What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Do Analyst Stock Recommendations Piggyback on Recent Corporate News? An Analysis of Regular‐Hour and After‐Hours Revisions

Analysts often update their recommendations following corporate news. Questions have been raised regarding analysts’ ability to generate new information beyond recent corporate events. Employing a comprehensive database on corporate news, we show that only a small minority, or 27.9%, of all recommendation revisions directionally confirm the information in the preceding corporate events and even these “confirming revisions” facilitate the information discovery of corporate events and thus cannot simply be dismissed as “piggybacking.” Our analysis further shows that analysts not only facilitate price discovery to corporate news through issuing trending revisions but also help reverse prevailing market sentiments following corporate news by issuing contrarian revisions. Our study is the first to investigate short‐window intraday market reactions to revisions issued after hours, which account for 70% of all recommendation revisions in our sample period. Analysts’ incentives to issue revisions after hours appear to reflect demands from large institutional clients, who dominate after‐hours trading. More importantly, we show that the after‐hours revisions are associated with significantly greater price reactions and different price reaction patterns than revisions issued during regular trading hours. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analysts are a significant source of new information beyond recent corporate news and they also help shape the market's assessment of corporate disclosures.     

Does Limited Attention Constrain Investors’ Acquisition of Firm‐specific Information?

According to the framework outlined in Peng and Xiong ( 2006 ), attention‐constrained investors tend to process more market‐ and sector‐level information. We empirically test this theory. We find that firms with higher media coverage have lower contemporaneous stock return synchronicity. Such an effect is robust to analyses within size deciles, inclusion of firm fixed effects, estimation using a matched sample, and a two‐stage least squares approach. The effect becomes less pronounced during the financial crisis period when both the quantity and quality of firm‐specific information decrease. Further, the attention from media coverage has a spillover effect on the firm's industry peers without media coverage. Finally, investors of firms with higher media coverage are more efficient in incorporating future firm performance into current stock prices. Collectively, our findings support the theory in Peng and Xiong ( 2006 ) that investors increase their acquisition of firm‐specific information when a firm captures their attention.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Does Anticipated Information Impose a Cost on Risk‐Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.     

Earnings Announcement Lags and Market Responses—Does the Tone of the News and the Market Sentiment Matter?

We investigate earnings announcement lags (period from the end of the reporting period until the announcement date) for the good and the bad quarterly earnings news across different market sentiment periods as well as market reactions thereto. Companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges exhibit clear signs of strategic timing of earnings announcements. Earnings announcement lags for the bad news tend to be longer than those for the good news. This difference is more pronounced during low market sentiment periods. If the release of the bad news is postponed, abnormal return responses remain lower, as expected.     

Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings,Broadtape Disclosure,and the Timing of Price Reactions

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This Broadtape announcement effect persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11-day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.     

Does the market dole out collective punishment? An empirical analysis of industry,geography, and Arthur Andersen’s reputation

Arthur Andersen’s reputation was tarnished following news that its Houston office had shredded documents related to the auditing of energy giant Enron. Earlier studies documented widespread spillover of the reputation effect, suggesting a strong commonality in Big 5 audit practices. We examine whether the market is more discriminating in its assessments. We focus on the roles industry specialization of auditors and the geography of clients’ audit offices play in accounting for the contagion. Our results are supportive of investors who differentiate audit practices by industry and who account for the location of the specific office where the audit work is done. We find that losses suffered by energy firms or firms located close to Houston are equivalent to approximately 90% of the aggregate abnormal losses suffered by Big 5 clients. Our evidence suggests the possibility of more localized impact of accounting scandals and supports accounting regulations targeted at individual industries.     

Why Does the Law Matter? Investor Protection and Its Effects on Investment,Finance, and Growth

Investor protection is associated with greater investment sensitivity to q and lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. Finance plays a role in causing these effects; in countries with strong investor protection, external finance increases more strongly with q, and declines more strongly with cash flow. We further find that q and cash flow sensitivities are associated with ex post investment efficiency; investment predicts growth and profits more strongly in countries with greater q sensitivities and lower cash flow sensitivities. The paper's findings are broadly consistent with investor protection promoting accurate share prices, reducing financial constraints, and encouraging efficient investment.     

Does adopting good corporate governance impact the cost of intermediated and non‐intermediated debt?

This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non‐intermediated debt ( Sengupta, 1998 ; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 ; Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2006 ). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non‐intermediated debt sub‐samples, we find this result only holds for the non‐intermediated debt sub‐sample. Furthermore, we find that small companies that adopt better corporate governance practices do not benefit through lower cost of debt. This raises questions about the merits of universal adoption of costly governance practices.     

What Drives the Disposition Effect? An Analysis of a Long‐Standing Preference‐Based Explanation

We investigate whether prospect theory preferences can predict a disposition effect. We consider two implementations of prospect theory: in one case, preferences are defined over annual gains and losses; in the other, they are defined over realized gains and losses. Surprisingly, the annual gain/loss model often fails to predict a disposition effect. The realized gain/loss model, however, predicts a disposition effect more reliably. Utility from realized gains and losses may therefore be a useful way of thinking about certain aspects of individual investor trading.     

Does educational diversity of managers matter for the performance of team‐managed funds?

We study the effect of the educational diversity of managers on the performance of team‐managed mutual funds using a large sample of U.S. equity funds from 1994 to 2013. We consider diversity in terms of both final educational degree and field of educational specialisation. We find that, in general, both types of diversity have a positive impact on fund performance, and our results are robust over a wide range of performance metrics and changes in market conditions.     

What is the After‐Tax Price of R&D? An Interstate Comparison*

As of 2005, 31 US states offered corporate income tax credits on research and development (R&D) expenses in order to encourage more in‐state innovation activities. Empirical questions about the efficacy of such tax breaks at the state level persist, in part because the complexity of the tax laws means that simple credit‐rate comparisons across states do not fully capture the differential variation in effective after‐tax price incentives firms face in choosing where to locate R&D activities. We are unaware of any research analysing and comparing the effective prices of R&D faced by firms, across all US states and utilising micro‐level data. Using data extracted from detailed reading of individual firms' 10‐K and S‐1 filings and of state‐level tax credit rules, we estimate the effective after‐tax price of basic and qualified research expenditure each firm would have faced in each of the 50 states had they been located there. Our methodology simulates the effective tax price of each firm's marginal dollar of research expenditure, assuming the firm chose to move all of its R&D operations to each of the 49 other states. Through Monte Carlo techniques, we consider the sensitivity of our interstate comparative results to several modelling assumptions. We find significant variation in after‐tax R&D prices across states with quite different R&D tax laws. Prices range from $0.176 to $0.520 on a marginal dollar of R&D in Virginia and Washington State, respectively. We also find that the interstate variability is generally more important – indeed, much wider than we had anticipated before investigating state‐by‐state regulations – than the inter‐firm variability within states.     

Does information risk affect the implied cost of equity capital? An analysis of PIN and adjusted PIN

Using a unique dataset of Korean listed companies for which trade initiators are correctly identifiable, we estimate bias-free PIN (probability of informed trading) that is no longer subject to the trade misspecification problem and test whether it is related to expected returns. Unlike prior studies, we find that bias-free AdjPIN, the adjusted PIN purged of a liquidity component, is positively related to implied cost of equity. Our findings suggest that the errors in PIN variables hamper a proper identification of PIN pricing in prior studies.     

Does the Management's Forecast of Merger Synergies Explain the Premium Paid,the Method of Payment,and Merger Motives?

I study a sample of 336 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals to investigate the effect of managements’ estimate of synergy on the reservation price and the payment method. I find that synergy does not explain the premium paid implying that it may have been announced to induce shareholders to endorse the deal. Acquiring firms are more likely to overpay if they have low growth potential, while the target firm is large, has higher premerger operating performance, and high growth potential. Acquirers may be serving their own self‐interests as they are more likely to exceed their reservation price if they receive low compensation and if entrenchment provisions are in place. I also find that these acquisitions lead to postmerger shareholders’ wealth destruction, which is more pronounced when acquirers overpay. I document that the greater the synergy and the acquirer firm‐specific overvaluation, the higher the likelihood of settling the deal with more shares.