Theories of the firm: contractual and competence perspectives

The article compares alternative approaches to the theory of the firm. The two main approaches confronted are the contractual (Coasian) perspective and the competence (evolutionary) perspective. Whereas the firm as a repository of tacit knowledge is neglected in the contractual perspectives, it occupies center stage in the competence perspective. It is argued that the competence perspective is not only applicable an understanding of the sources of firms' competitive advantage, but may also be applied to the issues of the existence and the boundaries of the firm. This means that a distinct theory of the firm can be constructed on the basis of evolutionary theory.     

Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Often a bargainer can use some form of power—legal, military, or political—to impose a settlement. How does the “outside” option of being able to impose a settlement, albeit at some cost, affect the bargaining? And, how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers? These questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to Rubinstein's game of dividing a pie. Each actor can accept an offer, make a counteroffer, or try to impose a solution. Imposing a settlement is, however, costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification number: C72.     

Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field

We explore the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for nontransferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution is to establish that theconsistent fieldis intimately related to the concept ofsubgame perfectionfor finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. We then show that in the general NTU case—unlike the transferable utility and pure bargaining cases—the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria need not approach the consistent value.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72.     

利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。     

Regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability

This paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance. Our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance. In the Random Audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection. In the Tournament Audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting. To study the effects of social information, the experiment varies the observability of identity, output, and compliance decisions. Optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme, but equilibrium reporting is higher under the Tournament mechanism than Random auditing. Experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting, but deviate modestly for output. In particular, we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the Tournament treatment compared to the Random Audit treatment. At the individual level, a majority of participants misreported in most periods. Social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments.     

Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin

Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making responsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolution as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain’s Upper Guadiana Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We investigate how the government can most effectively allocate this money to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bargaining, we find that if the national government creates appropriate incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central government’s decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy, which will be influenced by the relative value the government places on various financial and environmental outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government’s preferences over water levels.     

Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set

We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem

We give a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics. We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay, we prove that the agents' equilibrium continuation payoffs converge to the utility from the median, so that delay, if it occurs, is inconsequential. We do not impose stationarity or any other refinements. Our result counters intuition based on the folk theorem for repeated games, and it contrasts with the known result for the distributive bargaining model that as agents become patient, any division of the dollar can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.     

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome.     

Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies

Within a policy game, where monetary and fiscal authorities are subject to a time inconsistency problem vis-à-vis a monopoly-union, we provide additional support for commitments of either authority: monetary commitment moderates fiscal time inconsistency problems, and fiscal commitment moderates monetary time inconsistency problems. In contrast with the benefits of commitments, a regime of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy may turn out to be counterproductive.Comments and suggestions from Torben M. Andersen and one anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Errors and omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.     

Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties

This study investigates how national levels of corruption are influenced by the interaction of two factors in political decentralization: the presence of local elections and the organizational structure of national parties. Previous studies have focused primarily on the role of fiscal decentralization on corruption and have mostly ignored the institutions of political decentralization. Using new data in a series of expansive models across multiple countries and years, we find that corruption will be lower when local governments are more accountable to and more transparent toward their constituents. This beneficial arrangement is most likely to occur when local elections are combined with nonintegrated political parties, meaning that party institutions themselves are decentralized from national control. Such an institutional arrangement maximizes local accountability by putting the decision to nominate and elect local leaders in the hands of those best in a position to evaluate their honesty—local electors.     

Rewards from public office and the selection of politicians by parties

We investigate the relationship between the quality of politicians, defined in terms of their competence (skills), and rewards from public office in a game between parties and citizens in which parties play a crucial role in the selection of politicians. Parties shape the selection of politicians by manipulating information about the quality of their candidates. An increase in the rewards from public offices leads to two opposing effects on the average quality of politicians. The first is a selection effect, whereby more skilled citizens enter politics, leading to an increase in average quality. The second is a manipulation effect, as parties have the incentive to further manipulate information to increase the probability of election for their unskilled candidates, from whom they can extract higher rents in the form of service duties. We find that the second effect dominates when (i) parties’ costs of manipulating information are sufficiently low; (ii) even in the absence of manipulation, the quality of information available to citizens about candidates is sufficiently poor; and (iii) the net gains from becoming a politician for unskilled citizens are sufficiently larger than those for skilled citizens. These findings provide a rationale for the ambiguous sign of the empirical relationship between the quality and pay of politicians.     

Earnings mobility in Spain: the role of job mobility and contractual arrangements

This paper analyses the relationship between earnings mobility, job mobility and changes in the contractual arrangement in Spain using a sample of Spanish workers aged 16–60 years extracted from the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP 1995–2001). Overall, earnings mobility remains mostly unchanged over time, although clear differences, both in terms of levels and trends, can be perceived among different types of workers. Results show that, in general, job mobility contributes to increase earnings mobility. Switching into permanent contract are associated with the highest probability of upgrading among those workers who remain with the same employer. In contrast, the highest risk of downgrading among stayers appears when changing from permanent to temporary. An analysis on low pay/no low pay transitions reveals that job mobility always increases the probability of moving from low pay to better-paid jobs among females. For males, in contrast, this occurs only when they were initially employed on a temporary basis. Furthermore, for females it is found that either switching into permanent contract while staying with the same employer, or changing employer while being employed on a permanent basis yield a higher chance of upgrading than staying with the same employer with a permanent contract.      

策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

内生家庭谈判力与婚姻匹配

本文从内生家庭谈判力模型分析了中国当前婚姻匹配中梯度匹配与结构性失衡并存现象。本文认为,由于在养育孩子投入中自然的性别差异,择偶倾向上出现性别差异,女性存在向上匹配倾向,而男性则存在向下匹配倾向。当受教育程度性别差距缩小,尤其是高学历人群中男女性别比降低时,出现梯度匹配与高学历女性的匹配困难并存的现象。     

Bargaining in the transfer market: theory and evidence

This paper examines the transfer market for association football players as operated in the English Football League using transfer data for the 1990–91 season. After describing the purposes and procedures involved in the transfer system together with the motives of the participants, we apply two-person bargaining theory to analyse the determination of transfer fees. The data and estimation procedures are explained and the results reported and interpreted. Our analysis suggests that the Nash bargaining theory captures the salient features of the bargaining process in the footballer's transfer market.     

Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court

We formulate a new game-theoretic model of bargaining on theUS Supreme Court. In the model, a degree of monopoly power overpolicy endogenously accrues to the assigned writer despite an"open rule" permitting other justices to make counteroffers.We assume justices are motivated ultimately by a concern forjudicial policy, but that the policy impact of an opinion dependspartly on its persuasiveness, clarity, and craftsmanship—itslegal quality. The effort cost of producing a high-quality opinioncreates a wedge that the assignee can exploit to move an opinionfrom the median without provoking a winning counteroffer. Weuse this bargaining model as the foundation for a formal analysisof opinion assignment. Both the bargaining and opinion assignmentmodels display rich and tractable comparative statics, allowingthem to explain well-known empirical regularities, as well asto generate new propositions, all within a unified and internallyconsistent framework.