Reconsidering the Impact of the Environment on Long-run Growth when Pollution Influences Health and Agents have a Finite-lifetime

Using an overlapping generation model à la Blanchard (1985, J Polit Econ 93:223–247) with human capital accumulation, we demonstrate that the influence of the environment on optimal growth in the long-run may be explained by the detrimental effect of pollution on life expectancy. We also show that, in such a case, greener preferences are growth- and welfare-improving in the long-run even if the ability of the agents to learn is independent of pollution and utility is additively separable. Finally, we establish that a minimum environmental policy is required to obtain a sustainable equilibrium in the market economy and that it is possible to implement a win–win environmental policy.     

Graded eco-labels: A demand-oriented approach to reduce pollution

Supplied oriented environmental policies are generally used in order to limit production related pollution. This fact is based on the hypothesis that consumers are not willing to sacrifice personal utility for a wider social gain. We suggest that widespread environmental concerns of consumers can be exploited to push producers along cleaner technological patterns. Our core assumption is that consumers would be ready to purchase cleaner products if the products' characteristics are not ‘too dissimilar’ to those of more polluting alternatives. However, due to a lack of information about non-observable product characteristics, this assumption on its own is not sufficient for ‘environmental friendly’ producers to become competitive. We show - by means of a simulation model - that only if consumers are provided with appropriate information on the greenness of products through adequate eco-labels (graded eco-labels), then producers will be pressed to implement innovations aimed at reducing the environmental impact of their products. Under two test settings - one without any certification and another with binary eco-labels - the model shows markets characterised by highly polluting technological patterns. Only in the presence of graded eco-labels, competition drives the market toward cleaner technological patterns.     

Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics

While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis: ideas, power, and institutions. For each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining “what’s in it” for environmental economics.     

What’s the aim for competition policy: optimizing market structure or encouraging innovative behaviors?

Innovation is usually thought of as a change in the fundamentals of an economy, which can require adjustments by policy-makers. The latter are usually thought as in regard to a dominant vision, which is to restore an optimal market structure, and leads to a competition policy mainly aimed at controlling for antitrust practices and limiting market power. In this paper, we favor another vision of innovation, as a discovery process that cannot allow ex ante a definition of best practices. Dealing with information issues in two different and alternative perspectives, we argue that antitrust authorities confront a market imperfection–market failure dilemma (MI–MF dilemma) which leads them to favor the existence of appreciative and discretionary policy rather than encouraging the existence of any market structure thought of as optimal as regards the current state of information. We conclude with policy implications, contrasting the EU with the US. This paper was presented at the 10th International J.A. Schumpeter Society Conference on Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Structural Transformation: Schumpeterian Legacies, Milan 2004. It owes very much to the collaboration of J-L Gaffard with M. Amendola in the recent years. However he is not responsible for the way we have taken advantage of it.     

The role of ethics and product personality in the intention to purchase organic food products: a structural equation modeling approach

The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche” market to a broader diffusion of these products.     

China??s banking system, market structure, and competitive conditions

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the market structure and the competitive conditions of the Chinese banking sector. We applied the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic on the data collected from a panel including 16 most significant Chinese banks for the period 2004–2007. Equilibrium tests and the competitive conditions tests were applied on the data. From the pooled regression in the whole period, we found that the banking sector in China for 2004–2007 was monopolistically competitive. We also show that the Chinese banks were not able to achieve high records of profitability in monopolistically competitive markets.     

Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types

We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley–Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley and Shubik in J Econ Theory 1:9–25, 1969), there might be a (fuzzy) game in which each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a game needs also to be homogeneous. We also study investment games – which are fuzzy games obtained from an economy with a finite number of agents cooperating in one or more joint projects. It is argued that the usual definition of the core is inappropriate for such a model. We therefore introduce and analyze the new notion of comprehensive core. This solution concept seems to be more suitable for such a scenario. We finally refer to the notion of feasibility of an allocation in games with a large number of players. Some of the results in this paper appear in a previous draft distributed by the name “Cooperative investment games or Population games”. An anonymous referee of Economic Theory is acknowledged for his/her comments     

Regulatory and environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach

This paper assesses the impact of regulatory and environmental factors and statistical noise on the efficiency of public transit systems within a DEA-based framework. Using a panel of Italian companies, we implement a DEA-SFA mixed approach based on [H.O. Fried et al. (2002) Journal of Productivity Analysis, 17(1–2), 157–174] to decompose DEA inefficiency measures into three components: exogenous effects, managerial inefficiency and stochastic events. Besides providing evidence on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials across companies, the results point out that managerial skills play a minor role, and emphasize the relevance of regulatory policies aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving environmental conditions of public transit networks.      

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Structural interactions in spatial panels

Until recently, considerable effort has been devoted to the estimation of panel data regression models without adequate attention being paid to the drivers of interaction amongst cross-section and spatial units. We discuss some new methodologies in this emerging area and demonstrate their use in measurement and inferences on cross-section and spatial interactions. Specifically, we highlight the important distinction between spatial dependence driven by unobserved common factors and those based on a spatial weights matrix. We argue that purely factor-driven models of spatial dependence may be inadequate because of their connection with the exchangeability assumption. The three methods considered are appropriate for different asymptotic settings; estimation under structural constraints when N is fixed and T → ∞, whilst the methods based on GMM and common correlated effects are appropriate when T ≫ N → ∞. Limitations and potential enhancements of the existing methods are discussed, and several directions for new research are highlighted.     

Exchange and evolution

This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination, adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general “generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.      

Market power, survival and accuracy of predictions in financial markets

In a standard General Equilibrium framework, we consider an agent strategically using her large volume of trade to influence asset prices to increase her consumption. We show that, as in Sandroni (Econometrica 68:1303–1341, 2000) for the competitive case, if markets are dynamically complete and some general conditions on market preferences are met then this agent’ long-run consumption will vanish if she makes less accurate predictions than the market, and will maintain her market power otherwise. We thus argue that the Market Selection Hypothesis extends to this situation of market power, in contrast to Alchian (J Pol Econ 58:211–221, 1950) and Friedman (Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953) who claimed that this selection was solely driven by the competitiveness of markets. I would like to thank T. Hens, A. Kirman and A. Sandroni for many stimulating conversations and encouragements. Two anonymous referees also provided very valuable comments.     

Food security implications of global marine catch losses due to overfishing

Excess fishing capacity and the growth in global demand for fishery products have made overfishing ubiquitous in the world’s oceans. Here we describe the potential catch losses due to unsustainable fishing in all countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas over 1950–2004. To do so, we relied upon catch and price statistics from the Sea Around Us Project as well as an empirical relationship we derived from species stock assessments by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In 2000 alone, estimated global catch losses amounted to 7–36% of the actual tonnage landed that year, resulting in a landed value loss of between 6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US). From 1950–2004, 36–53% of commercial species in 55–66% of EEZs may have been overfished. Referring to a species-level database of intrinsic vulnerability (V) based on life-history traits, it appears that susceptible species were depleted quickly and serially, with the average V of potential catch losses declining at a similar rate to that of actual landings. The three continental regions to incur greatest losses by mass were Europe, North America, and Asia—forming a geographic progression in time. But low-income and small island nations, heavily dependent on marine resources for protein, were impacted most profoundly. Our analysis shows that without the inexorable march of overfishing, ~20 million people worldwide could have averted undernourishment in 2000. For the same year, total catch in the waters of low-income food deficit nations might have been up to 17% greater than the tonnage actually landed there. The situation may be worst for Africa, which in our analysis registered losses of about 9–49% of its actual catches by mass in year 2000, thus seriously threatening progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals.     

Sustainable markets with short sales

Market objectives can conflict with long-term goals. Behind the conflict is the impatience axiom introduced by T. Koopmans to describe choices over time. The conflict is resolved here by introducing a new concept, sustainable markets. These differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in that traders have sustainable preferences and no bounds on short sales. Sustainable preferences are sensitive to the basic needs of the present without sacrificing the needs of future generations and embody the essence of sustainable development (Chichilnisky in Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257, 1996a; Res Energy Econ 73(4):467–491, 1996b). Theorems 1 and 2 show that limited arbitrage is a necessary and sufficient condition describing diversity and ensuring the existence of a sustainable market equilibrium where the invisible hand delivers sustainable as well as efficient solutions (Chichilnisky in Econ Theory 95:79–108, 1995; Chichilnisky and Heal in Econ Theory 12:163–176, 1998). In sustainable markets prices have a new role: they reflect both the value of instantaneous consumption and the value of the long-run future. The latter are connected to the independence of the axiom of choice at the foundations of mathematics (Godel 1940).     

Evolution of Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy

We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior.     

Moments of truncated <Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis> distributions

Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric literature.      

What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al.

In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unemployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s [(1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes identified here, namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term unemployment. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature. We thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for most helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.     

Persistent unemployment and co-ordination issues: an evolutionary perspective

Abstract. In this paper we look at unemployment as a phenomenon which reflects the co-ordination problems that characterize out-of-equilibrium processes of adjustment. The analysis carried out shifts the focus from structural factors to the economic process. It shows that unemployment cannot be satisfactorily explained – and policy interventions devised – by focusing only on specific characters of the technology or confining the analysis to structural factors concerning the labour market. The co-ordination mechanisms of adjustment processes rather than the fundamentals of the economy appear, in this light, as the main determinants of differences in unemployment trends in different economies; and monetary policy comes back to the center of the stage as an essential element of the working of these mechanisms. RID="*" ID="*" We thank anonymous referees for their very useful comments, and Elena Lega for the helpful support to the simulation analysis carried out. Correspondence to: J.-L. Gaffard     

Exact arbitrage and portfolio analysis in large asset markets

Summary. We provide a detailed portfolio analysis for a financial market with an atomless continuum of assets. In the context of an exact arbitrage pricing theory (EAPT), we go beyond the characterization of the existence of important portfolios (normalized riskless, mean, cost, factor and mean-variance efficient portfolios) to furnish exact portfolio compositions in terms of explicit portfolio weights. Such an analysis has not been furnished before in the context of the asymptotic arbitrage pricing theory (APT). We also characterize conditions under which a mean-variance efficient portfolio is a benchmark portfolio used in the EAPT to proxy essential risk. We illustrate our results with several examples of specific financial markets. Received: May 30, 2002; revised version: August 15, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"Some of the results reported here constituted part of Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper– No. 1139 circulated under the title “Hyperfinite Asset Pricing Theory”; additional results were obtained when Sun visited the Department of Economics at Johns Hopkins University during March 2002. This paper was presented at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU on July 6–9, 2002 Correspondence to: M. A. Khan     

国际资本流动对房地产价格的影响——基于中国的实证检验:1998-2006

Taking the inflation into consideration and making use of the quarter data of the actual foreign investment, housing and land prices in China from 1998 to 2006, this paper examines the relationship between housing prices and international capital flows using Error Correction Model (ECM) and Granger causality test. Results show that in the short run, the increase of housing prices attracts the inflow of foreign capitals; in the long run, foreign capitals help to boost the rise of housing prices. Therefore, at present, Chinese government must impose effective restrictions on the flow of foreign capital into the real estate market. __________ Translated from Caijing Wenti Yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Financial and Economic Issues), 2007, (3): 55–61