Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

The Effect of Mortgage Price and Default Risk on Mortgage Spreads

Variations over time in mortgage yield spreads should reflect changes in the underlying prepayment option value; moreover, the relationship between mortgage yield spreads and interest rate dynamics should weaken as the value of the borrowers prepayment option declines. We verify this hypothesis through an empirical analysis of residential mortgage yield spread behavior, and we also present evidence that the strength of the relationship between mortgage spreads and interest rate dynamics weakens (strengthens) as the level of default risk increases (decreases). This result is consistent with the competing risks effect between a borrowers option to prepay or default. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for mortgage price discount to par as well as default risk when developing time series of mortgage yields.     

个人住房抵押贷款违约风险影响因素:一个文献综述

文章对个人住房抵押贷款违约风险影响因素的文献进行了一个梳理和回顾,发现影响个人住房抵押贷款违约风险的因素总体上可以分为微观个体特征因素和外部宏观经济因素.个体特征可以区分出哪类借款人具有更高违约风险,外部宏观特征决定了借款人在哪些时间段和条件下具有更高违约风险.在个体特征方面,贷款价值比(LTV)、年龄、居住区域、还款方式、家庭收入、月还款额占家庭收入比例和住房面积等都是影响违约风险的重要因素;从外部宏观层面来看,房价变化、利率水平、季节等都是影响违约风险的重要因素.     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

Mortgage Default: Classification Trees Analysis

We apply the powerful, flexible, and computationally efficient nonparametric Classification and Regression Trees (CART) algorithm to analyze real estate mortgage data. CART is particularly appropriate for our data set because of its strengths in dealing with large data sets, high dimensionality, mixed data types, missing data, different relationships between variables in different parts of the measurement space, and outliers. Moreover, CART is intuitive and easy to interpret and implement. We discuss the pros and cons of CART in relation to traditional methods such as linear logistic regression, nonparametric additive logistic regression, discriminant analysis, partial least squares classification, and neural networks, with particular emphasis on real estate. We use CART to produce the first academic study of Israeli mortgage default data. We find that borrowers features, rather than mortgage contract features, are the strongest predictors of default if accepting icbadli borrowers is more costly than rejecting good ones. If the costs are equal, mortgage features are used as well. The higher (lower) the ratio of misclassification costs of bad risks versus good ones, the lower (higher) are the resulting misclassification rates of bad risks and the higher (lower) are the misclassification rates of good ones. This is consistent with real-world rejection of good risks in an attempt to avoid bad ones.     

Debt Overhang and Lack of Lender's Commitment

The debt overhang of sovereigns or firms is modeled in the recent literature as a constrained efficient outcome of dynamic debt contracts under the lack of the borrower's commitment, where debt relief is not Pareto-improving. The early literature observes another type of debt overhang where the borrower is discouraged from expending effort, anticipating the lender to take all output ex post. We show that this inefficiency is due to the lack of the lender's commitment and debt relief is Pareto-improving. Nevertheless, debt overhang may persist, as frictional bargaining over debt relief can take a long time.     

A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.     

Optimal Investment and Consumption with Default Risk: HARA Utility

In this paper, we consider a portfolio optimization problem in a defaultable market. The representative investor dynamically allocates his or her wealth among the following securities: a perpetual defaultable bond, a money market account and a default-free risky asset. The optimal investment and consumption policies that maximize the infinite horizon expected discounted HARA utility of the consumption are explicitly derived. Moreover, numerical illustrations are also presented.     

A Model of Mortgage Default

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero‐profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan‐to‐value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable‐rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.     

固定利率住房抵押贷款违约行为及其定价研究

固定利率住房抵押贷款的信用风险主要是违约风险,基于理性期权的定价模型往往会低估借款人的违约概率.通过分析违约成本及非理性违约因素,可以确定借款人违约时贷款机构收回的现金流,得到固定利率住房抵押贷款定价的期望值模型,并得出模型的求解方法.     

Household Debt Overhang and Transmission of Monetary Policy

We investigate how the level of household indebtedness affects the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy. Using state‐dependent local projection methods, we find that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful during periods of high household debt. In particular, the impact of monetary policy shocks is smaller on GDP, consumption, residential investment, house prices, and household debt during a high‐debt state. We then build a partial equilibrium model of borrower households with financial constraints to rationalize these facts. The model points to the weakening of the home equity loan channel as a possible reason for the decline in monetary policy effectiveness when initial debt levels are high.     

Benefits to Homeowners from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Mortgage investing is the domain of financial intermediaries, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who possess specialized knowledge and experienced analytic teams. Capital is channeled to homeowner/borrowers at lower cost through such entities. As the demand for mortgage borrowing outstrips aggregate domestic saving (which is currently negative) foreign sources of capital should become even more significant. Foreign capital can be channeled efficiently into the U.S. mortgage market by Fannie and Freddie. Their debt has the highest credit standing and their risk management ability has been demonstrated by their enormous retained portfolios of mortgages.     

公司信用债违约风险预警与防范研究

我国债券规模位居世界第二,债券市场已成为企业直接融资的主要渠道;同时我国公司信用债违约频发,违约主体几乎涵盖了全部行业,永煤AAA债券违约事件引发各方关注。在此背景下,本文研究了信用债违约风险预警与防范,搭建了债券违约预警模型:一是深入分析了违约原因,提出了经济下行加剧‘债务-通缩’流动性分层导致再融资困难民企互保引发违约风险串联的观点;二是基于KLR信号分析法,以历史违约主体财报数据为基础构建了上市公司债违约预警模型,抽离出相关指标权重构成预警指标体系,并进行了实证检验;三是基于预警模型,提出加强动态监测、构建债券风险分类管理办法等政策建议。     

The Role of Default Risk in Determining the Market Reaction to Debt Announcements

The stock price reaction to straight debt announcements is examined by differentiating firms on the basis of any subsequent change in their overall default risk. Results indicate that firms that will within six months of straight debt announcements undergo debt rating downgrades experience significant negative abnormal stock returns at the time of the new debt announcements, while firms with bond ratings that are later upgraded exhibit significant positive abnormal returns. Multiple regression analysis shows these results to be robust to the influence of filing size, tax shield effects, relative pre-announcement long-term debt levels, and subordination effects.     

Pricing Mortgage Insurance with Asymmetric Jump Risk and Default Risk: Evidence in the U.S. Housing Market

This study provides the valuation of mortgage insurance (MI) considering upward and downward jumps in housing prices, which display separate distributions and probabilities of occurrence, and the mortgage insurer??s default risk. The empirical results indicate that the asymmetric double exponential jump diffusion performs better than the log-normally distributed jump diffusion and the Black-Scholes model, generally used in previous literature, to fit the single-family mortgage national average of all home prices in the US. Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that the MI premium is an increasing function of the normal volatility, the mean down-jump magnitudes, the shock frequency of the abnormal bad events, and the asset-liability structure of the mortgage insurer. In particular, the shock frequency of the abnormal bad events has the largest effect of all parameters on the MI premium. The asset-liability structure of the mortgage insurer and shock frequency of the abnormal bad events have a larger effect of all parameters on the default risk premium.     

企业社会责任与债务违约风险——基于ISO26000社会责任指南的原则和实践的分析

基于 ISO26000社会责任指南的原则和实践经验,分析企业社会责任降低债务违约风险的内在机制及我国企业社会责任表现与其债务违约风险的关系。研究发现：社会责任表现较好的企业债务违约风险较低,因债务事项被提起仲裁和诉讼的可能性较小,企业积极承担社会责任可以促进债务契约的履行,降低债务违约风险。进一步分析发现,经营能力和信息质量在企业社会责任与债务违约风险的关系中发挥部分中介传导作用,而经营风险的中介效应不明显。     

Appraisal Quality and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from Alaska

We empirically examine the effect of appraisal quality on subsequent mortgage loan performance using data from the high volatility housing market of Alaska in the 1980s. We develop measures of appraisal quality by computing the residual between a hedonic estimate of house value using available information from other appraisals compared to actual ex ante appraised value. We then estimate proportional hazard models of mortgage default and find that several measures of appraisal quality, particularly appraised value in excess of hedonic estimates, are significantly related to default risk. Using valuations subsequent to loan default, we are also able to evaluate how well house price indices perform in terms of estimating current loan-to-value and offer some additional evidence on the controversy over the role of net equity versus trigger events as determinants of mortgage default. We also show that defaults are related to ex ante measures of housing market conditions, with additional implications for underwriting policies and the current industry trend away from traditional appraisal and toward automated valuation.     

信用债违约特征与市场展望

从总量的角度来看,信用债违约主体数量呈现上升的趋势,违约主体的行业、地区分布相对较为分散,各主体的违约特征呈现多元化的趋势,受经济增速下行压力加大、民企再融资收紧、股票质押爆仓等因素的影响较为明显。结合微观企业违约的最新特点,在信用风险分析的过程中需要重点关注企业是否发生了投资激进、短债长投、公司治理风险、财务舞弊等问题。建议正本清源,加强对财务造假的惩治力度,强化企业信息披露,推进社会信用体系建设,发挥民营企业信用缓释工具作用。     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.