CAPTIVE FINANCE SUBSIDIARIES: OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS

A captive finance company is a wholly owned subsidiary whose primary business is to finance the sales of the parent's products and services. Despite the continued growth and long history of captive finance companies, the issue of the economic impact of forming a captive remains controversial. Some view captive finance subsidiaries as unnecessary structures that may actually reduce the value of the firm. Others hold that captives can produce benefits that will increase firm value. The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the finance academic literature and to suggest direction for future research.     

USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS

In this study we examine dividends and chief executive officer (CEO) stock ownership as interrelated mechanisms that may be used to reduce agency costs. We find a significant nonmonotonic relation between dividend yield and CEO stock ownership. Our evidence shows that until the CEO becomes entrenched, increased executive stock ownership reduces agency costs and decreases dividend yield. Beyond that point, increased stock ownership increases dividend yield. Whether additional stock ownership can reduce agency costs depends upon the CEO's degree of control in the firm.     

GROWTH,BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS

A model of optimal dividend payout is presented in which increased dividends lower agency costs but raise the transactions cost of external financing. The optimal dividend payout minimizes the sum of these two costs. A cross-sectional test of the model relates dividend payout to the fraction of equity held by insiders, the past and expected future revenue growth of the firm, the firm's beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. The coefficients of all variables are significant in the predicted directions. The results indicate that investment policy influences dividend policy.     

A TEST OF THE EASTERBROOK HYPOTHESIS REGARDING DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS

Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payments may be an ambiguous signal unless the market can distinguish growing firms from disinvesting firms. Shares of growing firms that announce both financing and dividend increases are predicted to rise more in value than shares of firms announcing a dividend increase alone. We examine the relation between prior financing activity and the market response to initial dividends and find evidence consistent with the Easterbrook agency cost model.     

MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES IN ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

This paper fnst discusses the results of previous empirical and theoretical work relating to multiple objectives. It then reports on a survey carried out in 1978 by means of a questionnaire circulated to the top 500 companies. The paper finds that despite strong evidence of multiple objectives, the profit motive is dominant, although there is evidence of growth as a significant objective.
Proxy goals for a single primary objective function are found to be present, particularly in relation to risk. Finally, the implications of these results for accounting and finance are discussed.     

AN INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION TO REDUCE THE AGENCY COSTS OF PUBLIC CORPORATE BONDS

This paper proposes an institutional innovation in the structure of public bonds that is intended to provide some of the advantages of private loans- active monitoring, tight covenants, and ease of reorganization-while retaining the benefits of liquidity and ease of diversification provided by publicly traded securities. The authors propose that a publicly registered corporate bond provide for a "supertrustee" who will act on behalf of bondholders. The supertrustee will be charged with responsibility to monitor the compliance of the borrower with the terms of the bond covenants and given exclusive authority to negotiate amendments to the covenants and decide what action to take in the event of a breach of a covenant.     

EFFECTS OF AGENCY AND TRANSACTION COSTS ON DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE AGENCY-TRANSACTION COST HYPOTHESIS

In this study we replicate and extend an agency-transaction cost model of dividend payout previously hypothesized and supported in the literature. We find no statistical difference between the estimated regression model obtained for the original seven-year sample period, 1974–80, and that obtained for our seven-year period, 1981–87. The latter period is characterized by significantly lower inflation, stronger economic growth, and lower taxes. The intertemporal stability of the model suggests that it is useful for predicting dividend payout at the individual firm level.     

INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

LEVERAGING THE UNDERINVESTMENT PROBLEM: HOW HIGH DEBT AND MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDINGS SOLVE THE AGENCY COSTS OF FREE CASH FLOW

It is argued that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) provide managers with a powerful incentive to release excess cash rather than invest in negative net present value projects. This incentive is attributed to the large debt obligations associated with “junk” bond financing and to an increase in the shareholdings of top management. In this paper I explore the conditions under which leverage and management shareholdings complement one another in resolving the agency costs of free cash flow and would therefore optimally be used “together” as in an LBO. Complementarity is shown to obtain under plausible conditions, essentially because increased leverage reduces equityholders' share of investment returns. Increased management shareholdings then leverage this underinvestment effect. My analysis also helps explain why top managers who participate in an LBO receive a highly leveraged equity claim rather than a share of the “strip” that is generally provided to outside investors.     

农村商业银行的委托代理关系及其改革前景

本文以江苏省常熟市农村信用合作社向农村商业银行的改制为例,重点介绍了农村商业银行的委托代理关系,并将其与改制前的信用合作社、普通股份制企业以及股份制商业银行的委托代理关系进行比较.作者认为,常熟农村信用合作社改制是适应当地社会经济发展和加强自身建设的要求,由于其委托代理关系方面的创新,使得改制后的农村商业银行竞争力大为增强.但是,由于农村商业银行是新生事物,在此之前没有任何经验可以借鉴和参考,因此,其委托代理关系及支持该种关系发挥最大效力的制度和环境尚存在欠缺,需要社会各方特别是政府和监管部门对其加以关注,以期不断改进和完善.