Does product market competition foster corporate social responsibility? Evidence from trade liberalization

This study examines whether product market competition affects corporate social responsibility (CSR). To obtain exogenous variation in product market competition, I exploit a quasi‐natural experiment provided by large import tariff reductions that occurred between 1992 and 2005 in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Using a difference‐in‐differences methodology, I find that domestic companies respond to tariff reductions by increasing their engagement in CSR. This finding supports the view of “CSR as a competitive strategy” that allows companies to differentiate themselves from their foreign rivals. Overall, my results highlight that trade liberalization is an important factor that shapes CSR practices. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Code and conduct in French cuisine: Impact of code changes on external evaluations

We study the effects of organizational code‐preserving and code‐violating changes on external evaluations by third parties—an essential but under‐studied strategic outcome. We define code‐preserving changes as a variation in the firm's product range that preserves the social code within which the firm positions its offering. By contrast, a code‐violating change corresponds to a variation in the product range that breaks with past codes and embraces another social code. Our analyses of French haute cuisine restaurants show that code‐preserving changes and code‐violating changes have positive effects on external evaluations. Both effects decline with prior evaluations received by the organization, but only the effect of code‐violating changes is reduced with age. Moreover, external evaluations improve when restaurants undertake more code‐preserving changes than their direct competitors but decline when they make more code‐violating changes than competitors. These results enable us to derive implications for research on strategic change, strategic groups, and strategic social positioning. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Information Salience on Product Quality: Louisville Restaurant Hygiene and Yelp.com*

In June, 2013, Louisville, Kentucky, announced plans to provide restaurant health inspection scores—already available on the city’s website—for publication on Yelp.com. I find that this increased salience caused substantial hygiene improvements among independent Louisville restaurants across three different counterfactual models. Among independent Louisville restaurants, estimates suggest the partnership caused anywhere from a 9-14% relative decrease in inspection score point deductions, with the effect being entirely evident in restaurants’ first inspections following the partnership’s announcement. Relative to the rest of Kentucky, I find that the partnership significantly reduced rates of severe food poisoning in Louisville.     

Digging Deep to Compete: Vertical Integration,Product Market Competition and Prices

This article establishes a causal effect of product market competition on vertical integration. I exploit a hitherto unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. coal mining industry and a unique mine‐level organizational data set. Following an exogenous increase in product market competition, the incidence of vertical integration fell by 33% within the treatment group relative to the counterfactual. I find novel evidence that transition to the lower degree of vertical integration is driven by competition's reducing market prices by 32% which decreased the incentive to conduct vertical mergers. I discuss several possible interpretations of these changes.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

Getting rid of trans fats in the US diet: Policies, incentives and progress

Artificial trans fats in foods increase chronic disease risk in the US population. Federal nutrition label regulation enacted in 2003 requires mandatory disclosure of trans fat content on packaged foods. This action created incentives for the food industry to reduce trans fats both in response to consumer demand and through competition to maintain product reputation. Subsequent public actions include a ban on trans fat use in New York city restaurants and lawsuits against food companies, which created further incentives to remove trans fats, especially in the food service industry. Industry has reformulated packaged foods and found substitutes for restaurant fry oils and trans fats are disappearing from the US food supply. Market response extends throughout the supply chain, and has spurred research to alter oilseed crop characteristics. The widespread and relatively rapid industry response likely has improved the quality of US diets, and demonstrates the potential for policy actions to spur such improvements.     

Real Estate Investments,Product Market Competition and Stock Returns

By limiting operating flexibility, real estate investments are found to increase firm risk, thus expected returns. This study introduces product market competition as a critical determinant of the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. As part of capacity strategies, these investments are generally associated with increased market power and lower cash flow volatility in oligopolistic industries. I present a simple model of oligopolistic competition showing a negative relation between real estate holdings and firm beta, and empirically confirm this prediction. Controlling for product market competition enhances identification of the endogenous relation between real estate investments and stock returns.     

Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents’ Profits and Consumer Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case

I estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. I find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The price increase was most pronounced among the introducers existing brands. I also find that the data used in the paper identify a significant enhancement of consumer welfare as a result of the change in product characteristics provided by new brands even if a large portion of welfare gain is explained by the assumption on the error term in the utility function.JEL classification: D40, D60, L13, L66, H20     

PRODUCT VARIETY AND COMPETITION IN THE RETAIL MARKET FOR EYEGLASSES*

I use original data on eyewear retailers in a cross‐section of U.S. markets to study how firms' product range choices vary with the degree of local competition. Market level regressions show average per firm variety declining in the number of rivals. In regressions at the firm level, taking account of spatial differentiation within each market, a non‐monotonic relationship between product ranges and competition is apparent. As the number of nearby rivals increases, per firm variety may first rise before eventually declining. Explanations for this pattern are offered, in terms of a tradeoff between business stealing and clustering effects.     

THE EFFECT OF GROUP SIZE AND ASYMMETRIES ON THE INCENTIVE TO REVEAL GROUP‐SPECIFIC INFORMATION*

In this paper, I examine how firms' incentives to differentiate their products through the revelation of truthful information about product attributes varies with the distribution of consumer preferences for those attributes. I show that information will tend to be provided for large groups, even absent scale economies in producing that information. In addition, the relative sizes of the groups whose estimates of product quality change positively vs. negatively (i.e., the degree of asymmetry) by the information is likewise an important determinant of its profitability.     

Impact of mandated exclusive territories in the US brewing industry: Evidence from scanner level data

I examine the competitive effects of mandated exclusive territories in the US beer industry. Theory is ambiguous as to the competitive impacts of this vertical practice. Using scanner data from a large number of grocery stores, I empirically examine the impact on beer prices, quantities, and number of brands sold after Wisconsin mandated that brewers must assign exclusive wholesale territories in 2006. Reduced form results from a differences-in-differences model using several control groups and a synthetic control show that the mandates increased prices and reduced quantity of craft beer. Overall number of brands sold decreased as well and craft brewers were the most negatively impacted. Findings suggest that the mandate gave protection to wholesalers and caused an increase in the costs of distribution and reduced competition in the brewing industry.     

The effect of air traffic delays on airline prices

A legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions at LaGuardia Airport provides an opportunity to study the effect of an exogenous shock to product quality on prices in the airline industry. I test how the price response varies with the degree of competition in the market. I find that prices fall by $1.42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay, and that the price response is substantially larger in more competitive markets.     

Collusion Along the Learning Curve: Theory and Evidence From the Semiconductor Industry*

I study the effectiveness of collusion during an international cartel in DRAM, a type of semiconductor characterized by learning-by-doing and multiproduct competition. First, by exploiting time and firm-level variation in cartel activity, I estimate that cartel participants cut output more on the oldest product generation than on newer generations. This is consistent with a hypothesis that higher learning rates in newer generations make defection from collusive equilibria more attractive. Second, I formulate a test for defection from collusive equilibria in learning-by-doing industries. Third, I formalize these results in a theoretical framework and discuss implications for antitrust policy in high technology markets.     

Competition and Strategic Budget Choices in the Motion Picture Industry*

In this article, we study the effect of differentiation on firms' optimal investments in advertising and product quality in the specific context of the motion picture industry. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized model uncovering that competition in advertising is the highest for intermediate levels of horizontal differentiation, while product quality increases monotonically in differentiation. We corroborate our theoretical predictions with a large dataset on the movie industry confirming both the inverted U-shaped relationship between advertising and differentiation, and the monotonically increasing relationship between product quality and differentiation.     

转轨经济下管理层权力影响高管-员工薪酬差距的研究

企业高管薪酬一直是学术界热议的话题之一,近几年学者把目光更多地放在了研究高管薪酬与普通员工薪酬差距的方面。产品市场竞争作为一种非标准的外部治理机制,正日益受到越来越多学者的关注。本文以2006-2010年我国上市公司为研究样本,对企业内高管与普通员工薪酬差距越来越大的现象进行实证研究。结果表明,在国有企业中,管理层权力对薪酬差距的影响大于非国有企业,而产品市场竞争程度在非国有企业中对薪酬差距扩大有较好的缓解作用。在产品市场竞争越激烈、管理层权力越高的国有企业,高管与普通员工薪酬的差距依然很大。     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Work with and implementation of new concepts for management of product development—experiences for the Swedish Manufacturing Industry

Extensive organizational changes in the management of product development work of industrial companies are currently taking place. Speediness (time-based competition) and/or 'high' quality (total quality) are emphasized and for this purpose concepts such as simultaneous, concurrent or integrated product development have been introduced. This paper describes a study of the importance of these concepts in 29 large Swedish manufacturing companies and how these companies deal with the implementation of the new product development concepts. In addition, three in-depth studies have been carried out to enable a more detailed study to be made of the effects of the product development work on time and quality variables.     

市场结构与横向产品差别化的相互关系分析

产品差别化对市场结构的形成有很大的作用,经典的豪特林模型只得出了产品差别最小化和最大化原则,由此模型得到的市场结构为完全竞争市场和寡头垄断市场,但垄断竞争市场却无法得到。文章在豪特林模型的基础上构造出统一框架,不但分析产品最大和最小差别情况,而且提出中间程度差别化的分析模型。得出所时应的三种市场结构。尤其是中间程度的差别化对应的垄断竞争市场。对这三种市场结构进行社会福利分析,得出在消费者不同质时,相对于完全竞争市场,垄断竞争市场是相对较好的选择。     

Market size and competition: A “hump-shaped” result

An active empirical literature estimates entry threshold ratios (ETRs), introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), to learn about the impact of firm entry on competition. We show that in the standard homogeneous goods oligopoly model, there is no monotonic relationship with the price-cost margin, one measure for the strength of competition. Regardless of the shape of demand, the ETR is hump-shaped in the number of active firms. It can also increase with entry in the Salop model of product differentiation or in a game of repeated interactions where collusion is possible. Empirical applications should use caution and only interpret changes in the ratio as indicative of a change in competition when the number of firms is sufficiently large.