Think tanks—Who needs them?: Advising a government in a democratic society

In democratic societies the government may be advised on policy problems by bodies of individuals not part of the government. These bodies are called external advisory bodies and are composed of either individuals representing a group in society or individuals representing themselves. For example, the Netherlands Social Economic Council (SER) is composed of representatives from the labour unions and the employer organizations and of crown appointees. This article looks at the contribution these bodies can make to the functioning of a democratic society. It focuses on the role of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy.     

Foreign versus local investors: Who knows more? Who makes more?

This paper examines the nature of information asymmetry between foreign and local investors on the Helsinki stock exchange (HEX) for the period 1999–2004. We take into account the differences in informational characteristics by partitioning stocks into single-listed, cross-listed and internationally well-known stock categories, after which we compare foreign and local investors’ performance and trading advantages. Local investors have trading advantages in the short term in all stock categories. However, such local advantages diminish for Nokia, the only internationally well-known stock on HEX.     

Who uses robo-advising and how?

Using propriety data from a large Indian robo-advisory firm, we show that users of robo-advisory services are relatively young, predominantly male, married, small investors, and professionals. We show that the majority of small retail investors utilize a systematic investment plan (SIP). Additionally, we document that there are differences in demographic characteristics, occupation, and geographic location of investors in utilizing SIP versus one-time lump sum investments. Furthermore, we find that daily user account creation increases during periods of high market volatility.     

Who goes, who stays?

The merger announcement between DeWaal Pharmaceuticals and BioHealth Labs was front-page news. Pictures of CEO Steve Lindell and chairman Kaspar van de Velde had appeared in newspapers around the world. Two months later, the press had moved on to a new story, and the hard labor of integration loomed. Steve had worked tirelessly to clear regulatory hurdles, and all signs pointed toward approval in the near future. Now Steve was feeling pressure to attack the real challenge of the merger: bringing together two very different cultures as quickly and efficiently as possible. DeWaal was an established drug-maker based in the Netherlands, and BioHealth, headquartered just north of New York City, had in recent years become competitive at the highest tier of the market. The first step in integrating the two companies was to select the top layers of management for the new company. At the moment, there were some 120 people on two continents for about 65 senior-level jobs. Steve's urgency was not without cause: talented people from both sides were jumping ship, and BioHealth's stock price had dipped 20% after the initial euphoria over the deal had worn off. Complicating matters was confusion over who was really in charge: Steve wanted to take leadership and move ahead rapidly, but he was often disarmed by Kaspar's charming persuasiveness. As the two men attempt to work through the important personnel issues during a lunch meeting, they quickly hit a roadblock. How can they come to agreement about who goes and who stays? Four commentators offer advice in response to this fictional case.     

Who makes on-the-run Treasuries special?

The most recently issued, on-the-run, Treasuries are extremely liquid and frequently trade at a premium in both the cash and repo, or financing, markets. Previous research suggests that both the cash and repo premiums reflect demand from buy-and-hold investors who value the superior liquidity of these securities and are reluctant to lend them in the repo market. We find evidence that premiums in the repo market are also closely related to market participants’ demand to hedge interest rate risk associated with their holdings of fixed income securities.     

Who Gambles in the Stock Market?

This study shows that the propensity to gamble and investment decisions are correlated. At the aggregate level, individual investors prefer stocks with lottery features, and like lottery demand, the demand for lottery-type stocks increases during economic downturns. In the cross-section, socioeconomic factors that induce greater expenditure in lotteries are associated with greater investment in lottery-type stocks. Further, lottery investment levels are higher in regions with favorable lottery environments. Because lottery-type stocks underperform, gambling-related underperformance is greater among low-income investors who excessively overweight lottery-type stocks. These results indicate that state lotteries and lottery-type stocks attract very similar socioeconomic clienteles.     

Who trades bitcoin futures and why?

Using regulatory data with identifiers, we analyze the traders active in the Bit- coin futures (BTC) contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). We find two primary trader types, those who hold almost exclusively BTC (con- centrated traders) and those who hold BTC to diversify a broader futures portfolio (diversified traders). The prevalence of these two types changes over time. We also study how BTC markets are connected to other futures markets through common holdings of BTC traders. Finally, we analyze the micro BTC contract and find that the trader composition is different than that of the full-size contract.     

Who＇s Who

《会计学报》是1920年国立暨南大学（上海真如）的“商学院会计学会”所编，当时．未见有“会计系”编制．商学院学生依研究兴趣结社．如银行学会、会计学会等。     

Who should set CEO pay? The press? Congress? Shareholders?

Populist fervor in an election year has transformed executive compensation from a business issue into a political one. Critics, led by Graef Crystal, author of In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, charge that CEOs are ripping off shareholders with their outrageous salaries while running U.S. corporations into the ground. Politicians claim overpaid CEOs are the root cause of the U.S. competitiveness problem. Add a recessionary business climate to the fact that some CEOs earn 130 times more than their lowest paid employees, and you have the makings of a populist rebellion. In a bid to appease voters, Congress is considering several bills that would limit the deductibility of "excessive executive salaries," the SEC has opened the issue to shareholder comment, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board is looking at new accounting standards for granting stock options to executives as part of company compensation schemes. Andrew R. Brownstein and Morris J. Panner say it's time to put the debate back where it belongs--in a business context. The real question is not are executives paid too much, but are shareholders getting their money's worth. Most U.S. corporations use stock compensation to link company long-term performance to executive salaries. And because of the staggering market performance of U.S. corporations in the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of CEOs are actually paid in line with their performance. Rather than cut executive pay, Brownstein and Panner suggest that corporations extend incentive-based compensation plans to all employees, thus narrowing the salary gap and establishing pay for performance at every level of the organization.     

Access to services: what are the real needs?

Adequate accessibility to managed care services is typically a key determining factor when an employer decides to implement a managed care plan. And although it can be difficult for an employer to determine what constitutes adequate accessibility, it is necessary in order for managed care utilization and associated cost savings to be maximized.     

Single payer: do government-run programs meet America's needs?

The impact of a government-run program on our current health care system is not well understood by most Americans. Californians could be in for many unpleasant surprises should the single payer ballot initiative pass this November. The author examines how a single payer program attempts to meet the goals of health care reform and why it fails in many important aspects.     

Who Drove and Burst the Tech Bubble?

From 1997 to March 2000, as technology stocks rose more than five‐fold, institutions bought more new technology supply than individuals. Among institutions, hedge funds were the most aggressive investors, but independent investment advisors and mutual funds (net of flows) actively invested the most capital in the technology sector. The technology stock reversal in March 2000 was accompanied by a broad sell‐off from institutional investors but accelerated buying by individuals, particularly discount brokerage clients. Overall, our evidence supports the bubble model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), in which rational arbitrageurs fail to trade against bubbles until a coordinated selling effort occurs.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.     

Who Are the Value and Growth Investors?

This paper investigates value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents. We show that, over the life cycle, households progressively shift from growth to value as they become older and their balance sheets improve. Furthermore, investors with high human capital and high exposure to macroeconomic risk tilt their portfolios away from value. While several behavioral biases seem evident in the data, the patterns we uncover are overall remarkably consistent with the portfolio implications of risk‐based theories of the value premium.     

Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks?

This paper asks whether a single resolution authority for multinational banks is desirable. Such an authority was recently established within the European Monetary Union, where the resolution power for large banks was transferred to a Single Resolution Board. To address this issue, we consider the risk incentives of a multinational bank in the presence of different resolution frameworks and determine the welfare-efficient structure which prevents banks from excessive risk-taking. We argue that a single resolution authority is not always welfare-efficient, because it is the heterogeneity of bank resolution power which induces multinational banks to behave prudently. In severe solvency crises, the multinational authority should have the resolution power, whereas in less severe crises national resolution authorities are more efficient in avoiding excessive risk-taking on the part of multinational banks.     

Who Benefits in an Insider Negotiated Block Trade?

We examine insider negotiated block trades to investigate whether new active blockholders with special expertise create shareholder value. In contrast to existing studies, we find no reliable overall evidence of permanent stock price increases, operating changes, or improved net of industry profitability associated with these major control changes. Top executive turnover is extensive, but appears largely attributable to the block sellers’ actions, not the imposition of discipline by the block buyer. Results suggest initial shareholder gains anticipate takeovers, not improvements in profitability. When a takeover is not forthcoming, the gain disappears.     

Who Obtains Greater Discounts on Automobile Insurance Premiums?

Insurance purchasers obtain varied discounts for insurance. This paper examines what drives these differences, specifically whether the loss probability and the wealth of the insured affect the size of the premium discount in automobile insurance. To describe a bargain between a client and an insurer over premiums and coverage, we first develop a sequential insurance bargaining game where the client has an outside option to bargain with another insurer. We find that the equilibrium involves full coverage and, based on the results of comparative statics, we propose hypotheses regarding the effects of the loss probability and the wealth of the insured on the size of the premium discount. We then use a unique data set of 85,806 observations of Taiwanese automobile liability insurance for property damage to empirically test the predictions. After controlling for underwriting and macroeconomic variables, we find that both (1) the insured with a lower claim probability (as a proxy for the insured with a lower loss probability) and (2) the insured with a higher salvage value car (as a proxy for the wealthier insured) receive a greater premium discount. These results support our theoretical results.