Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Mortgage Prepayment and Default Behavior with Embedded Forward Contract Risks in China’s Housing Market

Most condominiums in China are sold forward on a pre-sale market, where purchasers and developers transact on an underlying property that is not yet completed. During the pre-sale period home buyers face a significant forward contract risk. However, home buyers can borrow mortgages from banks so that they can effectively share the forward contract risk with banks. This explains the phenomenon of irregularly high early-stage default and prepayment rates observed in residential mortgage lending in China, where there are few, if any, financial incentives for mortgage borrowers to exercise either put or call options. Mortgages collateralized by forward housing assets are riskier than are those with underlying assets traded on the spot market. However, currently Chinese mortgage banks charge the same rate to all mortgage borrowers. This inefficiency in risk sharing between mortgage borrowers’ groups in the forward and spot housing markets leads to mispricing in secondary mortgage sales and mortgage-backed security trading.     

Mortgage defaults

A life-cycle model is developed in which households face income and house-price risk and buy houses with mortgages. This model, which accounts for key features in U.S. data, is used as a laboratory for prudential policy. Recourse mortgages increase the cost of default but also lower equity and increase payments. The effect on default is nonmonotonic. Loan-to-value (LTV) limits increase equity and lower the default rate, with negligible effects on housing demand. Combining recourse mortgages and LTV limits reduces the default rate while boosting housing demand. Together, they also prevent spikes in default after large declines in aggregate house prices.     

The effect of sovereign wealth funds on the credit risk of their portfolio companies

We study how sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments affect the credit risk of target companies as measured by the change in their credit default swap (CDS) spreads around the investment announcement. We find that the CDS spread of target companies decreases, on average, following an SWF investment. The reduction in the CDS spread is higher when the SWF is established by a politically stable non-democratic country that has a neutral political relationship with the host country of the target company. Our results suggest that creditors expect SWFs to protect target companies from bankruptcy when it is in the interest of their home country to build political goodwill in the host country of the company.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Mortgage risks,debt literacy and financial advice

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.     

Residential Mortgage Default: The Roles of House Price Volatility, Euphoria and the Borrower’s Put Option

House price volatility; lender and borrower perception of price trends, loan and property features; and the borrower’s put option are integrated in a model of residential mortgage default. These dimensions of the default problem have, to our knowledge, not previously been considered altogether within the same investigation framework. We rely on a sample of individual mortgage loans for 20 counties in Florida, over the period 2001 through 2008, third quarter, with housing price performance obtained from repeat sales analysis of individual transactions. The results from the analysis strongly confirm the significance of the borrower’s put as an operative factor in default. At the same time, the results provide convincing evidence that the experience in Florida is in part driven by lenders and purchasers exhibiting euphoric behavior such that in markets with higher price appreciation there is a willingness to accept recent prior performance as an indicator of future risk. This connection illustrates a familiar moral hazard in the housing market due to the limited information about future prices.     

Loss given default of high loan-to-value residential mortgages

This paper studies loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high loan-to-value residential mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that loss given default can largely be explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, and the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. We find that the current loan-to-value ratio is the single most important determinant. More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions. These findings have important policy implications for several key issues in Basel II implementation.     

The unsung impact of currency risk on the performance of international real property investment

The paper revisits the currency risk debate to ascertain the statistical significance of currency risk on the return of international real property investment, especially in a period of increased exchange rate volatility. After statistical analyses of the returns of a portfolio of office investments in seven Asia Pacific cities over the 1986 to 2007 period, it was found that currency risk had a statistically significant positive impact on the performance of the portfolio of office investments. This is confirmed by the results of stochastic dominance test. If the results of this study are verified by subsequent studies, and the past reliably presages the future, they would imply that investors holding portfolios of real property investments in the sample markets might not need to be unduly concerned with currency risk.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

The sensitivity of bank stock returns to real estate

According to the Federal Reserve Board, banking firms have recently been shifting significantly larger portions of their loan portfolios into real estate. This increase in real estate lending has caused concern about the continuing economic health of banks on the part of state and federal regulators, since changes in real estate returns, evidenced by changes in property value, can potentially have a significant impact on bank default risk and profit-ability. However, concerned parties do not seem to have explicitly considered the relationship between mortgage default risk and the specific characteristics of real estate investments.This study examines the sensitivities of stock returns for different bank groups, based on the percentage of total loans in real estate and the percentage of loans in five different mortgage categories (construction and development loans, farmland loans, one- to four-family residential loans, multifamily residential loans, and nonresidential and nonfarm loans), to changes in real estate market returns. This is done by developing and using a three-index model.The results of this study indicate that bank stocks, overall, are very sensitive to changes in real estae returns. Banks, with a larger portion of their total loans invested in all types of real estate loans, except farmland loans, are most sensitive to changes in real estate returns.     

Pricing Mortgage Insurance with Asymmetric Jump Risk and Default Risk: Evidence in the U.S. Housing Market

This study provides the valuation of mortgage insurance (MI) considering upward and downward jumps in housing prices, which display separate distributions and probabilities of occurrence, and the mortgage insurer??s default risk. The empirical results indicate that the asymmetric double exponential jump diffusion performs better than the log-normally distributed jump diffusion and the Black-Scholes model, generally used in previous literature, to fit the single-family mortgage national average of all home prices in the US. Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that the MI premium is an increasing function of the normal volatility, the mean down-jump magnitudes, the shock frequency of the abnormal bad events, and the asset-liability structure of the mortgage insurer. In particular, the shock frequency of the abnormal bad events has the largest effect of all parameters on the MI premium. The asset-liability structure of the mortgage insurer and shock frequency of the abnormal bad events have a larger effect of all parameters on the default risk premium.     

The Effect of Housing on Portfolio Choice

We show that characterizing the effects of housing on portfolios requires distinguishing between the effects of home equity and mortgage debt. We isolate exogenous variation in home equity and mortgages by using differences across housing markets in house prices and housing supply elasticities as instruments. Increases in property value (holding home equity constant) reduce stockholdings, while increases in home equity wealth (holding property value constant) raise stockholdings. The stock share of liquid wealth would rise by 1 percentage point—6% of the mean stock share—if a household were to spend 10% less on its house, holding fixed wealth.     

Local Traits and Securitized Commercial Mortgage Default

We expand on the standard commercial mortgage default model and create a new model by looking beyond the usual factors of option value, insolvency, property type, region, originator type, state foreclosure laws and macroeconomic measures. The new model incorporates measures of local economic conditions, specifically MSA-level commercial property market conditions, county level unemployment, and local home price appreciation. We estimate our new model using a dataset containing the performance histories of over 30,000 CMBS loans that were originated between 1998 and 2012. We find that those local trait variables affect the default rate of CMBS loans significantly and provide improved explanatory power over the standard model. We further explore the impact of local home price measures by comparing the explanatory power of lagged and contemporaneous home price indexes, comparing the power of home price indexes at the state, county, and zip-code level, examining the interaction of home price indexes with commercial property type, looking at the impact of home price indexes over time, and at the impact of introducing local commercial land price indexes. We find that local residential house price-related measures provide a high quality and high frequency signal of local market conditions.     

The Anticipated Capitalisation Effect of a New Metro Line on Housing Prices*

Housing units with closer access to public transportation enjoy a higher market value than those with similar characteristics but poorer access. This difference can be explained by the lower cost of transport to the main workplaces and shopping areas in town. For this reason, investments in public transport infrastructure, such as building a new metro line, are capitalised totally or partially into land and housing prices. This work empirically analyses the degree of capitalisation into housing prices of the benefits of the new Line 4 of the Santiago metro system, which began operating in December 2005. We focus on anticipated capitalisation into housing prices at the moment construction of Line 4 was announced and at the moment information on the basic engineering project was unveiled, identifying the location of the future stations. We use a unique database containing all home buying and selling transactions in the Greater Santiago area between December 2000 and March 2004. The results show that the average apartment price rose by between 4.2 per cent and 7.9 per cent after construction was announced and by between 3.1 per cent and 5.5 per cent after the location of the stations was identified. These increases were not distributed evenly, but depended on the distance from the apartment to the nearest station. An indirect effect of this kind of capitalization is that property tax collections will increase if property is reappraised following the price rise. This effect is not negligible in magnitude and could represent 11 to 17 per cent of investment in the new metro line. This raises and interesting discussion on how the metro network extension is financed.     

Hedge funds,CDOs and the financial crisis: An empirical investigation of the “Magnetar trade”

The so called Magnetar trade (a kind of capital structure arbitrage on the US housing market, using CDS and synthetic CDOs, and exploiting rating-dependent mispricing of risk) has gained a high publicity due to a Pulitzer Prize awarded media story from two journalists of ProPublica (an online news outlet). The story essentially claimed that the mortgage investment strategy of the hedge fund Magnetar during the period between 2006 and mid 2007 was based on a desire to construct CDO deals with riskier assets so that they could place bets that portions of their own deals would fail. This paper provides several pieces of evidence in line with the argument that tranches from Magnetar-sponsored CDOs present overly risky investments. However, investors and rating agencies appear to have adjusted their required spread levels and ratings to reflect this higher riskiness, at least to some extent.     

自由现金流量创造力与违约风险——来自A股公司的经验证据

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据,研究了企业自由现金流量创造力与违约风险之间的关系。研究发现：(1)企业自由现金流量创造力越强,其违约风险越低。经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依旧成立。(2)自由现金流量创造力越强的企业往往有更低的债务规模、更高的资产收益率和更低的股票波动,因而其违约风险更低。(3)自由现金流量创造力与违约风险的负相关关系,主要存在于货币政策紧缩时期以及外部信息环境较差的企业。本文发现意味着,监管部门和投资者应重视上市公司自由现金流量创造力不足所带来的潜在债务违约风险,通过不断提高公司自由现金流量创造力,助力我国宏观经济与微观企业高质量发展。     

Deriving Optimal Portfolios for Hedging Housing Risk

Households that contemplate moving to different cities or trading up/down in the future are exposed to substantial housing risk. In order to mitigate this risk, we derive optimal portfolios using CME housing futures. Housing investment risk is hedged by selling housing futures amounting to the full value of the home. Housing consumption risk is hedged by buying housing futures in each city where the household might move. The size of the hedges depends on the probability of moving, on home values, and on labor income in each region. The hedging demands offset each other when the household intends to live in the same home indefinitely.     

Borrowing in foreign currency: Austrian households as carry traders

Household borrowing in a foreign currency is a widespread phenomenon in Austria. Thirteen percent of Austrian households report their housing loan to be denominated in foreign currency, mostly Swiss franc. Yet, despite its importance, peculiar character, and acute policy concerns, we know little about the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved in this type of carry trade. We analyze a uniquely detailed financial wealth survey of 2556 Austrian households to sketch a comprehensive profile of the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved. We employ both univariate tests and multivariate multinomial logit models. The survey data suggest that risk seeking, affluent, and married households are more likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency. Financially literate or high-income households are more likely to take a housing loan in general. These findings partially assuage policy concerns about household default risk on foreign-currency housing loans or household retirement security.