as other forms of credit markets imperfections.     

Overnight borrowing, interest rates and extreme value theory

We examine the dynamics of extreme values of overnight borrowing rates in an inter-bank money market before a financial crisis during which overnight borrowing rates rocketed up to (simple annual) 4000 percent. It is shown that the generalized Pareto distribution fits well to the extreme values of the interest rate distribution. We also provide predictions of extreme overnight borrowing rates using pre-crisis data. The examination of tails (extreme values) provides answers to such issues as to what are the extreme movements to be expected in financial markets; is there a possibility for even larger movements and, are there theoretical processes that can model the type of fat-tails in the observed data? The answers to such questions are essential for proper management of financial exposures and laying ground for regulations.     

Monetary Policy, Credit and Aggregate Supply: The Evidence from Italy

This paper concerns theory and evidence of the monetary transmission mechanisms. Current research has deeply investigated factors, such as dependence of firms on bank credit, that amplify the impact of monetary policy impulses on aggregate demand exerting strong but temporary effects on output and employment. We present an intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium model of a competitive economy where current production is financed by bank credit, and then we use it to identify supply–side effects of the credit transmission mechanism in data drawn from the Italian economy. We find evidence that the 'credit variables' identified by the model – the overnight rate as a proxy of monetary policy and a measure of credit risk – have permanent effects on employment and output by altering credit supply conditions to firms.
To save on space, mathematical proofs, statistical tests and data sources have been gathered in two separate appendices that can be examined on request.
(J.E.L.: E2, E5).     

Current Account Imbalances or Too Much Bank Debt as the Main Driver of Gross Capital Inflows? Spain During the Great Financial Crisis

Abstract:

In contrast to the widespread view which posits that large current account deficits and net international debt were at the epicenter of the crisis in the Euro Zone, with diverging competitiveness playing a central role, this article points to the huge volume of bank credit that banks refinanced in international markets.

With a focus on the Spanish economy, we ground our view in an analysis linking gross—not net—capital flows, bank credit, and gross external debt, which provides more adequate information about a country’s international financing patterns and its external exposure.

The main conclusion of this article is that the principle driver of gross external debt in Spain was bank credit, with accumulated current account deficits accounting for less than 50 percent of gross external debt. Other consequences in keeping with this view are: the measures of economic policy required to sort out current account imbalances—particularly wage devaluation to improve competitiveness—may do more harm than good and they do not prevent the problem of too much bank credit from occurring again, and the residence of debt holders in the Euro Zone crisis is relevant for the understanding of the crisis as the result of a power imbalance     

Credit Losses in Australasian Banking

We analyse the determinants of bank credit losses in Australasia. Despite sizeable credit losses over the past two decades, ours is the first systematic study to do so. Analysis is based on a comprehensive dataset retrieved from original financial reports of 32 Australasian banks (1980–2005). Credit losses rise when the macro economy is weak. Asset markets, particularly the equity market, are also important. Larger banks provide more for credit losses while banks with high cost-income-ratios show greater loan loss provisions. Strong loan growth translates into significantly higher credit losses with a lag of 2–4 years. Finally, the results show strong evidence of income smoothing activities by banks.