Production theory,uncertain prices and investment portfolios

This paper examines the allocative decisions of a competitive firm where input and output prices are uncertain and where the capital asset pricing model prevails. The firm behaves much as a profit maximizer under certainty, except that certainty equivalent prices formally replace the known prices. These certainty equivalent prices are composed of the expected price, the covariance of the price with the market (a measure of systematic risk) and a measure of risk aversion in the economy. Both static and comparative static propositions emerge in a natural way as extensions of standard, competitive and profit maximizing behavior. In addition, the model contains both the certainty case and the risk-neutral case as limiting examples.     

The influence of external reference price strategies in a nonprofit arts organization's “pay‐what‐you‐want” setting

Nonprofit arts organizations face conflicting objectives to balance—or more specifically, to create—artistic and educational value and to generate financial income from various sources. Pay‐what‐you‐want (PWYW), a participative pricing mechanism where services have no fixed price and customers actively decide what to pay, is a novel pricing mechanism and is of high interest for organizations and researchers alike. Based on the concepts of loss aversion and gain, this study presents a field experiment to test the effects of different PWYW pricing strategies on the amount of money paid by visitors of a German photo biennial. Explicitly, the provisions of minimum, maximum, and suggested external reference prices are compared to a setting with no external reference prices. We test the derived hypotheses, discuss the results, and provide implications for future research, as well as for the management of nonprofit arts organizations.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms

We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.     

Revealing Incentives for Compatibility Provision in Vertically Differentiated Network Industries

We determine the incentives for compatibility provision of firms that produce network goods with different intrinsic qualities when firms do not have veto power over compatibility. When network effects are strong, there are multiple equilibria in pricing and consumer decisions. We show that in some equilibria, it is the high‐quality firm that invests in compatibility, whereas in others, the low‐quality firm triggers compatibility. The socially optimal compatibility degree is zero, except under very strong network effects, where one of the equilibria has all consumers buying the low‐quality good. In this case, a partial degree of compatibility is optimal.     

The Determinants of Price Adjustments in Retail Supermarkets

This paper examines the determinants of price adjustment decisions by supermarkets to increase or decrease prices for 11 different food categories and evaluates the characteristics of these firms that influence these decisions. We use a unique dataset to analyze firm variables and industry variables and their impact on price adjustment in supermarket stores. The study contributes to the price adjustment literature by identifying determinants of price behavior by stores and product category. We find that the rationale for increasing prices differs from that for decreasing prices, retailers make different adjustment decisions based on product category, and market‐level controls have little impact. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Multiple Boundaries of the Firm*

ABSTRACT The notion of firm boundaries has received considerable attention in theories of the firm that address the problems of investment incentives and mitigation of hold‐up problems. In this paper we attempt to develop a different approach to the problem of vertical firm boundaries, based on recent advances in the capabilities view of the firm. Our arguments rely on the pioneering insights of Penrose, Richardson and Loasby to elaborate a view of the boundaries determined by the interaction of the firm's direct and indirect capabilities with other actors. We develop the notion of indirect capabilities to highlight how firm boundaries respond to the distribution of capabilities in the economy as well as the modes of access to complementary and external capabilities. We conclude that the evolution of firm boundaries must be understood in the context of decisions on how the firm relates to other actors in its environment.     

Information Flow Analysis and the Theory of the Firm

In this paper, I examine the role the firm plays in economizing on information flows that are required to turn raw materials and ideas into products and services used by final consumers. Specifically, I argue that scale economies associated with complex information transfers are an important benefit of integration. This argument is distinct from theories that are based on incentives and leads to different or more refined conclusions in some cases. The differences are explored in the context of literature on specific assets, vertically related monopolies, and physical asset ownership. Information flow analysis also arms managers with a framework for addressing organizational questions beyond firm‐boundary decisions such as intrafirm decisions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

High‐performance organizing,environmental management,and organizational performance: An evolutionary economics perspective

This study applies evolutionary economics reasoning to the green HRM context and examines whether and how environmental management routinization relates to organizational performance. In doing so, we introduce the concept of ecological routines, defined as deeply embedded, firm‐specific rules and procedures associated with organizing and practicing corporate environmental management that do not change very much from one iteration, period, or functional unit to another. We examine the extent to which ecological routines that encompass organizing (high‐performance organizing [HPO]) and practice routines of environmental sustainability relate to green decisions, green behaviors, and organizational performance. In a sample of 229 managers from 33 organizations in the environment‐sensitive industries of the United States, we find support for multilevel mediation of green decisions and green behaviors as well as interaction of HPO and environmental management practice routines. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that regulated firms issue more debt, invest more, and enjoy higher regulated prices when they face more independent regulators, are more privatized, and when regulators are more pro‐firm. Moreover, regulatory independence, higher degree of privatization, and pro‐firm regulatory climate are associated with higher social welfare.     

Quantity precommitment and price-matching

We study the effects of price-matching in a capacity-constrained duopoly setting. We show that no firm does worse at any pure equilibrium under price-matching relative to Bertrand, but as capacity increases, one or both firms do better relative to Bertrand. If the firms choose their capacities simultaneously before making pricing decisions, then the effect of price-matching varies with the cost of capacity. Specifically, when the cost is “high” price-matching either (i) has no effect on the market price, i.e., the market price associated with the pure SPEs is the Cournot one, or (ii) weakly decreases the market price relative to Cournot. Furthermore, when the cost is “low” price-matching leads to a set of (pure) SPE prices that includes the Cournot price in the interior. Therefore, price-matching does not necessarily benefit the firms when firms select their capacities before competing in price.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price dispersion and optimal price categories with limited memory consumers

In this paper, we study consumers with limited memory and examine the effects of their price categorization on the pricing strategies of competing firms. The valuations of consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous. We find that it is possible to observe price dispersion even when each firm charges a single price if the consumers categorize prices non‐optimally. Moreover, we demonstrate that the likelihood of a price dispersion outcome is reduced when consumers with limited memory set up the price categories optimally. These findings suggest that the consumers' limited memory and their sub‐optimal behavior, that is, their inability to choose price categories optimally can be a reason for observed price dispersion.     

Strategic Staffing and Small‐Firm Performance

Although staffing can be a critical determinant of whether small businesses succeed or fail, there has been less research in this area than might be expected, given the large numbers of such firms. While there has been some research on specific recruiting and selection practices, there has been little attention to the strategic aspects of staffing. We investigated relationships between strategic approaches to staffing and small‐firm performance using lagged survey data from 139 founders and owners of small firms. Results indicate that recruiting approaches imitating the practices (processes) of larger businesses are positively related to a perceptual measure of firm performance. Selection approaches stressing a growth orientation are also positively related to firm performance. Finally, founders’ and owners’ perceptions of the strategic importance of human resources moderate the relationship of firm performance with imitative recruiting practices as well as with growth‐oriented selection practices. An important contribution of this article is that contextual knowledge facilitates our understanding of the performance implications of staffing practices in small firms. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

Museum pricing: challenges to theory development and practice

• The museum sector has undergone considerable change in the last few decades, which has been a result of both internal and external forces. The topic of pricing in museums, however, has attracted little interest from researchers in the field despite the sector's need to understand it better. This study aimed to address this gap in knowledge. Results of a comprehensive literature review on pricing highlight that the topic of pricing in museums is problematic, as a range of issues, social, political and often value-laden, must be considered before pricing decisions can be made. The study highlights that there is diversity in the sector with regard to pricing, but that museums generally adopt a unilateral approach to pricing. Researchers in entrepreneurial marketing have noted that conventional pricing theory is being turned on its head and they argue that deciding what prices to charge represents one of the more entrepreneurial strategies for organisations. This study indicates that, within the context of museums, marketers are failing to recognise and capitalise on such pricing opportunities. Approaches to setting multiple museum pricing strategies, depending on the market context, are proposed in this paper. In this way, knowledge of museum pricing can optimise the organisational outcomes of museums while continuing to meet their social responsibilities.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Points mechanisms and rewards programs

I study points programs, such as frequent flyer and other rewards programs, as a revenue management tool. I develop a two‐period contracting model where a capacity‐constrained firm faces consumers who privately learn their valuations over time. The firm cannot commit to long‐term contracts, but it can commit to allocate any unsold capacity through a points program. This points scheme creates an endogenous and type‐dependent outside option for consumers, which generates novel incentives in the firm's pricing problem. It induces the firm to screen less ex interim, and to offer lower equilibrium prices, reversing the intuition of demand cannibalization.     

Firm risk and the power of the Chairman and CEO in a civil law country: evidence from Spain

Many authors have examined the effect of various control mechanisms on firm value, but have devoted little attention to the effect of these mechanisms on firm risk. This paper studies the effect of different variables related to the power of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) on firm risk in Spain. Decisions taken by both the chairman and the CEO are very important in order to attain the shareholders' objectives. Thus, decisions relative to both posts can be considered very relevant from the human resources point of view. There is little previous empirical evidence on this topic, and what there is comes from the US. Most results are consistent with what we call a ‘power perspective’. That is, we observe a positive relation between firm risk and combining in the same person the positions of chairman of the board and CEO. We also find a positive relation between firm risk and the status of both leaders as founding partners, and a negative relation between firm risk and board size.