The Risk‐Return Relation in International Stock Markets

We investigate the risk‐return relation in international stock markets using realized variance constructed from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) daily stock price indices. In contrast with the capital asset pricing model, realized variance by itself provides negligible information about future excess stock market returns; however, we uncover a positive and significant risk‐return tradeoff in many countries after controlling for the (U.S.) consumption‐wealth ratio. U.S. realized variance is also significantly related to future international stock market returns; more importantly, it always subsumes the information content of its local counterparts. Our results indicate that stock market variance is an important determinant of the equity premium.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Risk‐Adjusted Measures of Value Creation in Financial Institutions

Abstract Many financial institutions assess portfolio decisions using RAROC, the ratio of expected return to risk (or ‘economic’) capital. We use asset pricing theory to determine the appropriate hurdle rate, finding that this varies with the skewness of asset returns. We quantify this discrepancy under a range of assumptions showing that the RAROC hurdle rate differs substantially, being higher by a factor of five or more for equity which has a right skew compared to debt which has a pronounced left skew, and also between different qualities of debt exposure. We discuss implications for both financial institution risk management and supervision.     

Cream‐Skimming in Financial Markets

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital

In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices (deltas) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility (vegas) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation.     

Twin Picks: Disentangling the Determinants of Risk‐Taking in Household Portfolios

This paper investigates risk‐taking in the liquid portfolios held by a large panel of Swedish twins. We document that the portfolio share invested in risky assets is an increasing and concave function of financial wealth, leading to different risk sensitivities across investors. Human capital, which we estimate directly from individual labor income, also affects risk‐taking positively, while internal habit and expenditure commitments tend to reduce it. Our microfindings lend strong support to decreasing relative risk aversion and habit formation preferences. Furthermore, heterogeneous risk sensitivities across investors help reconcile individual preferences with representative‐agent models.     

Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: Exploring All Avenues

The literature on the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk‐taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk‐shifting.     

Separation of Ownership and Management: Implications for Risk‐Taking Behavior

Issues associated with the relation between the separation of ownership and management and risk‐taking behavior have been considered in an array of studies, with varying results. Due to the wide variety of ownership structures present, the property–casualty insurance industry provides an excellent setting to test the conflicting hypotheses related to separation of ownership from management and risk taking behavior. Employing a large sample of property–liability insurance companies over the period of 1996–2004, we empirically test the alternative hypotheses regarding the implications of separation of ownership from management for firms’ risk taking behavior. The empirical tests include the ownership structures specified in prior research as well as a more detailed classification scheme. We find that each ownership structure is significantly different from every other ownership structure in terms of risk.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

Trade Credit Risk Management: The Role of Executive Risk‐Taking Incentives

In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit.     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

Risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market effect

This paper proposes a risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market (B/M) effect. I decompose B/M into net operating asset‐to‐market (NOA/M) and net financing asset‐to‐market (NFA/M) components. Portfolio analysis shows that (i) positive B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M are positively related to future returns and (ii) negative B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M are negatively related to future returns. To the extent that positive B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M act as measures of asset risk and negative B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M act as inverse measures of borrowing risk, the nonlinear relations between B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M and future returns provide some evidence to support the risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market effect in stock returns.     

Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.     

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance,Risk‐Taking,and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.     

Financial Markets,the Real Economy,and Self‐Fulfilling Uncertainties

We develop a model of informational interdependence between financial markets and the real economy, linking economic uncertainty to information production and aggregate economic activities in general equilibrium. The mutual learning between financial markets and the real economy creates a strategic complementarity in their information production, leading to self‐fulfilling surges in economic uncertainties. In a dynamic setting, our model characterizes self‐fulfilling uncertainty traps with two steady‐state equilibria and a two‐stage economic crisis in transitional dynamics.