Changes in executive compensation following an environmental shift: the role of top management team turnover

In this study we examine the changes in executive compensation at the top management team (TMT) level following an environmental shift. Using the context of deregulation in the airline industry, we find that: (1) a dramatic environmental change that heightens managerial discretion leads to greater pay level and performance sensitivity of TMT compensation; and (2) the greater the magnitude of turnover among TMT members following the environmental shift, the greater the compensation change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive repertoire complexity: Governance antecedents and performance outcomes

Research summary : Past inquiry has found that implementing complex competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is challenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complexity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to examine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and executive compensation—help shape firms' competitive repertoires. We find that the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament theory are both important antecedents of competitive complexity, and an interaction exists wherein firms build especially complex repertoires when both influences are strong. Managerial summary : In boxing, the fight does not always go to the bigger or stronger person, or even to whomever throws the most punches—the fight is sometimes won by the boxer who is unpredictable, such as throwing an uppercut when the opponent expected a right hook. Similarly, when companies compete in the marketplace, advantage is afforded not only to those with more resources or who engage in more competitive activity, but also to those whose actions are unpredictable. In this study, we develop the notion of “competitive complexity,” which describes the diversity and changing nature of a company's competitive moves. Implementing complex competitive repertoires can be painful in the short term but, if done correctly, can help company performance in the long run. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board control and ceo compensation

The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross-section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size?

Prior empirical research has documented a large cross-sectional correlation between the level of executive pay and firm size. In contrast, this paper examines the association between percentage changes in executive compensation and percentage changes in organizational size. We analyze compensation and size data for executives at several levels of the corporate hierarchy for a sample of 303 firms. Our results indicate that the correlation between compensation and size is much smaller, although still statistically significant, in changes than in levels. This suggests that changes in an executive's compensation are not primarily driven by changes in organizational size.     

Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When much more of a difference makes a difference: Social comparison and tournaments in the CEO's top team

We integrate the seemingly contradictory theoretical predictions of behavioral and economic perspectives about the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance and show that tournament and social comparison theories are more supplementary than contradictory in nature. Our results show that high levels of firm performance will be found around either meaningfully low or meaningfully high levels of pay disparity. Additional findings indicate that this curvilinear relationship is weakened in the presence of both an heir apparent and high CEO power, and strengthened when top management team members are more eligible as CEOs. These findings suggest that factors that increase or inhibit social comparison or tournament perceptions among TMT members play a role in the strength of the curvilinear relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investor Rationality: Evidence from U.K. Property Capitalization Rates

Recent analyses have suggested the irrationality of Australian and U.S. office property investors in that they have failed to raise capitalization rates sufficiently at rental cyclical peaks to account for the obvious mean reversion in real rents and thus have significantly overvalued properties. In this article, we present a model of capitalization rates and explain U.K. office and retail cap rates in an error correction framework. We demonstrate that our proxies for expected real rental growth do, in fact, forecast future real growth and that cap rates reflect rational expectations of mean reversion in future real cash flows. Moreover, property cap rates are linked to the equity capitalization rate (dividend/price ratio) and expected real dividend growth in the expected manner.     

Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model

Employing survey and archival data from a sample of IPO firms, and extending the ideas of the Behavioral Agency Model, this study examines the influence of various forms of risk bearing created within the compensation contract on perceived risk taking. The results show that employment risk and variability in compensation each corresponds to greater risk taking, while downside risk and the intrinsic value of stock options correspond to lower risk taking. Among the implications from these results are the importance CEOs attach to relatively stable forms of pay, and to drawing distinctions between the potential for loss of pay and uncertainty about the amount of future pay. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬——业绩敏感性

企业研发投资会影响高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性。本文以2010～2014年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究结论表明,研发投资与企业风险呈正相关关系;增加研发投资导致企业风险加大,高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性会有所降低;进一步地,企业风险在研发投资与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性的负向关系中起中介作用。本文不仅丰富了高管薪酬--业绩敏感性影响因素的研究,也为企业针对研发活动设计合理薪酬契约提供了决策支持。     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角,将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下,以产权性质为依据,收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据,分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系,以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用,并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业;股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用,而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

The Innovation Value Chain in New Technology‐Based Firms: Evidence from the U.K.

Innovation is central to the survival and growth of firms, and ultimately to the health of the economies of which they are part. A clear understanding both of the processes by which firms perform innovation and the benefits which flow from innovation in terms of productivity and growth is therefore essential. This paper demonstrates the use of a conceptual framework and modeling tool, the innovation value chain (IVC), and shows how the IVC approach helps to highlight strengths and weaknesses in the innovation performance of a key group of firms—new technology‐based firms. The value of the IVC is demonstrated in showing the key interrelationships in the whole process of innovation from sourcing knowledge through product and process innovation to performance in terms of the growth and productivity outcomes of different types of innovation. The use of the IVC highlights key complementarities, such as that between internal R&D, external R&D, and other external sources of knowledge. Other important relationships are also highlighted. Skill resources matter throughout the IVC, being positively associated with external knowledge linkages and innovation success, and also having a direct influence on growth independent of the effect on innovation. A key benefit of the IVC approach is therefore its ability to highlight the roles of different factors at various stages of the knowledge–innovation–performance nexus, and to show their indirect as well as direct impact. This in turn permits both managerial and policy implications to be drawn.