OPTIMAL TAX POLICY IN A STOCHASTICALLY GROWING ECONOMY

This paper analyses the optimal taxation of capital in a stochastically growing small open economy in which there is a perfect market for a traded bond. The analysis emphasizes the dependence of the optimal tax structure upon the policy rule guiding the growth of government expenditure, and its impact on the behaviour of private agents. In general three taxes, reflecting three required conditions, are necessary to attain the first-best optimum. The first is to correct for any externality caused by government expenditure; the second is to attain the optimal portfolio share; the third is to ensure that the government budget constraint is met.     

AN OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT OF LEVIATHAN*

This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a “benevolent planner,” who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a “Leviathan planner,” who places more weight on the utilities of “favored consumers.” The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare-improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing all commodities.     

FISCAL POLICY AND OPTIMAL TAXATION: EVIDENCE FROM A TAX SMOOTHING EXERCISE

Testing the tax smoothing hypothesis for the EU‐15, we hypothesise that the introduction of the 3%‐deficit rule of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 may have inhibited tax smoothing as European Union (EU)‐member states are no longer capable of letting the deficit grow as much as implied by expected decreases in government expenditure. Our results show that for some countries this fiscal rule may have indeed changed the validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis, thus implying that EU accession has caused welfare losses.     

IDEAL AND REAL JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL POLICY MEASURES*

This paper discusses the successes and failures of Japanese monetary policy by evaluating policies from January 1980 to May 2003 in the light of optimal policy rules. First, we quantitatively conceptualize the Bank of Japan (BOJ)'s policy decisions by employing Bernanke and Mihov's (1998 ) econometric methodology for developing monetary policy measures and term the resulting policy measure the ‘actual policy measure’. Next, assuming that the BOJ is committed to optimal policy rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, which we term ‘optimal policy measures’. We evaluate Japanese monetary policy historically by comparing actual and optimal policy measures.     

CAREER CONCERNS,MATCHING, AND OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE POLICY*

Raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers' quality. When workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity, the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency. Long‐term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive. The optimal short‐term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive, and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained. These conditions are not only sufficient but also “almost necessary” for full disclosure. Partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY IN THE DESIGN OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS*

The quantitative literature has documented that a privatization of the social security system generates large long‐run welfare gains at the cost of welfare losses for transition generations. In this article, we maximize over the entire policy space, following the optimal fiscal policy approach. The resulting allocation, by construction, lies on the constrained Pareto frontier. We find that the optimal design of reforms exhibits sizeable welfare gains arising from a reduction in labor supply distortions. In contrast, the welfare gains coming from the reduction of savings distortions are relatively small.     

OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL*

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in the presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. However, when we account for the costs associated with cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also analyze the long‐run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW*

In this article, I examine the current state of knowledge about optimal monetary policy. I distinguish between two literatures, basic and applied. The basic literature is explicit about the frictions that generate a positive value for money and make it socially beneficial. The applied literature is not. I describe the recent lessons about monetary policy that we have learned from each literature and discuss how the two distinct approaches may be usefully combined.     

A SURVEY ON THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

This study reviews the existing evidence on the effects of tax reforms on output levels and growth over the short and long run from different strands of the literature. It develops and applies criteria to evaluate the usefulness of ex‐post estimates to predict the effects of tax reforms ex ante. Based on these criteria, we present detailed tables summarizing and comparing ex‐post estimates of the effects of tax reforms. Overall, our review suggests that at least the direction of the short‐run and long‐run growth effects can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty, but there is disagreement with respect to the magnitude. Our review also suggests that depending on the tax change, trade‐offs between short‐run stabilization and long‐run growth may arise and that more research on this question is needed. (JEL E62, H20, O20)     

OPTIMAL MIGRATION: A WORLD PERSPECTIVE*

We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare. Welfare is assumed to be a weighted average of the utilities of the world’s various citizens, but the weights are also country specific. Using a calibrated one‐sector model, we find that unless the weights are heavily biased toward the natives of rich countries, the extent of migration that would be optimal far exceeds the levels observed today. The claim remains true in a two‐sector extension of the model. All versions of the model assume that migration is the only redistributive tool.     

A MICROCONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM DATA SET FOR CANADA FOR USE IN TAX POLICY ANALYSIS

In this paper we describe a micro consistent data set for Canada for 1972, assembled with general equilibrium tax policy analysis in mind. We stress the methodology used and in a number of tables report its main features.
In the data set the separate detail contained in input-output transactions tables, national accounts, household income and expenditure data, taxation statistics, foreign trade statistics, flow of funds and other sources is adjusted for mutual consistency. The final result is a micro consistent data set in which demands equal supplies for all products, zero profit conditions hold for industries and all agents' demands satisfy their budget constraints.
The motivation for data assembly is the currently widely used practice of calibrating "empirical" general equilibrium models so as to exactly reproduce a base year data observation as an equilibrium model solution. This procedure enables empirically based models to evaluate counterfactual equilibria in a way which corresponds to comparative static analysis in theoretical literature.
More detail on the data set is available on request in appendices deleted from the published version of this paper due to space constraints.     

ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME-SERIES APPROACH*

This paper provides a time-series analysis on the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade policy and both political and economic variables. The chosen trade policy indicator is the number of foreign-trade regulations passed each year for the benefit of a single firm or industry. The data are from Uruguay, 1925–1983. This country, which experienced an impressive economic decline, is an outstanding example of the rent-seeking society. The paper shows that endogenous regulations increased with discretionary policies, with adverse macroeconomic shocks and under dictatorship. It also shows that these regulations had a negative long-run effect on the growth rates of output and exports. The short-run effect was positive however.     

TOURISM AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: A QUANTITATIVE APPRAISAL*

Within the last decade the promotion of tourism has gained a prominent place in many development plans. Recently, however, doubts have been cast on previous attempts to analyse its contribution to development. This paper describes a quantitative technique which remedies some of their more obvious defects. The method is then applied to the Turkish situation, and the implications of the results are examined in the light of an explicit policy preference function.