When Do Outsider CEOs Generate Strategic Change? The Enabling Role of Corporate Stability

When academic researchers, business commentators, and boards of directors have debated the merits of hiring new CEOs from outside the firm, the implicit or explicit assumption typically made is that outsider CEOs will provide an advantage in achieving strategic change. In this study, we challenge this assumption by employing a duality perspective on stability/change, and we provide an original conceptual framework to posit that it is the presence of corporate stability (ordinary succession, a long‐tenured predecessor CEO, and good firm performance) that allows outsider CEOs to generate a greater degree of post‐succession strategic change. We use extensive longitudinal data from US airline and chemical industries between 1972 and 2010 to test our hypotheses, and we discuss how our supportive findings challenge long‐standing assumptions regarding the outsider succession–strategic change relationship, and we advocate embracing the non‐intiutive notion that stable (unstable) conditions can be enablers (barriers) of strategic change for outsider CEOs.     

CEO Succession Mechanisms,Organizational Context,and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms

This article extends the literature on CEO succession and financial performance by addressing corporate owners' mixed motives and desires to protect their interest in being in business. We draw on a Socio‐Emotional Wealth (SEW) perspective to investigate how the choice of one of three succession mechanisms – relay succession, ‘horse races’ among internal CEO candidates, and hiring from outside – may effectively balance trade‐offs between corporate owners' non‐financial SEW motives and the firm's financial performance. We find that implementing one of these succession mechanisms reduces the negative impact that typically characterizes CEO transitions in family firms. We also show that family presence on the board of directors offsets the benefits of having selected these balancing succession mechanisms, in either placing too much emphasis on SEW, or creating negative dynamics that make the chosen succession mechanisms less effective.     

Experience Matters? The Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Firm Performance

We sample CEOs of the 2005 S&P 500 corporations to look at the relationship between experience in the CEO position of a different firm and the post‐succession financial performance of the firm that they currently lead. We find that experience in the CEO position is negatively related to firm performance. CEOs who directly move to their current CEO position from the previous one and those with job‐specific experience in the same or related industry or at the helm of a previous company similar in size to the current one are associated with significantly lower post‐succession performance than those without prior CEO experience. The results contribute to the literatures on CEO succession, the performance effect of job‐specific experience, and the transferability of human capital. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO compensation: does it pay to be green?

The relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various organizational variables (i.e., size, length of tenure of the CEO, board composition and firm performance) has been explored in academic research. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and the firm's reputation based on the firm's commitment to the community and the environment has been relatively unexamined in the academic research. This study's purpose is to empirically examine this relationship using the Fortune Reputation Index as revised by Brown and Perry (1995) . Using a sample of 186 firms in 1990 and 188 firms in 1991, the relationships between CEO compensation and organization size, financial performance and environmental reputation are examined. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm environmental reputation, firm size and firm financial performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Directors' Pay and Turnover: An Application to a Sample of Large UK Firms

This paper examines the operation of the UK managerial labour market. We test the twin agency predictions that directors' pay is positively related to corporate performance and CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm profitability. We find that (i) the panel data econometric evidence reveals a significant and positive correlation between directors' pay, company performance and size, (ii) the CEO turnover model predicts a negative, and significant, association with pre-dated shareholder returns: the data is consistent with the view that CEOs are disciplined by the threat of dismissal, (iii) boardroom governance factors (e.g. proportion of non-executives and board size) are only of some importance in the CEO succession process.     

The adoption of outside boards by small private US firms

The research issue motivating the present study is concerned with why some small private firms adopt an ‘outside board’ (i.e. larger boards in which the majority of directors are neither managers of the firm nor relatives of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)) and others do not. This issue is addressed by investigating whether differing contextual conditions distinguish adopters from non-adopters of outside boards. The authors consider the adoption of an outside board to be one part of a larger organizational life-cycle process in which organizations implement more ‘professional management’ structures and practices in response to their evolving internal and external contexts. The authors examine simultaneously three contextual pressures that commonly confront small private firms as they develop over time- firm growth and larger size, the succession of the CEO, and the diffusion of equity to individuals outside the firm- to determine which of these are salient in explaining the presence of an outside board. Logistic regression results (3070 respondents toa cross-industry mail survey) indicate that outside boards are more likely when more equity is held by individuals outside the firm, CEOs are older and CEOs do not intend to implement an intra-family transition of leadership. The results suggest that firms adopt outside boards primarily to satisfy the desires of external owners, and only secondarily for the service and resource benefits that outside directors provide.     

Contextual Influences on Executive Selection: Firm Characteristics and CEO Experience

This study examines the relationship between antecedent organizational characteristics and the pre-succession experience of individuals chosen as chief executive officer (CEO) – relationships that have received limited attention in past research. A sample of 214 CEO selection decisions was used to test hypothesized relationships between the firm characteristics of size, performance, growth, advertising intensity, risk and individual attributes pertaining to the experience of selected CEOs. Results indicate the following relationships: pre-succession profitability, size and advertising intensity are associated with the chosen executives' organizational tenure levels; pre-succession firm size and risk are associated with the age of selected CEOs; and, pre-succession profitability and advertising intensity are associated with type of functional background experience. Findings provide new insights into the relative importance of pre-succession experience associated with different organizational contexts in CEO selection decisions.     

TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER AND CEO SUCCESSION: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TURNOVER ON PERFORMANCE

One strategic action which is often taken by firms in need of a turnaround is to bring in a new chief executive officer (CEO). Many observers argue, however, that having done this the new CEO must replace large numbers of top managers in order to effect a change in the firm's interactions and subsequent performance. Critics of this perspective insist that just the opposite is true. Substantial levels of turnover may only serve to further disrupt the organization decreasing performance still more. This controversy is addressed in the following study using a sample of 84 firms all of which experienced CEO succession during the year 1980. Analyses rely on a three-year-period pre-succession and three-year period post-succession. Three hypotheses are proposed. First, poor performance prior to CEO succession leads to greater turnover afterward. Second, that turnover is curvilinearly related to performance after the succession. And, finally, that successor type (i.e. whether the CEO was an inside or outside candidate) is related to the level of turnover in upper level management positions in the post-succession period. the results from tests of these hypotheses are presented, and the implications of these findings are discussed.     

Not all Risk Taking is Born Equal: The Behavioral Agency Model and CEO's Perception of Firm Efficacy

We examine the relationship between agent (CEO) risk bearing and the quality of executive risk‐taking outcomes, by examining the contingency effect of CEO perceived firm efficacy. In doing so, we extend the behavioral agency model (BAM) beyond predictions of risk magnitude to examining how CEO risk‐taking outcomes differ qualitatively in response to risk bearing. We argue that CEO risk bearing (due to stock options or cash compensation) will positively influence performance outcomes in the presence of higher perceived firm efficacy. However, this positive influence reverses when efficacy is lower. We demonstrate the utility of firm efficacy in exploring the effect of agent risk bearing on performance outcomes and provide the insight that the CEO pay‐performance relationship is influenced by the CEO’s perception of firm efficacy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Do LGBT‐supportive corporate policies enhance firm performance?

Prior research provides evidence that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)‐supportive corporate policies are related to important human resource functions, such as enhanced recruitment and retention. In addition, prior research indicates that investors view the adoption of such policies positively. We examine the firm‐performance mechanisms underlying favorable stock‐market reactions based on an integration of perspectives from corporate social responsibility and the business case for diversity. Specifically, we estimate a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to account for the nested nature of our data (firms nested within states) and find that (1) the presence of LGBT‐supportive policies is associated with higher firm value, productivity, and profitability; (2) the firm‐value and profitability benefits associated with LGBT‐supportive policies are larger for companies engaged in research and development (R&D) activities; and (3) the firm‐value and profitability benefits of LGBT‐supportive policies persist in the presence of state antidiscrimination laws. In supplemental analyses, we find that firms implementing (discontinuing) LGBT‐supportive policies experience increases (decreases) in firm value, productivity, and profitability. We are among the first to link LGBT‐supportive policies specifically to financial performance outcomes as well as to develop and test a multilevel model of these relationships. Our results have important implications for theory and research on LGBT issues in organizations, human resource managers, and policymakers.     

High‐Performance Work Systems in Professional Service Firms: Examining the Practices‐Resources‐Uses‐Performance Linkage

Professional service firms (PSFs) play an important role in the knowledge‐based economy. Their success is highly dependent on their people, the knowledge resources they possess, and how they use these resources. However, how to systematically manage human resources to attain high performance is not fully understood. This study addresses this issue by investigating the linkage mechanisms through which high‐performance work systems (HPWS) influence the performance of PSFs. We integrate resource‐based and dynamic capability theories in order to identify and investigate two intervening mechanisms that link HR practices to firm performance. The first mechanism is the intellectual capital resources comprising the human, social, and organizational capital that HPWS create. The second mechanism is the uses to which both HPWS and resources can be applied, operationalized as organizational ambidexterity, the simultaneous exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of new knowledge. These mechanisms are hypothesized to link HPWS to firm performance in the form of a practices‐resources‐uses‐performance linkage model. Results from a longitudinal study of 93 accounting firms support this linkage model. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Does organization capital matter? An analysis of the performance implications of CEO power

Chief executive officer (CEO) power reflects the ability of the CEO to influence the firm's decision-making. Whether the CEO of the firm could manage the firm’s investment assets to support maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation is an important issue. As previous studies found, organization capital is a key intangible asset that improves the firm’s production efficiency and affects long-term performance. This study explores how CEO power affects organization capital investments and how it further affects the efficiency of firm resource allocation. We use the following three variables to measure CEO power: CEO founder, CEO-only insider and CEO duality. Our results indicate that the level of CEO power can influence a firm’s value by controlling the organization capital. When the firm’s CEO is also the founder, the CEO will attempt to increase investments in organization capital to create growth opportunities for the firm, which will therefore increase the firm's value. Specifically, when the company is in financial distress, the powerful CEO's increasing in organizational capital investment will expose the company to greater risk of loss of intangible assets. This result may further increase the company's price volatility.     

Ceo Locus of Control and Small Firm Performance: an Integrative Framework and Empirical Test*

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. to overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others.     

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

Riding off into the Sunset: Organizational Sensegiving,Shareholder Sensemaking,and Reactions to CEO Retirement

We test hypotheses derived from resource dependence and sensemaking/sensegiving theoretical lenses in the context of CEO succession, focusing on an under‐researched yet prevalent type of executive turnover – CEO retirement. Using event study methodology and a sample of CEO retirements from S&P 1500 firms during the 2003–12 period, we find that, all else equal, shareholders’ perceptions of organizations’ capacity to serve their interests are adversely affected when a retirement related change occurs in the leadership structure. Specifically, in line with resource dependence theory, we find that CEO retirement disclosures typically generate negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, in line with the sensemaking perspective, we find that the magnitude of shareholders’ reactions is contingent on the lexical sensegiving cues contained in the organizational narratives that are released to capital markets via executive retirement announcements. Overall, our theory and results point to CEO retirement events as consequential in the eyes of shareholders, challenging an important assumption of extant succession research. Moreover, they suggest that shareholders’ interpretation of these events is influenced by organizational sensegiving, highlighting the important role of organizational communication around succession events.     

Four ways to choose a CEO: Crown heir,horse race,coup d'Etat,and comprehensive search

Most attempts to understand CEO succession fail to adequately differentiate the various ways by which CEOs are chosen. This article presents a conceptual framework that identifies four kinds of CEO succession processes, distinguished according to two key factors: political dynamics (who rules?) and the candidate search (are preferences known in advance?). Our main point is that the response of organizational stakeholders to CEO successions—(a) whether the process is perceived as fair, (b) whether the chosen successor is seen as good for an organization's future, and (c) the extent of disruption attending the leadership change—reflects how the politics and the search are managed. How internal and external stakeholders respond to a CEO succession can affect a new CEO's capacity for exercising effective leadership. Examples of each type (Apple, General Motors, Kodak, and Procter & Gamble) are offered and implications are drawn for researchers and for human resource executives. © 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Executive Pay Matters: Looking Beyond the CEO to Explore Implications of Pay Disparity on Non‐CEO Executive Turnover and Firm Performance

Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Tournament Structure of Managerial Pay: Evidence from the Transition Period

This paper uses matched employer–employee data to study the structure of managerial compensation. The evidence supports key predictions from tournament theory. First, the managerial pay differential between organizational levels is non‐decreasing as one goes up the corporate ladder. This result is robust to controlling for human capital characteristics and firm fixed effects. I document a particularly large increment in the pay differential at the top of a firm's hierarchy. Second, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Last, high wage dispersion is associated with high firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO Stock‐Based Incentive Compensation and Firm Performance: A Quantile Regression Approach

This study employs the quantile regression model to examine the non‐monotonic impact of CEO stock‐based compensation on firm performance, using the data for U.S. non‐financial firms from 1993 to 2005. The results indicate that while the impact of CEO stock‐based pay on firm performance is positive for firms in the higher earnings quantile levels, the impact is negative for firms in the lower levels. In addition, the “V‐shaped” relationship between CEO stock‐based pay and firm performance satisfactorily explains the longstanding disagreement among earlier studies with regard to whether CEO stock‐based pay can enhance firm performance. Furthermore, the quantile‐varying pattern of the impact of stock‐based compensation on firm performance is robust after controlling for the industrial and yearly effects. It is also robust to the use of the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity as an alternative explanatory variable or the market‐based measure of performance as the dependent variable, or the consideration of the suspected endogenous problem between firm performance and stock‐based compensation.