Sunk Cost and Entry

The usual mechanisms by which sunk costs are said to affect entry arethrough raising the expected average cost of an entrant, relative to that ofincumbents. I show that in standard models and in the absence of riskpremia imposed by financial markets on an entrant's cost of capital, sunkcosts may make entry unprofitable because of their effect on the post-entryunit costs of incumbents.     

Does competition increase quality? Evidence from the US airline industry

This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.     

Product specification under a threat of entry: Evidence from Airlines’ departure times

I examine how incumbent airlines adjust their departure times in response to the threat of entry by Southwest Airlines. I find that incumbents space their flights more evenly throughout the day when faced with potential entry. This reaction depends strongly on the level of the incumbent’s market share and hub status at the endpoint airports of a market. The evidence suggests that incumbents’ actions are designed to deter, rather than accommodate, entry. I do not find effects on flight frequency, suggesting that incumbents may rely more on the strategic choice of product attributes than on product proliferation to deter entry.     

Did federal regulation discourage facilities-based entry into US local telecommunications markets?

In the United States from 2001 to 2006, federal regulations allowed entrants to lease from incumbents at relatively low cost all of the network infrastructure necessary to provide local phone service. These platform entrants could then provide phone service without installing any of their own equipment. Advocates of this policy claimed that it was needed to provide an economically feasible means by which entrants could serve residential customers. Critics contended that the policy substantially deterred loop entry whereby entrants installed their own switching equipment. An analysis of panel data for each state over this period indicates that the policy's critics may have been correct. The cross-price elasticity of loop entry with respect to platform price was roughly 1.0. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that loop entry may have decreased by roughly 20% due to platform entry price reductions.     

Three problems in applying contestability to regulated markets

The theory of contestable markets emphasizes that the ease of entry rather than the number of existing firms forces incumbents to set prices at optimal levels. The policy implications of this work contrast sharply with past U.S. regulatory and antitrust policies, legitimizing increased industry concentration and decreased regulation. This paper explores three factors that influence the desirability of regulation or antitrust policy despite the apparent existence of a contestable market time lags, technological change, and cyclical macroeconomic fluctuations. Time lags enable incumbents to earnsupra-normal profits and take last-minute action to forestall entry. New technologies can create sunk costs that reduce the contestability of a market. Recessions can depress capital markets, raising the cost of exit, while expansion creates opportunities for entry without threatening monopolistic prices. These shortcomings limi the ability of contestability theory to provide guidelines for the regulation of actual industries.     

Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection.Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs.The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.     

Does Big Drive Out Small?

This paper measures the impact of the entry of large supermarkets on incumbents of various sizes. Contrary to the conventional notion that big stores drive small rivals out of the market, data from Tokyo in the 1990s show that large supermarkets’ entry induces the exit of existing large and medium-size competitors, but improves the survival rate of small supermarkets. These findings highlight the role of store size as an important dimension of product differentiation. Size-based entry regulations would appear to protect big incumbents, at the expense of small incumbents and potential entrants.     

Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries

I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing potential entry, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and then competition in prices. The merger solves Cournot complementarity problems in investment and pricing, which is what makes it profitable but also potentially anti-competitive. When the demand is inelastic the merger harms consumers by reducing R&D of the entrants if the incumbents are efficient enough (always when bundling is adopted). Instead, with a demand elastic enough, the merger increases consumer surplus (even with bundling).     

Productivity Dynamics and the Role of ‘Big‐Box’ Entrants in Retailing

We use a dynamic model to measure the impact of the entry of large stores on incumbents’ productivity separate from demand while accounting for local markets and the endogeneity of entry. Using data on all retail food stores in Sweden, we find that incumbents’ productivity increases after the entry of large stores and that the magnitude of the increase declines toward the upper part of the productivity distribution. Our findings highlight that large entrants drive productivity.     

Deregulation and differentiation: Incumbent investment in green technologies

Integrating elements from industrial organization economics and the resource‐based view—coupled with path dependence as firm resources evolve over time, this paper suggests that deregulation may not always provide greater opportunities for incumbents, and the extent to which incumbents differentiate on the green dimension may be constrained by their prior resources, in particular, capabilities with respect to brown technologies and experiences with green technologies. Using data on U.S. investor‐owned electric utilities from 1992 to 2008, this paper finds that deregulation is associated with lower entry into the renewable generation market by incumbents compared to regulation. More capable firms using brown technologies, for example, coal‐based generation, are less likely to enter the renewable generation market. Also, incumbents are responsive to actual, not latent, demand for renewable energy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The determinants of entry and exit reconsidered

In this paper we empirically examine the hypothesis that there is a symmetrical relationship between entry and exit barriers. The analysis, using Canadian cross-section data, proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we estimate entry and exit equations which ignore the possibility that displacement occurs (that entry causes exit). These results indicate that there is symmetry in the determinants of entry and exit, but that the exit equation is misspecified. In the second stage, we estimate a model in which entrants are allowed to displace incumbents (cause exit). These results indicate much less symmetry primarily because in the absence of entry barriers, entry occurs and incumbents are displaced. We conclude that symmetry exists, but in the ex-ante sense that barriers to exit are barriers to entry.     

Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999–2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry.     

The learning curve,technology barriers to entry,and competitive survival in the chemical processing industries

This paper evaluates entry and survival rates in a sample of 39 chemical product industries. The analysis focuses on learning-based cost advantages potentially held by incumbent firms. A logit model of entry gives no evidence that entry decisions were sensitive to the cumulative production lead held by incumbents. Entry was facilitated by the fact that for most products, technology was available from a range of sources. A hazard function model reveals that entrant survival rates were unrelated to order of entry or source of process technology. However, survival was adversely affected when the leading incumbent held a large cumulative output advantage or when entrants built plants of sub-optimal scale. Thus, a large incumbent lead in production experience did not deter new entry but did reduce the entrant'S probability of survival.     

Preemptive rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power

Monopoly power evokes rent seeking aimed at supplanting an incumbent monopolist as well as preemptive rent seeking by incumbents concerned with deterring entry of potential competitors. Using an illustrative example where preemptive rent seeking takes the form of excess capacity, this note makes the point that the relation between the value of resources expended in the two types of rent-seeking activity determines whether exposure of an incumbent monopolist to the discipline of potential competition reduces the social cost of monopoly power.     

Entry in Local Telecommunication Markets

In this paper, we explore the determinants of recent entry into local exchange service, and the role that regulatory policies have had in aiding this policy objective. Our results suggest that the 1996 Telecommunications Act did lead to some entry, but that strategic non-price behavior by incumbents may have offset this impact to some extent. We also find that regulatory policies and market fundamentals play an important role in determining entry. Clearly, market size (measured in various ways) is an important determinant of entry, while there is empirical support for the role of more flexible regulatory mechanisms in promoting new entry.     

Asymmetry of information and contestability theory

In this paper, contestability theory is examined under conditions of asymmetric information. Signals of economic profitability to potential entrants are the incumbent's list price and accounting rate of return. A disequilibrium analysis indicates that, while potential entry imposes a price discipline, incumbents can earn profits, although not indefinitely under stable conditions. Also, there may be wasteful entry even into industries where prices approximate the optimum.     

Non-Discriminatory Pricing,Partial Backward Ownership,and Entry Deterrence

This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.     

CREDIBLE RETALIATORY ENTRY AND STRATEGIC TOE‐HOLDS*

The anticipated profits from entry by an established firm into a new market will depend on how incumbents in that market are expected to respond. One possibility, suggested by cases and the literature, is that an incumbent may respond with ‘retaliatory entry’ into the first entrant's ‘home’ market. The model presented here describes conditions under which this can be a credible threat that deters the first entry. When the conditions are such that it is not credible, the paper shows how firms can provide credibility through the establishment of toe‐hold investments in other markets.     

How does institutional change affect heterogeneity among firms?

This paper examines the variation in performance of incumbents and entrants following the deregulation of prices and entry in the airline industry. Our approach is similar to earlier studies of interfirm performance heterogeneity across industries. Drawing on theories of industry evolution, we hypothesize that the performance of entrants will have higher variance than incumbents. Further, given the opportunities offered by price deregulation, we propose that incumbents will have higher variance in performance under deregulation than in the earlier regime. The findings indicate that entrant performance heterogeneity is significantly greater than incumbent performance heterogeneity following deregulation, but that the variation in performance among incumbents does not significantly change when deregulation occurs. The second result is surprising given the range of service and process innovations that incumbents initiated. These results suggest that the distinction between entrants and incumbents is critical to future studies of performance variation within and across industries. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.