Experimenting to Learn about Demand in Duopoly with Forward‐Looking Consumers

Using a two‐period model, I show that competition between two symmetric duopolists trying to learn about unknown features of demand results in an informationally suboptimal process. Because a firm’s marginal return to price experimentation equals zero if the rival’s price is matched in the first period, myopic symmetric pricing arises in equilibrium even though a firm’s expected second‐period profit attains a local minimum. Furthermore, forward‐looking consumers suffer from ratcheting because their first‐period purchase decisions partly reveal their preferences, which exacerbates the informational suboptimality of the firms’ experimentation process without affecting their pricing. The role of firm asymmetries is also analyzed.     

Knowledge spillover in corporate financing networks: embeddedness and the firm's debt performance

Building on social embeddedness theory, we examine how the competencies and resources of one corporate actor in a network are transferred to another actor that uses them to enhance transactions with a third actor—a strategic process we dub ‘network transitivity.’ Focusing on the properties of network transitivity in the context of small‐firm corporate finance, we consider how embedded relations between a firm and its banks facilitate the firm's access to distinctive capabilities that enable it to strategically manage its trade‐credit financing relationships. We apply theory and original case‐study fieldwork to explore the types of resources and competencies available through bank–firm relationships and to derive hypotheses about how embedded bank–firm relationships affect the strategy of small‐ to medium‐sized firms. Using a separate large‐scale data set, we then test the generalizability of our hypotheses. Our qualitative analyses show that embedded bank–firm ties provide special governance arrangements that facilitate the firm's access to bank‐centered informational and capital resources, which uniquely enhance the firm's ability to manage trade credit. Consistent with our arguments, our statistical analyses show that small‐ to medium‐sized firms with embedded ties to their bankers were more likely to take lucrative early‐payment trade discounts and avoid costly late‐payment penalties than were similar firms that lacked embedded ties—suggesting that social embeddedness beneficially affects the financial performance of the firm. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

Optimal inventory and pricing policies for remanufacturable leased products

In this paper we consider a company which leases new products and also sells remanufactured versions of the new product that become available at the end of their lease periods. When the amount of end-of-lease items in stock is not sufficient to meet the demand for remanufactured products, the firm may purchase additional cores from a third-party supplier. We develop a dynamic programming formulation for determining the optimal price of remanufactured products, and optimal payment structure for the leased products. Our objective is to maximize the discounted system-wide profit over a finite horizon. The profit function consists of revenues that are obtained from remanufactured product sales and leasing, remanufacturing and manufacturing costs, inventory holding and shortage costs. We consider a consumer choice based demand model for mapping a potential customer into one of the product segments (a remanufactured product customer or a customer for a leased product with a particular lease period) for a given price/lease payment vector. We explore several properties of the discounted profit function and provide insight on the behavior of pricing and inventory policies. We also investigate the effect of key product characteristics such as deterioration in age, cost of shortage in remanufacturable product inventory, and key market characteristics such as relative willingness-to-pay for buying a remanufactured product and relative willingness-to-pay for leasing a new product on optimal pricing policies through a computational study.     

DYNAMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS*

This paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor. Consumers' past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms' products. Price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if it does not cause the weaker firm to exit; otherwise it can harm consumers. The effect of price discrimination also depends on firms' cost differences, market competitiveness, and consumers' time horizon. The stronger firm may price below cost in the presence of consumer switching costs, with the purpose and effect of eliminating competition.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi‐product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade‐off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price‐coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra‐firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi‐product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit‐sharing, intra‐firm price competition can reduce quality‐adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.     

Price discrimination on booking time

Even if consumers are forward looking and free to choose when to purchase, a firm can price discriminate on booking time if consumers learn their valuations at different times and consumers who learn later have higher valuations. The model is related to our work on optimal screening with returns contracts Akan, Ata, and Dana [1], but here we consider a simpler binary-valuation distribution and consider more realistic consumer learning assumptions. The main contribution is to show that the profitability of screening on time is robust to relaxing the assumption that consumers learn instantaneously. In addition to analyzing a bad-news model in which information arrives gradually, we characterize a general bound on consumer optimism that guarantees that the instantaneous learning results are robust.     

Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation

We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with vertically differentiated products. In the second period, a firm not only knows the purchase history of all customers, as in standard Behavior Based Price Discrimination models, but it also collects detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. The analysis reveals that there exists a natural market for each firm, defined as the set of customers that cannot be poached by the rival in the second period. The equilibrium is unique, except when firms are ex-ante almost identical. In equilibrium, only the firm with the largest natural market poaches customers from the rival. This firm has highest profits but not necessarily the largest market share. Aggregate profits are lower than under uniform pricing. All consumers gain, total welfare is higher herein than under uniform pricing if firms’ natural markets are sufficiently asymmetric. The low quality firm chooses the minimal quality level and a quality differential arises, though the exact choice for the high quality depends upon the cost specification.     

Does how you pay influence the share of healthy items that you Buy? Assessing differences in nutritional quality of food purchases by payment type

Shoppers that use cash as a form of payment are more likely to evaluate the necessity of an item they purchase than shoppers that pay with other forms of payment, such as credit cards. In this paper, we hypothesize that the use of cash may nudge shoppers to buy more healthful food items. We empirically evaluate whether the payment method affects the nutritional quality of food purchases. We also test whether the effect of payment type differs between food-at-home and food-away-from-home events. Specifically, we test whether shoppers purchase a higher share of nutritious food items when they pay with cash compared to when they use credit and debit cards. We use the National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) data that tracks individual’s food purchases over one week. Using the Guiding Stars Program (GSP) algorithm to measure the nutritional quality of food items, we calculate the share of healthy items purchased at each event. We find that shoppers using cash purchase a higher share of healthy items than when they use credit or debit cards, and this nudging effect is primarily driven by food-away-from-home purchases.     

Old technology meets new technology: complementarities,similarities, and alliance formation

Alliance formation is commonplace in many high‐technology industries experiencing radical technological change, where established firms use alliances with new entrants to adapt to technological change, while new entrants benefit from the ability of established players to commercialize the new technology. Despite the prevalence of these alliances, we know little about how these firms choose to ally with specific firms given the range of possible partners they may choose from. This study explores factors that lead to alliance formation between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. We focus on the alliance tie as the unit of analysis and argue that dyadic complementarities and similarities directly influence alliance formation. We then introduce a contingency model in which the positive effect of complementarities and similarities on alliance formation is moderated by the age of the new technology firm. We draw theoretical attention to the intersection between levels of analysis, in particular, the intersection between dyadic and firm‐level constructs. We find that a pharmaceutical and a biotechnology firm are more likely to enter an alliance based on complementarities when the biotechnology firm is younger. Another noteworthy finding is that proxies for broad capabilities appear to be at least as effective, if not more so, in predicting alliance formation compared to fine‐grained science and technology‐related indicators, like patent cross‐citations or patent common citations. We conclude by suggesting that future studies on alliance formation need to take into account interactions across levels; for example, how dyadic capabilities interact with firm‐level factors, and the advantages and disadvantages of more or less fine‐grained measures of organizational capabilities. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

厂商市场份额的品牌经济模型及其现实解释

厂商的市场份额决定了其利润率,从而决定了厂商能否在残酷的竞争中生存、增长与发展。而在经济过剩的条件下,消费者的选择决定了厂商的市场份额,货币价格与品牌及品牌信用度决定的选择成本作为消费者选择和购买过程中的局限条件制约和影响着消费者的选择与购买。本文建立起引入品类需求强度系数、价格、选择成本的需求函数,并以此模型解释了厂商市场份额的决定是通过价格机制与品牌机制共同作用而实现的。在理论分析的基础上,对大量的现实进行了解释,在验证该模型的同时,对未来市场竞争及厂商市场份额做出了预测。同时,本文提出了提高厂商市场份额与定价权的＂品类需求强度—品牌信用度＂二维模型,并分别从开发具有较高品类需求强度的品类市场和提高品牌信用度的品牌建设方面给现实中的厂商提供了相应策略。     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Employee Ownership and Employment Stability in the US: 1999–2011

Do firms with employee ownership (EO) programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic downturns? In particular, are firms with EO programs less likely to lay off workers during negative shocks? In this article, we examine the relationship between EO programs and employment stability in the United States using longitudinal Form 5500‐CompuStat matched data on the universe of publicly traded companies during 1999–2011. We examine how firms with EO programs weathered the recessions of 2001 and 2008 in terms of employment stability relative to firms without EO programs, and also whether such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array of measures of EO at firms, including the presence of EO stock in pension plans, the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), the value of EO stock per employee, the share of the firm owned by employees, the share of workers at the firm participating in EO and the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs. We also consider both economy‐wide negative shock measures (increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment‐to‐population ratio) and firm‐specific negative shock measures (declines in firm sales, declines in firm stock price). Our results indicate that EO firms exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economy‐wide and firm‐specific negative shocks.     

MATCHING OWN PRICES,RIVALS' PRICES OR BOTH?*

Many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices. That is, many retailers combine elements of both price‐matching guarantees and retroactive most‐favored‐customer clauses. This is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices, and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes. In this paper, we show that price‐matching guarantees and most‐favored‐customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself.     

The heterogeneous impact of house purchase limits policy on housing prices: Comparison between elite and non-elite school district houses

The effectiveness of housing purchase limits policies has aroused heated debate, yet few discussed its impact on educational capitalization. We examine the heterogeneous effect of housing purchase limits policy on the price of elite school district houses (ESDH) and non-elite school district houses. By exploiting second-hand houses data in Hefei China, we find that the price of ESDH has increased greatly after the limitation, compared with non-elite school districts. Further we discover that the ESDH have lower depreciation risks, and their price is higher in neighborhoods with smaller dwelling area. Our finding indicates that the limits policy may have exacerbated the educational capitalization.     

Network effects and competition: an empirical analysis of the home video game industry

Building on the resource‐based view of the firm, we advance the idea that a firm's customer network can be a strategic asset. We suggest that network effects are a function of network size (i.e., installed customer base) and network strength (i.e., the marginal impact of a unit increase in network size on demand). We empirically study these network effects in the 16‐bit home video game industry in which the dominant competitors were Nintendo and Sega. In the spirit of the new empirical IO framework, we estimate a structural econometric model assuming the data are equilibrium outcomes of the best fitting noncooperative game in price and advertising. After controlling for other effects, we find strong evidence that network effects are asymmetric between the competitors in the home video game industry. Specifically, we find that the firm with a smaller customer network (Nintendo) has higher network strength than the firm with the larger customer base (Sega). Thus, our results provide a possible explanation for this situation in which the firm with a smaller customer network (Nintendo) was able to overtake the sales of a firm with a larger network size (Sega). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Merger Incentives and the Failing Firm Defense

The merger incentives between profitable firms differ fundamentally from the incentives of a profitable firm to merge with a failing firm. We investigate these incentives under different modes of price competition and Cournot behavior. Our main finding is that firms strictly prefer exit of the failing firm to acquisition. This result may imply that other than strategic reasons, like economies of scale, must be looked for to understand why firms make use of the failing firm defense. However, when products are sufficiently heterogenous, we find that (i) the failing firm defense can be welfare enhancing and (ii) a government bail‐out increases total welfare when the number of firms is sufficiently low.     

Role of resource gap and value appropriation: effect of reputation gap on price premium in online auctions

In this study, we draw on the resource‐based view of the firm and on value‐based models of strategy to examine when firms appropriate value from their superior resources. We argue for the need to take into account the role of the resource gap between competitors rather than the absolute resource stock of the focal firm when examining the resource‐performance relationship. In particular, we investigate whether the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium is influenced by the reputation gap (i.e., the reputation differences between the focal seller and its closest competitor standardized by the reputation stock of both sellers). We test our hypotheses on 72 matched pairs of online transactions screened from more than 2,000 auctions of new mobile phones on the Polish Internet auction site Allegro. We find that the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium (1) increases with the size of the reputation gap between the focal seller and its matched competitor, and (2) becomes increasingly smaller for each additional unit of the seller reputation gap. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector

The restructuring of the Chinese electricity sector in 2002 reshaped the market structure by vertically unbundling the dominant integrated firm and started the process of wholesale price liberalization. We estimate factor demands to study whether these reforms boosted productivity in the generation segment of the industry. Controlling explicitly for price‐heterogeneity across firms and unobservable productivity shocks, we find that the reforms are associated with reductions in labor and material use of 7 and 5 per cent, respectively. These effects only appear two years after the reforms and are robust to many specification checks. The absolute magnitudes of the estimated restructuring effects vary in intuitive ways by location, firm size or age, and for different definitions of restructured firms.