国有商业银行公司治理的问题与对策

一、商业银行公司治理结构的含义公司治理结构是现代企业制度中最重要的组织架构。狭义的公司治理结构是指投资者与管理者之间的利益分配和控制关系,即通过股东大会、董事会、监事会的机构设置,明确各机构的责权分配,达到三者之间约束和权力制衡的目的。广义的公司治理结构可以理解为有关企业组织方式、控制机制、利益分配的所有法律、机构、文化和制度安排,其合理与否直接影响企业的经营业绩。市场经济条件下,任何企业都必须建立科学的公司治理结构,而公司治理结构的实质是权力分配制衡机制。商业银行规范公司治理结构就是要解决代理人的“…     

我国商业银行治理结构特殊性研究

为完善商业银行改革,在商业银行内势必应当实施法人治理结构,但由于商业银行与一般企业不同,导致商业银行的治理结构也与一般企业存在根本差别。对比商业银行与一般企业的差异性,对商业银行治理结构的特殊性采取与一般公司治理结构不同的、有针对性、切实有效的治理方式,这样才能更好地完善对商业银行的治理。     

中国上市银行公司治理特殊性实证研究

商业银行存在高杠杆率、高度复杂的委托代理关系等治理特性,因此其公司治理结构应当有别于其他行业,本文拟通过对上市银行与其他行业企业治理结构进行对比分析,通过实证检验揭示我国上市银行公司治理结构与机制所存在的特殊性。     

论商业银行公司治理的特殊性

近年来,公司治理的研究发展很快,但是作为企业的重要类型之一,商业银行的治理问题却一直不被重视。本文从商业银行的特殊性出发,将商业银行同一般企业剥离,研究在共性之外商业银行的独有属性及其造成的公司治理形态变异,寻找商业银行公司治理的特有问题以及症结所在,以完整商业银行公司治理理论体系,为商业银行治理改造指明方向。     

国有商业银行公司治理的问题与对策

一、商业银行公司治理结构的含义 公司治理结构是现代企业制度中最重要的组织架构.狭义的公司治理结构是指投资者与管理者之间的利益分配和控制关系,即通过股东大会、董事会、监事会的机构设置,明确各机构的责权分配,达到三者之间约束和权力制衡的目的.广义的公司治理结构可以理解为有关企业组织方式、控制机制、利益分配的所有法律、机构、文化和制度安排,其合理与否直接影响企业的经营业绩.     

女性董事比率与商业银行绩效的关系

1997年亚洲金融危机对商业银行体系脆弱性的暴露,2007年美国次贷危机席卷全球等一次次商业银行危机对国家、地区乃至全球经济稳定产生的冲击,对金融秩序的维护以及宏观经济的稳定构成的重大威胁,其中产生的巨大成本唤醒了人们对商业银行公司治理研究的重视,董事会治理作为公司治理机制的核心,其人员组成结构就像一个企业的大脑,深刻影响着企业的发展。一家商业银行的绩效跟其董事会成员的知识和技能的多元化、受教育程度等董事会资本息息相关。     

我国商业银行公司治理的问题研究

随着我国金融改革尤其是商业银行改革的深入,国内主要商业银行纷纷上市,在此背景下,本文从现代公司治理的角度,阐述了商业银行作为一种企业组织形式的公司治理一般性和作为金融企业的特殊性,分析了我国商业银行公司治理的主要障碍,指出我国商业银行公司治理必须要优化股权结构,发挥各种资本的积极作用,建立和规范董事会的运行机制,配套完善风险管理机制和内部控制机制,建立和完善信息披露制度,完善商业银行公司治理的外部环境。     

商业银行公司治理与风险管理研究

商业银行的公司治理关系到商业银行的未来发展和收益以及竞争力问题。商业银行公司治理结构是风险管理的一个基础平台,而风险管理是商业银行公司治理的重要内容和目的。因此研究商业银行的公司治理结构与风险管理的关系,对提升商业银行的治理水平和面对国际国内同行竞争具有重大的意义。本文旨在通过对完善我国商业银行公司治理,加强风险战略的研究,进一步思考如何采取有效措施防范银行战略性风险。     

声誉维护:塑造地方商业银行企业文化的基点

作为金融体系重要组成部分的地方商业银行无论在经济实力与管理水平上,都与国有控股商业银行存在很大差距,尤其在治理结构、经营理念和自身定位等多方面暴露出诸多缺陷与不足,抵御风险能力也较低。要控制金融风险的发生,地方商业银行就必须维护其声誉并打造品牌形象,而维护声誉应从塑造金融企业文化入手,培育具有自身特色的理念文化、制度文化、行为文化与视觉文化。只有科学构建现代企业公司治理结构、有效防范金融道德风险、健全声誉风险防范机制,才能有效树立地方商业银行品牌形象,提高核心竞争力。     

商业银行的特殊性及其公司治理改革

本文从商业银行作为金融企业不同于其他一般企业的特殊性出发,分析了商业银行的特殊性及其对公司治理的影响,并提出了完善商业银行公司治理的对策建议.     

论公司治理结构与会计信息控制

公司治理需要完善公司治理结构和内部控制 ,公司治理结构是内部控制的基础 ,财务会计控制是内部控制的核心 ,是公司治理的手段。通过财务、会计和审计信息网络平台 ,实现决策、激励和监督约束机制的有效运行 ,达到公司治理的目的 ,将财务会计控制纳入到公司治理的轨道上     

The Effect of Outside Board Members on Energy Efficiency in Korea

Drawing largely upon the stakeholder theory and the resource dependence literature, this article examines the relationship between corporate governance structure and sustainability measured by energy efficiency. The model uses data from South Korean (Korean hereafter) firms that have relied heavily on energy-intensive industry for economic growth and have experienced major changes in their corporate governance structure since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Estimation results show that a corporate governance structure that includes the appointment of heterogeneous outside directors, given other conditions, leads to an increase in energy efficiency and thus sustainability.     

公司融资结构与公司治理及在中国的特点

公司融资结构与公司治理有重要的联系 ,而融资结构的合理安排对公司的代理关系和治理结构将产生重要影响。从不对称信息的角度出发 ,通过詹森、麦克林 (1 976 )的委托代理理论和梅耶斯、迈基里夫(1 984 )的融资优序理论来说明公司融资结构与公司治理的关系 ,并进一步分析中国上市公司融资偏好的特点和原因     

Corporate Governance and Institutional Transparency in Emerging Markets

This paper posits that differences in corporate governance structure partly result from differences in institutional arrangements linked to business systems. We developed a new international triad of business systems: the Anglo-American, the Communitarian and the Emerging system, building on the frameworks of Choi et al. (British Academy of Management (Kynoch Birmingham) 1996, Management International Review 39, 257–279, 1999). A common factor determining the success of a corporate governance structure is the extent to which it is transparent to market forces. Such transparency is more than pure financial transparency; as it can also be based on factors such as governmental, banking and other types of institutional transparency mechanism. There may also be a choice for firms to adopt voluntary corporate disclosure in situations where mandatory disclosure is not established. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 and the more recent corporate governance scandals such as Enron, Andersen and Worldcom in the United States and Ahold and Parmalat in Europe show that corporate governance and business ethics issues exist throughout the world. As an illustration we focus on Asia’s emerging¹ markets, as, both in view of the pressure of globalization and taking into account the institutional arrangements peculiar to the emerging business system, these issues are important there. Particularly for those who have to find an accommodation between the corporate governance structures and disclosure standards of the Emerging system and those of the Anglo-American and Communitarian systems.     

Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance?

We examine whether the behavior of institutional investors representatives on boards leads to observable differences in corporate finance. We find that directors representing pressure-sensitive investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies) prefer lower financial leverage whereas pressure-resistant directors (i.e., mutual funds and pension funds) show no particular preference. When analyzed separately, directors appointed by banks and insurance firms have different attitudes. Bank representatives on boards increase both the financial leverage and the banking debt. This result suggests that some types of institutional directors provide financial resources to the firms on whose board they sit, supporting the view that boards manage the uncertainty associated with strategic decision making and provide firms with preferential access to resources and financial expertise. This research has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate over the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance. Different institutional investors have different agendas and incentives for corporate governance, and, therefore, both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole. In addition, our paper calls for new research on the causes and implications of institutional investor involvement in the corporate governance of nonfinancial firms. This new research could require new insights on the dynamics within the boards and on the interplay among the knowledge, incentives and attitudes of quite different directors.     

企业资源聚集视角下的利益相关者财务控制权配置

财务控制权配置是财务治理的核心内容。合理的财务控制权安排可以抑制内部人的道德风险,优化公司治理结构。本文从企业资源聚集的角度,构造企业利益相关者的经济效用函数并分析其特征,认为利益相关者之间是相互依存的动态竞争关系,企业的财务控制权应按照以股东为主导的各利益相关者共同分享的模式来分层次配置。     

Erratum to: Ethics,Diversity Management,and Financial Reporting Quality

This article proposes and empirically tests a theoretical framework incorporating Reidenbach and Robin’s (J Bus Ethics 10(4):273–284, 1991) conceptual model of corporate moral development. The framework is used to examine the relation between governance and business ethics, as proxied by diversity management (DM), and financial reporting quality, as proxied by the magnitude of earnings management (EM). The level of DM and governance quality are measured in accordance with the ratings of Jantzi Research (JR), a leading provider of social and governance research for institutional investors. This DM score is part of an index developed by JR that investment managers use to integrate DM criteria into their investment decisions. As expected, a negative relation between corporate DM development and financial reporting quality is found while controlling for other factors known in the literatures on governance and accounting choices to affect earnings quality. Despite some caveats presented in conclusion, this study contributes to the ethics, governance, and financial reporting literatures by studying the dynamics between governance and ethics in the prevention of EM.     

Understanding the Determinants of RiskMetrics/ISS Ratings of the Quality of UK Companies' Corporate Governance Practice

We examine the determinants of RiskMetrics/ISS Ratings of the quality of UK companies' corporate governance practice and investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms and firm specific characteristics affect these ratings. We also investigate the association between firms' financial distress and these ratings. Using data for nonfinancial Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 250 firms over the 2003 to 2009 period, we find that board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, firm size, and profitability are associated with firms' corporate governance ratings. In addition, we find that more independent directors on the board, more institutional ownership, and larger size lead to a high level of board‐related ratings. Finally, we find no association between corporate governance ratings and financial distress. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

集团化企业内部财务控制问题及成因分析

集团化企业的内部财务控制是企业集团管理的核心,加强其内部财务控制至关重要。目前,我国集团化企业由于治理结构不合理、财务信息不完善、对财务控制认识不足、管理水平低下等原因,还存在财务控制能力弱、财务信息不真实、财务控制体系不健全、集团内部财务关系混乱等问题。集团化企业应实行全面整体的战略管理,加快健全公司治理结构,增强资金成本管理,完善公司财务信息,并对其子公司制定松紧适当的控制力,以更好地完善内部财务控制体系,促进企业集团的健康有序发展。     

Ethics,Diversity Management,and Financial Reporting Quality

This article proposes and empirically tests a theoretical framework incorporating Reidenbach and Robin’s (J Bus Ethics 10(4):273–284, 1991) conceptual model of corporate moral development. The framework is used to examine the relation between governance and business ethics, as proxied by diversity management (DM), and financial reporting quality, as proxied by the magnitude of earnings management (EM). The level of DM and governance quality are measured in accordance with the ratings of Jantzi Research (JR), a leading provider of social and governance research for institutional investors. This DM score is part of an index developed by JR that investment managers use to integrate DM criteria into their investment decisions. As expected, a negative relation between corporate DM development and financial reporting quality is found while controlling for other factors known in the literatures on governance and accounting choices to affect earnings quality. Despite some caveats presented in conclusion, this study contributes to the ethics, governance, and financial reporting literatures by studying the dynamics between governance and ethics in the prevention of EM.