Nonearnings Corporate Guidance

We examine nonearnings related disclosure and find that many firms voluntarily provided guidance on capital expenditure (CAPEX) and provided strategic plan disclosure (SPD) before recent proposals to increase nonearnings information disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with high long‐term institutional ownership tend to provide both earnings and CAPEX guidance; that turnaround firms tend to provide SPD in lieu of earnings guidance; and growth firms tend to provide earnings guidance without SPD. Our results suggest that unconstrained firms make optimal disclosure decisions and that corporate guidance behaviors might not have contributed to earnings fixation and myopia in capital markets.     

Does auditor choice matter to foreign investors? Evidence from foreign mutual funds worldwide

This study explores whether a firm’s auditor choice affects its ability to access foreign equity capital. Using the equity holdings of 35,665 foreign mutual funds from 30 countries for the period 1998–2009, we find evidence that appointing a Big 4 auditor is associated with the increased level of foreign mutual fund ownership in firms. Our results are robust when conditioned on firm-level information asymmetries, country-level information disclosure quality, and when employing the Enron–Andersen fiasco as the natural experiment. Furthermore, appointing Big 4 auditors is particularly important for firms to attract foreign capital during the 2008 global financial crisis.     

Does the mandatory disclosure of audit information affect analysts' information acquisition?

This paper explores the effect of public information on analysts' information acquisition. By introducing the implementation of the Key Audit Matters (KAM) Disclosure Standards for China's firms cross-listed in Hong Kong in 2017, we present evidence that KAM disclosure reduces analysts' firm visits, which is an important channel of information acquisition. The effect is particularly pronounced for firms with audit partner rotation and low institutional ownership. KAM disclosure by industrial leaders has a spillover effect on analyst visits for peer firms. Disclosure also improves the frequency and quality of analysts' forecasts and firms' information environments, indicating that KAMs are informative and audit information is an important determinant of analysts' information acquisition. Our study reveals the real effect of KAM disclosure on analyst decisions, which may be of interest to regulators concerned with the mandatory disclosure of audit information and capital market efficiency.     

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Disclosures: An Empirical Study

This study examines empirically the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures. Agency theory predicts that investors' information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm. Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and therefore should reduce investors' information needs. This study tests the hypothesis that firms with lower levels of managerial ownership provide more extensive disclosures by examining analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures. In contrast to the proxies used in prior studies that test this relationship, such as the earnings-return correlation and management earnings forecasts, these ratings provide a more direct measure of firms' overall disclosure practices.I find that the relationship between managerial holdings and disclosures depends on the type of disclosure. Consistent with the hypothesis of this study, firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures provided in their annual and quarterly reports, even after controlling for size, performance, volatility of returns, the frequency of securities offerings and proprietary costs. The more informal and flexible aspects of disclosures, however, as measured by the investor relations rating, are not influenced by the level of managerial ownership. These results are consistent with prior research that predicts that firms lower their costs of capital by signaling a commitment to maintain a more open disclosure policy. Because annual and quarterly reports are less flexible, and therefore less likely to change, they may represent a more credible commitment to provide more informative disclosures.     

Family firm disclosure and accounting regulation reform in the Middle East: The case of Jordan

We examine the quality of accounting disclosures by family firms using mandatory and voluntary disclosures as proxies for the quality of disclosure. We find that family firms comply more fully with mandatory disclosure requirements than do non-family firms but they disclose significantly less voluntary information. We also document that the enhanced accounting regulation improves the strength of the association between family ownership and mandatory disclosure compliance. Another important finding is the greater disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, for firms with high family ownership compared to firms with low family ownership.     

Disclosure and cost of equity capital in emerging markets: The Brazilian case

In this paper, we conjecture that the weak association between disclosure and cost of equity capital found in the literature (Botosan, 1997) can be caused by the high-level corporate disclosure environment found in the United States. We hypothesize that in low-level corporate disclosure environments the variability in disclosure practices across firms will be larger than in the United States, and, consequently, the marginal effect of voluntary disclosure policies will be higher. Using a newly developed Brazilian Corporate Disclosure Index (BCDI), our results confirm this hypothesis. Disclosure is strongly associated with ex ante cost of equity capital for Brazilian firms. The results are more pronounced for firms with less analyst coverage and low ownership concentration, as expected.     

Quality of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Cost of Equity Capital: Lessons from China

This article explores the relationship between the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and the cost of equity capital by analyzing the financial data and CSR reports of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2014. The quality of the CSR disclosure is shown to be negatively related to the cost of equity capital of the listed firms. This negative correlation proves to be more prominent among firms of environmentally sensitive industries. Taking the ownership of the listed firms into consideration, it is further confirmed that the negative relationship between the CSR disclosure and the cost of equity capital is of higher significance for state-owned enterprises. Our findings also empirically demonstrate that the quality of CSR disclosure is more negatively related to the cost of equity capital among the large listed firms than the smaller ones.     

International variations in ESG disclosure – Do cross-listed companies care more?

We study the quantity of ESG disclosure of 1,963 large-cap companies headquartered in 49 countries. Using the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score as the measure of disclosure quantity, we find that firm characteristics explain most of the variation in firms' ESG disclosure, whereas variations in country factors such as corruption and political rights explain less. We empirically examine and extend the theoretical framework of the liability of foreignness in capital markets. Our results support the notion that cross-listed firms disclose more ESG data than those only listed in their home market to mitigate the liability of foreignness in external capital markets. We also find that an increased percentage of foreign ownership does not augment ESG disclosure. Companies which opt to increase foreign equity ownership at home do not encounter the challenges of foreignness. Our findings suggest that cross-listed status is likely to reduce the importance of country factors for variations in ESG disclosure quantity.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine empirically the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese listed firms that issue both domestic and foreign shares and determine if the cost of debt capital is related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. We find the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership, firm performance measured by return on equity, and reputation of the engaged auditor. There is no evidence, however, that companies benefit from extensive voluntary disclosure by having a lower cost of debt capital.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Mandatory CSR disclosure,monitoring and investment efficiency: evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on firms’ investment efficiency in China. Using the CSR regulation that mandates a group of listed firms to disclose stand‐alone CSR reports after 2008 as a natural experiment, we find that firms subject to the mandatory CSR regulation have decreased investment inefficiency subsequent to the mandate, especially in cases of overinvestment. This effect is more pronounced for firms with a control‐ownership wedge, state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and firms having lower institutional ownership. Further analyses find that the reduction of overinvestment is much more significant in industries with high pollution and that the reduction in investment is not due to the CSR spending siphoning off capital used in other projects. We argue that mandatory corporate social responsibility disclosure improves monitoring over firms in China, especially when firms are characterised as having severe agency problems.     

Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers

We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference-in-Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co-coverage and co-ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.     

Does intellectual capital disclosure in analysts' reports vary by firm characteristics?

In this paper, we explore how Australian sell-side financial analysts contribute to the supply of intellectual capital (IC) information in the capital market. Toward this end, we examine how types and semantic properties of IC disclosures in analyst reports vary by a number of firm-specific characteristics likely to be associated with voluntary corporate disclosure. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the uncertainty associated with forecasting firm's earnings and the IC intensity of the industry in which the firm operates are associated positively with the extent as well as several semantic properties of IC disclosure in analyst reports. Highlighting that IC disclosure in analyst reports is not always a function of the extent of IC disclosed by firm, we find a statistically significant but negative association between firm profitability and the extent and certain semantic properties of IC disclosure in analyst reports. Firm size was significantly and positively associated with only the extent of forward-looking IC disclosure. Of the three categories of IC, only relation capital disclosure varied with any of the explanatory variables. Our findings highlight the importance of analyst reports as an IC communication media that could complement corporate communications of IC not only for firms disclosing less IC information voluntarily but also for those firms known to disclose more.     

Disclosure “Bunching”

This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in “real‐time” or “continuous” financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure “bunching,” that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred “bunching” strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure “bunching.”     

Voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies

This paper provides evidence on the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information for U.S.-listed Asian companies. The paper examines the following issues: (1) the effect of firm size, ownership concentration, proportion of foreign revenue, and leverage on voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies; and (2) the use of international standards, and the effect of domestic and global culture on those disclosures. Results indicate that larger firms, firms with greater ownership dispersion, and firms with lower leverage provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information. The paper also documents that companies from countries that are more individualistic provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information than companies from countries that are collectivist. Therefore, it appears that domestic culture does affect the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information in the U.S. This paper uses the index developed for Portuguese companies by Oliveira, Rodrigues, and Craig (2006), to measure voluntary disclosures of intangibles information thereby providing external validity to their instrument.     

Disclosure Practices by Family Firms: Evidence from Swedish Publicly Listed Firms

Abstract

I investigate the effect of family ownership on firms’ disclosure practices in their annual reports. In specific, I study Swedish publicly listed firms, which are typically characterized by controlling owners that have a strong influence in the corporate governance decisions of the firm, including corporate disclosures. To measure disclosure, I construct a comprehensive disclosure index covering information on (1) corporate governance, (2) strategic and financial targets and (3) notes to the financial statements. The results reveal that overall, family firms provide less disclosure in annual reports than non-family firms do. The finding is consistent with the premise that through their management positions, family owners can directly monitor managers and avoid costly public disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that ownership structure of firms is important to consider in understanding firms’ disclosure incentives, particularly in settings where controlling owners play a significant role in the governance of the firm.     

Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?

We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results.     

注册制改革会产生溢出效应吗?——基于企业投资行为的视角北大核心

提高资本市场资源配置效率是注册制推行的重要目标之一,本文以此为出发点,构建了多期倍分法(DID)模型,探究了科创板(试点注册制)公司信息披露对同行业公司的溢出效应。研究发现,科创板公司信息披露会促使同行业公司提高研发投入,且该效应随着信息披露内容的丰富、精确度的增加而有所提高。机制分析表明,该溢出效应源自信息不确定性的降低和竞争压力的产生。同时,创板信息披露提高了同行业公司管理层对创新的认知程度以及增加了媒体关注度,进而促进公司研发投入。进一步研究发现,同行业公司研发投入受到正向溢出效应影响的同时,固定资产投入有所降低,投资结构的改变最终导致投资效率提升,显著抑制了过度投资。本文为强制性信息披露的溢出效应研究提供了因果证据,也为注册制改革政策效果的全面评估提供了支持。     

Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform

In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun‐jumping” restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi‐exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.